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Abstract
Liberalising the European electricity industry did not naturally produce its
intended results. Network constraints, few dominant sellers in a relatively
small market, complex market designs, price-inelastic consumers, reductions in
generation capacity, unavailability of perfect information provided in real-time,
and portfolio economics and technical characteristics induced the observed
strategic gaming behaviour of generators.
In order to understand the evolution of the electricity market, dynamic market
modelling tools can be applied. Using such models, all stakeholders can
gain insights on the sensitivity of market design parameters against potential
disturbances or market imperfections, and take necessary actions to pro-actively
address them. How the state of an interconnected electrical system evolves
after clearing the day-ahead market as organised under the European Power
Exchange (PX) model, subject to strategic gaming behaviour has been studied.
Presented contributions revolve around two research domains.
Firstly, a novel profit risk hedging offering strategy is presented. It submits
the coordinated dispatch schedule of thermal, hydropower and renewable power
plants to the market operator. The generator pursues a total profit-maximising
objective by simultaneously exercising physical and economic withholding
while explicitly taking into account underlying technical constraints and plant
economics. Price-responsive demand is realistically modelled by step-wise
decreasing curves. The consideration of portfolio flexibility to mitigate profit
risks is proven to yield higher total profit than alternative strategies.
Secondly, the offering strategy is integrated in a newly designed dynamic
electricity market model. Using multi-agent systems, each generator updates
its perception of the market environment by evaluating the performance of
historic decisions on its profit. Four learning and decision processes have been
designed. The first determines the optimal renewable energy supply quantity to
iii
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submit with hydropower as reserve, in order to minimise future self-balancing
responsibilities. The second determines whether to behave competitively or
strategically. The third determines the degree to which the generator can
strategically increase its profit. The last accounts for crossborder exchanges.
Results obtained by applying the model to case studies illustrate its validity.
Consequently, by explicitly taking into account the most relevant market design
parameters, the agent-based simulation platform is capable of answering research
questions existing electricity market simulation tools cannot address.
Beknopte samenvatting
De transformatie van een vertikaal-geïntegreerde naar een geliberaliseerde
elektriciteitsmarkt resulteerde niet in het gewenste resultaat. Een beperkte
netwerkcapaciteit, beperkte mededinging, een complexe marktstructuur, een
beperkte vraagelasticiteit, een beperkte transparantie, en technische en
economische beperkingen moedigen het strategisch gedrag van producenten aan.
Om de evolutie van de electriciteitsmarkt te onderzoeken kan gebruik gemaakt
worden van dynamische marktsimulatoren. Zij laten belanghebbenden toe
om de sensitiviteit van de marktstructuur te bepalen om zodoende de nodige
stappen te ondernemen deze pro-actief aan te pakken. Hoe de toestand van
het elektriciteitssysteem, na het sluiten van de day-ahead markt, evolueert
ten gevolge van een verandering in marktontwerp, rekening houdend met
het winstmaximaliserend gedrag van producenten, wordt onderzocht. De
wetenschappelijke bijdragen situeren zich binnen twee onderzoeksdomeinen.
Ten eerste wordt een nieuwe biedstrategie voorgesteld. Zij biedt de
marktoperator het gecoördineerde productieschema van thermische, waterkracht-
en hernieuwbare eenheden aan. De producent maximaliseert hierbij zijn totale
winst door simultaan fysiek en economisch energie achter te houden, rekening
houdend met de technische en economische beperkingen van de centrales in zijn
portfolio. De vraagelasticiteit wordt realistisch gemodelleerd als een stapsgewijs
dalende curve. De inachtneming van de flexibiliteit van het portfolio om de
onzekerheid op de winst te beperken leidt tot een grotere winst ten opzichte
van alternatieve biedstrategieën.
Ten tweede wordt de biedstrategie geïntegreerd in een nieuw dynamisch
elektriciteitsmarktmodel. Gebruik makend van een multi-agent systeem, werkt
elke producent zijn perceptie over de markt bij op basis van de impact die
historische beslissingen hadden op de uiteindelijke winst. Vier processen werden
hiervoor ontwikkeld. Het eerste bepaalt de optimale hoeveelheid hernieuwbare
v
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energie die aangeboden wordt aan de marktoperator, alsook de hoeveelheid
waterkracht die gereserveerd wordt voor zelf-balancering. Het tweede bepaalt of
de producent zich strategisch of competitief gaat gedragen. Het derde bepaalt
in hoeverre de producent zijn winst strategisch kan verhogen. Als laatste
worden de grensoverschrijdende energieuitwisselingen bepaald. Omdat het
agent-gebaseerd model rekening houdt met de meest relevante parameters in
termen van marktontwerp, is het mogelijk om onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden
die bestaande gelijkaardige modellen niet kunnen beantwoorden.
Contents
Abstract iii
Contents vii
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Context and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Need for dynamic electricity market models . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2 Importance of developing market rules and regulations . 3
1.2 Objective and scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Outline and structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
I Market Participant’s Offering Strategy 9
2 Restructured electricity market 11
2.1 Structure of liberalised electricity markets in mainland Europe 12
2.2 Market design options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
vii
viii CONTENTS
2.2.1 Domestic day-ahead markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 Congestion management mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.3 Renewable support mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Behaviour of generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1 Operating in the European electricity spot market . . . 16
2.3.2 Influence of the market structure and design . . . . . . 19
2.4 Conclusion and contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 Unit commitment and economic dispatch 23
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 State-of-the-art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.1 Thermal power plant modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.2 Hydropower plant modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.3 Wind and solar plant modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Model formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.1 Objective function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.2 Revenue calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.3 Thermal plant constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.4 Hydropower plant constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.5 Wind and solar plant constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Impact of the contributions of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4.1 Dynamic gradient limits and hot stand-by phase . . . . 48
3.4.2 Gradient costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4.3 Coordinated dispatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4 Offering Strategy 57
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
CONTENTS ix
4.2 State-of-the-art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.1 Literature overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.2 Conclusion and contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3 Risk-constrained offering strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3.1 Constructing price-quantity curves per market round . . 65
4.3.2 Determining complex price-quantity pairs . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4 Impact of the offering strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.1 Perfectly competitive market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4.2 Oligopolistic market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
II Electricity Market Simulation Platform 93
5 Electricity market models 95
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.1.1 Game theory-based optimisation models . . . . . . . . . 96
5.1.2 Supply function equilibrium models . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.1.3 Evolutionary models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.1.4 Conclusive discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2 Multi-agent systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2.1 Methodology description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2.2 Agent-based electricity market models . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2.3 Electricity market complex adaptive system . . . . . . . . 101
5.2.4 Agent-based modelling of electricity systems wholesale
power market test bed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.5 PowerACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.6 Comparison of electricity market modelling tools . . . . 103
x CONTENTS
5.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6 Agent-based electricity market model 107
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.2 Agent-based simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.2.1 Agent definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.2.2 Bidding area agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.2.3 Holding company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2.4 Agents’ interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.3 Case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.3.1 Simulation setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.3.3 Altering market design parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
III Synthesis 143
7 Conclusions and recommendations 145
7.1 Summary, contributions and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.1.1 Summary per chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.1.2 Conclusions and contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.2 Practical impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.2.1 Future of the competitive OPTIMATE tool . . . . . . . 149
7.2.2 Impact of the agent-based simulator . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.3 Model limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.3.1 Behaviour of TSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.3.2 Intra-day and balancing markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
CONTENTS xi
7.3.3 Regulatory intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.4 Recommended future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.4.1 Behaviour of bidding area agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.4.2 Perimeter definition of the simulator . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.4.3 Scenario generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
IV Appendices 155
A Market design parameter differences in Europe 157
B OPTIMATE project brochure 161
C Price evolution when behaving strategically 167
Bibliography 175
Curriculum vitae 197
List of publications 201

List of Figures
2.1 Aggregated supply and demand curve of the Iberian electricity
market as emerged for the first market round on January, 1, 2012 18
2.2 Residual demand curve faced by a new entrant, as calculated
from figure 2.1 (shaded areas correspond) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Effect of complex pairs during the first market round of January,
1, 2012 of the Iberian electricity market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1 Modelled revenue calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Modelled operational phases of the thermal unit . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 Modelled dynamic gradient limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Modelled fixed gradient limits in literature . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1 90% confidence interval of the price forecast distribution in the
electricity market of mainland Spain as calculated from January,
1 to the March, 11, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 Example of the target dispatch schedules for each residual demand
curve forecast in figure 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3 90% confidence interval of the residual demand curve forecast
distribution at market round 22 in the electricity market of
mainland Spain as calculated from the 1st to 24th of January 2012 64
4.4 Detail of figure 4.3 with the anticipated supply quantity and
anticipated market clearing price indicated . . . . . . . . . . . 64
xiii
xiv LIST OF FIGURES
4.5 Distribution of the emerging market clearing prices in the Iberian
electricity market as calculated from January, 1, to March, 11,
2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Comparative assessment of the performance of each offering
strategy to obtain maximum profit after the market clearing
mechanism, assuming a competitive market environment . . . . . 81
4.7 Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from
being accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by the
Market Operator (MO) when pursuing the ”expected literature
benchmark” benchmarked against the ”full literature benchmark”
strategy, in a competitive market environment. . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8 Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from
being accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by
the MO when pursuing the ”presented complex” benchmarked
against the ”full literature benchmark” strategy, in a competitive
market environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9 Accepted, actual and optimal dispatch schedule when pursuing
the benchmark offering strategy, during the worst performing
market session compared to the ”presented complex” strategy . 85
4.10 Accepted, actual and optimal dispatch schedule when pursuing
the ”presented complex” offering strategy using 7 price scenarios,
during the best performing market session compared to the
benchmark strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.11 Offer curves for each strategy, as submitted for hour 16, during
the presented strategy’s best performing market session compared
to the benchmark strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.12 Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from
being accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by
the MO when pursuing the ”presented simple” benchmarked
against the ”presented complex” strategy, in a competitive market
environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.13 90% confidence interval of the residual demand curve forecast
distribution for market round 5, in the electricity market of
mainland Spain as calculated from January, 1 to March, 24, 2012 87
LIST OF FIGURES xv
4.14 90% confidence interval of the residual demand curve forecast
distribution for market round 20, in the electricity market of
mainland Spain as calculated from January, 1 to the March, 24,
2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.15 Comparative assessment of the performance of each offering
strategy to obtain maximum profit after the market clearing
mechanism, assuming an oligopolistic market environment . . . 89
4.16 Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from
being accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by
the MO when pursuing the ”expected literature benchmark”
benchmarked against the ”full literature benchmark” strategy, in
a oligopolistic market environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.17 Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from
being accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by
the MO when pursuing the ”presented complex” benchmarked
against the ”full literature benchmark” strategy, in a oligopolistic
market environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.1 Simplified class diagram of the agent-based simulator with the
Thermal power plant (Th), Run-of-River power plant (RoR),
Pumped-Hydro Storage plant (PHS), Load (L), Photo-Voltaic
power plant (PV), Wind power plant (W) class types . . . . . . . 111
6.2 Example of mapping the European geographical environment to
the definition of clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.3 Decision process for creating price-quantity pairs . . . . . . . . 115
6.4 Merging residual demand forecast scenarios with crossborder
trade scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.5 Learning process for reinforcing the status . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.6 Decision process for selecting the status to pursue . . . . . . . . 120
6.7 Decision process for selecting residual demand curve forecast
scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.8 Example of reinforcing crossborder trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.9 Evaluating export opportunities and import threats . . . . . . 125
6.10 Calculating the import threat and export opportunity price-
quantity pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
6.11 Decision process for selecting the best-response crossborder trade
scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.12 Coordinating export opportunities and import threats . . . . . 128
6.13 Decisions and actions the bidding area agent must undertake, in
terms of the agent-based timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.14 Actions from the bidding area agent’s perspective . . . . . . . . 130
6.15 Demand per market round, per bus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.16 Dynamic five-bus test system used to validate the AMES simulator132
6.17 State of the system in market round 5 when all bidding area
agents behave competitively . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.18 State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding area
agents behave competitively . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.19 State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding area
agents behave strategically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.20 State of the system in market round 5 when all bidding area
agents behave strategically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.21 State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding
area agents behave competitively in a Flow-Based (FB) market
coupling environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.22 State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding area
agents behave strategically in a FB market coupling environment 139
6.23 State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding
area agents behave strategically with a market ceiling price of
e32.40/MWh in bidding area B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
C.1 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area A
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market
coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
C.2 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area A
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling . 169
C.3 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area B
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market
coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
LIST OF FIGURES xvii
C.4 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area B
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling . 170
C.5 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area C
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market
coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
C.6 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area C
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling . . 171
C.7 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area D
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market
coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
C.8 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area D
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling . 172
C.9 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area E
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market
coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
C.10 Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area E
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling . 173

List of Tables
2.1 Market design parameters influencing generator’s behaviour . . 20
3.1 Price Data and Optimal Generation Schedule . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Unit characteristics per plant type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Residual demand curve characteristics and optimal oligopolistic
dispatch schedule solutions per applied method . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 Optimal dispatch schedule solutions per applied method, given
residual demand curves shown in table 3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1 Thermal Generation Portfolio Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 Downward profit risk, measured in terms of the percentage of
maximum profit obtained in 90% of all cases . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Downward profit risk, measured in terms of the percentage of
maximum profit obtained in 90% of all cases . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 Agents’ characteristics in three agent-based electricity market
modelling tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.1 Specialised subagents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.2 Branch characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.3 Agents’ characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
xix
xx LIST OF TABLES
6.4 Market clearing prices in case all agents behave competitively
[e/MWh] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.5 Market clearing prices in market round 18 in case all agents
behave strategically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.6 Market clearing prices in market round 5 in case all agents behave
strategically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.7 Market clearing prices in case all agents behave competitvely
under FB market coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.8 Market clearing prices in case all agents behave strategically
under FB market coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.9 Market clearing prices in case all agents behave strategically with
a market ceiling price of e32.40/MWh in bidding area B . . . . . 141
A.1 Summary of market design parameters for selected West-
European bidding areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
A.2 Summary of market design parameters for selected Central-
European bidding areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
A.3 Summary of market design parameters for selected North- and
South-European bidding areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Glossary
bidding area A geographical area with common rules for
organised day-ahead and intra-day markets.
Examples of bidding areas are Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany, the Iberian Peninsula.
centralised planner Calculates a plan based on information received
from individual entities. The plan is fed back to
the entities as an instruction on how to behave.
competitive behaviour Behaviour in case no barriers to competition,
such as infrastructure constraints or technical
generation constraints, are present. Competitive
behaviour approaches the behaviour of operating
at variable cost the less market power potential
the market participant has.
control area A geographical area with common rules for
balancing service procurement and imbalance
settlements. Examples of control blocks are
Belgium, the Netherlands, the Iberian Peninsula.
economic withholding Artificially pricing price-quantity pairs away
from actual cost levels.
future energy Hydropower the plant can discharge during the
current market session, on top of the planned
energy. This additional hydropower is more
valuable than the water value.
xxi
xxii Glossary
gate closure time The deadline at which all price-quantity pairs for
all market rounds in the market session have to
be submitted to the market operator by market
participants active in the bidding area.
generator A firm whose core operation consists in coverting
one form of energy into electrical energy.
hybrid agent An agent attempting to balance reactive and
practive behaviour. Reactive behaviour responds
to changes in the environment without complex
reasoning while proactive behaviour requires
more complex learning methods.
market operator A special-purpose independent entity responsible
for hosting the day-ahead and intra-day
electricity market trading platform. It is charged
exclusively with clearing and settling wholesale
transactions (price-quantity pairs).
market power The ability of a firm to profitably maintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant period
of time (Werden, 1996). These firms are referred
to as price makers, others as price takers. Being
a price maker does not necessarily imply that
the market power potential is actually exercised.
physical withholding Artificially removing capacity of efficient plants
from the market, resulting in the need for
inefficient, more expensive plants to supply,
thereby increasing the market clearing price.
planned energy Hydropower which is planned to be discharged
during the current market session. This energy
is priced at the water value and provides a
maximum target discharge limit to ensure the
longer-term profitability of the plant.
price-quantity pair A market instrument indicating at which price
a generator (retail company, large consumer) is
willing to sell (buy) a certain energy quantity,
in which market round. An inflexible minimum
quantity is accompanied with a flexible quantity
up to the pair’s maximum volume. Simple price-
quantity pairs are valid for a single market round,
complex pairs span multiple market rounds.
Glossary xxiii
residual energy Unused hydropower from previous market
sessions or the energy needed to be discharged
in order to avoid reaching the reservoir capacity
limit. Residual hydropower is less valuable than
the hydropower the plant is expected to have
available during the market session.
retail company Electricity retailing is the final process in
the delivery of electricity from generation to
the consumer. Electricity retailers aggregate
demand from consumers to the wholesale market.
strategic gaming
behaviour
Behaviour resulting from a decrease in competi-
tion because of a favourable location in the grid.
It deviates from competitive behaviour as long
as barriers to competition are instated. Strategic
gaming behaviour approaches the behaviour of
a monopolist the more market power potential
the market participant has.
transmission system
operator
An entity entrusted with transporting energy in
the form of electrical power or gas on a national
or regional level, using fixed infrastructure.
Acronyms
ACE Agent-based Computational Economics.
AMES Agent-based Modelling of Electricity Systems
wholesale power market test bed.
ARIMA Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average.
BA Bidding Area.
BAA Bidding Area Agent.
CA Control Area.
CAA Control Area Agent.
CWE Central Western European.
ED Economic Dispatch.
EMCAS Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System.
ENTSO-E the European Network of Transmission System
Operators for Electricity.
FB Flow-Based.
GLPK GNU Linear Programming Kit.
L Load.
LSE Load Serving Entity.
MILP Mixed-Integer Linear Problem.
MO Market Operator.
NTC Net Transfer Capacity.
xxiv
Acronyms xxv
OMIE Operador del Mercado Ibérico de Energía.
OPTIMATE Open Platform to Test Integration in new
MArkeT designs of massive intermittent Energy
sources dispersed in several regional power
markets.
PCR Price Coupling of Regions.
PHS Pumped-Hydro Storage plant.
PV Photo-Voltaic power plant.
PX Power Exchange.
RES Renewable Energy Sources.
RoR Run-of-River power plant.
RTE Réseau de Transport d’Électricité.
Th Thermal power plant.
TSO Transmission System Operator.
UC Unit Commitment.
W Wind power plant.

List of Symbols
Binary Variables
L(b, t) Quantity of price-quantity pair b is partially met by the
generator, i.e. marginal, at market round t. [-]
L(kt, i, t, r) Power level of operational zone r of thermal unit i of plant
kt is fully used at market round t [-]
νD(kh, t) hydropower plant kh is generating electricity by discharging
water at market round t [-]
νD(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt decreases its power level from
market round t to t+ 1 [-]
νP(kh, t) hydropower plant kh consumes energy by pumping water
at market round t [-]
νU(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt increases its power level from
market round t to t+ 1 [-]
ω(kr, t,m) Coordinated dispatch scenario m is pursued for renewable
energy source kr at market round t [-]
φ^D(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt shuts down at market round t
[-]
φD(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt operates in its shut-down phase
at market round t [-]
φH(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt operates in its hot stand-by
phase at market round t [-]
xxvii
xxviii LIST OF SYMBOLS
φ^HD(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt goes out of hot-standby at
market round t [-]
φ^HS(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt goes into hot stand-by at market
round t [-]
φP(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt operates in its production phase
at market round t [-]
φ^S(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt starts up at market round t [-]
φS(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt operates in its start-up phase
at market round t [-]
ζ(kt, i, t) Thermal unit i of plant kt is operational [-]
Positive Continuous Variables
C(t) Total incurred cost for committing and dispatching the
portfolio at market round t [e]
CD(kt, i, t) Anticipated shut-down cost of submitting the commitment
of thermal unit i of plant kt on the day-ahead market at
market round t [e]
CD(kt, t) Aggregated anticipated shut-down cost of submitting the
commitment of thermal plant kt on the day-ahead market
at market round t [e]
CD(t) Aggregated anticipated shut-down cost of submitting the
commitment of the thermal plants in the portfolio on the
day-ahead market, at market round t [e]
CG(t) Aggregated anticipated supplementary maintenance cost
of submitting the dispatch of the thermal plants in the
portfolio on the day-ahead market, at market round t [e]
CH(t) Aggregated anticipated opportunity cost of submitting the
dispatch of the hydropower plants in the portfolio on the
day-ahead market, at market round t [e]
CP(kt, i, t) Anticipated operational generation cost of submitting the
dispatch of thermal unit i of plant kt on the day-ahead
market at market round t [e]
CP(kt, t) Aggregated anticipated operational generation cost of
submitting the dispatch of thermal plant kt on the day-
ahead market at market round t [e]
LIST OF SYMBOLS xxix
CP(t) Aggregated anticipated operational generation cost of
submitting the dispatch of the thermal plants in the
portfolio on the day-ahead market, at market round t
[e]
CR(t) Aggregated anticipated cost of submitting the quantities
of the renewable plants in the portfolio on the day-ahead
market, at market round t [e]
CS(kt, i, t) Anticipated start-up cost of submitting the commitment
of thermal unit i of plant kt on the day-ahead market at
market round t [e]
CS(kt, t) Aggregated anticipated start-up cost of submitting the
commitment of thermal plant kt on the day-ahead market
at market round t [e]
CS(t) Aggregated anticipated start-up cost of submitting the
commitment of the thermal plants in the portfolio on the
day-ahead market, at market round t [e]
CG(kt, i, t) Anticipated supplementary maintenance cost of submitting
the dispatch of thermal unit i of plant kt on the day-ahead
market, at market round t [e]
CG(kt, t) Aggregated anticipated supplementary maintenance cost
of submitting the dispatch of thermal plant kt on the
day-ahead market, at market round t [e]
κD(kt, i, t) Maximum dynamically calculated downward gradient limit
of thermal unit i of plant kt at market round t [MW/market
round]
κD(kt, i, t) Minimum dynamically calculated downward gradient limit
of thermal unit i of plant kt at market round t [MW/market
round]
κU(kt, i, t) Maximum dynamically calculated upward gradient limit of
thermal unit i of plant kt at market round t [MW/market
round]
κU(kt, i, t) Minimum dynamically calculated upward gradient limit of
thermal unit i of plant kt at market round t [MW/market
round]
xxx LIST OF SYMBOLS
µ(t) Total anticipated day-ahead revenue obtained by submit-
ting the coordinated dispatch of the portfolio on the day-
ahead market, at market round t [e]
P(kt, i, t) Envisaged power level of unit i of thermal plant kt at
market round t [MW]
P(kt, i, t, r) power level from operational zone r of thermal unit i of
plant kt at market round t [MW]
Q(b, t) Energy supplied by the generator to meet the demand of
price-quantity pair b at market round t [MWh]
Q(k, t) Envisaged energy supply by plant k at market round t
[MWh]
Q(kh, t) Envisaged energy supply by hydropower plant kh at market
round t [MWh]
Q(kr, t) Envisaged energy supply by renewable energy source kr at
market round t [MWh]
Q(kt, i, t) Envisaged energy supply by thermal unit i of plant kt at
market round t [MWh]
Q(kt, t) Aggregated envisaged energy supply by thermal plant kt
at market round t [MWh]
Q(t) Total anticipated energy generation by the portfolio at
market round t [MWh]
V(kh, t) Envisaged power level of residual energy by plant kh at
market round t [MW]
Vr(kh, t) Withholding of the available residual power level of
hydropower plant kh at market round t [MW]
W(kh, t) Envisaged power level of planned energy by plant kh at
market round t [MW]
Wr(kh, t) Withholding of the available planned power level of
hydropower plant kh at market round t [MW]
X(kh, t) Envisaged power level of future energy by plant kh at
market round t [MW]
Xr(kh, t) Withholding of the available future power level of hy-
dropower plant kh at market round t [MW]
LIST OF SYMBOLS xxxi
Y(kr, t) Envisaged power level of plant kr to submit to the day-
ahead market at market round t [MW]
Zr(kh, t) Withholding of the available power consumption input
level of hydropower plant kh at market round t [MW]
Indices
b(t)(1 . . . B(t)) Price-quantity pair of the residual demand curve the
generator faces at market round t, containing B(t) price-
quantity pairs [-]
f(1 . . . F) The number of historic crossborder trade scenarios to be
withheld from the database of historical assessments [-]
i(1 . . . I(kt)) Unit of thermal plant kt containing a total of I(kt) units
[-]
k(1 . . . K) Plant in the generator’s portfolio, consisting of K plants of
any plant type [-]
kh(1 . . . Kh) hydropower plant in the generator’s portfolio, consisting
of Kh plants of the hydropower plant type [-]
kr(1 . . . Kr) Renewable energy source in the generator’s portfolio,
consisting of Kr plants of the renewable energy source
type [-]
kt(1 . . . Kt) Thermal plant in the generator’s portfolio, consisting of
Kt plants of the thermal plant type [-]
m(1 . . .M(kr) One of the M coordinated dispatch scenarios between the
submitted power level of a renewable energy source and
reserved hydropower [-]
n(1 . . . N) The number of anticipated residual demand curve scenarios
to be applied to the scheduling problem [-]
n1(1 . . . N1) The number of historic residual demand curves to be
withheld from the residual demand curve distribution [-]
q(1 . . . Q) The subset of price-quantity pairs to be submitted to the
MO. A price-quantity pair tuple representing the supply
of energy to the market by either one for each renewable
energy source, one for each unit of each thermal plant and
one for each type of dispatched energy of each hydropower
plant [-]
xxxii LIST OF SYMBOLS
r(i(k))(1 . . . R) Allowed operational zone of unit i of plant k, able to
operate in R operational zones [-]
t(d)(1 . . . T(d)) Market round t in market session d containing T(d) market
rounds [-]
Parameters
α User-defined parameter which denotes the significance level
of the market clearing price forecast distribution per market
round, per agent [-]
β User-defined parameter which denotes the significance level
of the renewable injection forecast distribution per market
round, per agent [-]
CDD(kt, i, tu) Shut-down cost plus supplementary maintenance cost
incurred by thermal unit i of plant kt for shutting down
after an operational duration of tu [e]
CP0(kt, i) Sunk cost for dispatching thermal unit i of plant kt at
market round t [e/market round]
CPH(kt, i) Sunk cost for operating thermal unit i of plant kt in the
hot stand-by phase at market round t [e/market round]
CSU(kt, i, td) Start-up cost plus supplementary maintenance cost in-
curred by thermal unit i of plant kt for starting up after a
duration of inactivity td [e]
δ User-defined parameter which denotes the significance level
of the residual demand curve forecast distribution per
market round, per agent [-]
P The price granularity imposed by the MO [e/MWh]
ηt(kt, i, r) Fuel cost of thermal unit i of plant kt at market round t
when operating in operational zone r [e/(MW * market
round)]
ηh,F(kh, d) Water value for the supply of future energy by hydropower
plant kh during market session d [e/MWh]
ηh,P(kh, d) Water value for the supply of planned energy by hy-
dropower plant kh during market session d [e/MWh]
ηh,R(kh, d) Water value for the supply of residual energy by hydropower
plant kh during market session d [e/MWh]
LIST OF SYMBOLS xxxiii
ηh,Z(kh, d) Water value for the consumption of electricity to pump
water by hydropower plant kh during market session d
[e/MWh]
γ Market round granularity [hour/market round]
CGD(kt, i, t, tD∼) Supplementary maintenance cost incurred by thermal unit
i of plant kt for ramping down at market round t, tD∼
market rounds after having ramped up [e]
CGU(kt, i, t, tU∼) Supplementary maintenance cost incurred by thermal unit
i of plant kt for ramping up at market round t, tU∼ market
rounds after having ramped down [e]
H(kr, t) Maximum power level limit to be reserved from hydropower
plants at market round t in order to coordinate with the
dispatch of renewable energy source kr [MW]
H(kr, t) Minimum power level limit to be reserved from hydropower
plants at market round t in order to coordinate with the
dispatch of renewable energy source kr [MW]
κD(kt, i) Technical gradient of the predefined shut-down power
trajectory of thermal unit i of plant kt when operating in
the shut-down phase [MW/market round]
κPD(kt, i) Maximum technical downward gradient limit of thermal
unit i of plant kt when operating in the production phase
[MW/market round]
κPU(kt, i) Maximum technical upward gradient limit of thermal unit
i of plant kt when operating in the production phase
[MW/market round]
κU(kt, i) Technical gradient of the predefined start-up power
trajectory of thermal unit i of plant kt when operating in
the start-up phase [MW/market round]
λ(b, t) Price of price-quantity pair b at market round t [e/MWh]
λ(t) The market ceiling price imposed by the MO in the bidding
area [e/MWh]
λ(t) The market floor price imposed by the MO in the bidding
area [e/MWh]
λn(t) The anticipated residual demand curve, according to
scenario n, at market round t [e/MWtime]
xxxiv LIST OF SYMBOLS
P(kt, i) Maximum stable power level of unit i of plant kt [MW]
P(kt, i) Minimum stable power level of unit i of plant kt [MW]
PD(kh) Maximum technical power level of hydropower plant kh
[MW]
PD(kh) Minimum technical power level of hydropower plant kh
[MW]
pi(kr, t) Subsidies allocated to renewable energy source kr at market
round t [e/(MW * market round)]
Pµ(kr, t) Mean forecast power level of renewable energy source kr,
at market round t [MW]
PP(kh) Maximum technical power consumption input level of
hydropower plant kh [MW]
PP(kh) Minimum technical power consumption input level of
hydropower plant kh [MW]
ψ(kt, i, r) Upper power level limit of operational zone r of thermal
unit i of plant kt [MW]
ψ(kt, i, r) Lower power level limit of operational zone r of thermal
unit i of plant kt [MW]
Pσ(kr, t) Standard deviation of the forecast power level of renewable
energy source kr, at market round t [MW]
Q(b, t) Maximum quantity to be met when supplying price-
quantity pair b at market round t [MWh]
Q(b, t) Minimum quantity to be met in order to supply price-
quantity pair b at market round t [MWh]
QF(kh, d) Available extra energy to be discharged during market
session d by hydropower plant kh [MW * market round]
QP(kh, d) Available planned energy to be discharged during market
session d by hydropower plant kh [MW * market round]
QR(kh, d) Available residual energy to be discharged during market
session d by hydropower plant kh [MW * market round]
R(kr, t) Maximum allowed upward deviation from the expected
power level of renewable energy source kr at market round
t [%]
LIST OF SYMBOLS xxxv
R(kr, t) Maximum allowed downward deviation from the expected
power level of renewable energy source kr at market round
t [%]
ρc(kr, t,m) The expected balancing costs associated to renewable
energy source kr at market round t when pursuing
coordinated dispatch scenario m [e]
ρh(kr, t,m) The reserved power level of hydropower plant kr in scenario
m [MW]
ρr(kr, t,m) The power level of renewable energy source kr in scenario
m [MW]
τOFF(kt, i) Minimum duration thermal unit i of plant kt has
to be inactive before starting up without incurring
supplementary maintenance costs [market round]
τON(kt, i) Minimum duration thermal unit i of plant kt has to
be operational before shutting down without incurring
supplementary maintenance costs [market round]
tD≡(kt, i) Minimum duration for which the power level has to
be stable before ramping down after having ramped up
in order to avoid supplementary maintenance costs for
thermal unit i of plant kt [market round]
tU≡(kt, i) Minimum duration for which the power level has to
be stable before ramping up after having ramped down
in order to avoid supplementary maintenance costs for
thermal unit i of plant kt [market round]
Z(kh, t) Envisaged power consumption input level of plant kh at
market round t [MW]

Chapter 1
Introduction
The European electricity industry is constantly evolving in terms of network
infrastructure, market operation and regulations. Electricity markets are
considered of major importance in this context as they support an efficient use
of existing resources while acting as a catalyst to combat future challenges.
Section 1.1 presents the motivation for designing, implementing and validating an
agent-based dynamic electricity market simulation platform. It also provides the
motivation to describe realistic behaviour of generators, exploiting opportunities
for strategic gaming behaviour and including inherent complexities of the
electricity market. Research objectives and the central research question are
mentioned in section 1.2. The outline and structure are discussed in section 1.3.
1.1 Context and motivation
1.1.1 Need for dynamic electricity market models
In 2007, the European Commission adopted the third package of legislative
proposals for electricity markets (European Commission, 2008). The package
consists of a number of measures and proposals to complement existing rules:
separating generation and supply from transmission networks (i.e. functional
unbundling), facilitating crossborder collaboration and trade, strengthening
national regulators, and increasing market transparency (European Commission,
2007a; European Commission, 2007b).
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The package should promote sustainability by stimulating energy efficiency and
guaranteeing access to the energy market for smaller companies investing in
renewable energy. A competitive market is argued to ensure greater security
of supply by improving the conditions for investments in power plants and
transmission networks.
The third package complements the rules of the second Energy Package,
which came into force in 2003, in an attempt of moving toward a single
competitive European market, and illustrates the overall experience with
liberalising electricity markets: competitive results are not a natural product
of liberalisation. In contrast, national electricity markets in Europe have gone
through an evolutionary transition in terms of market design, each design the
result of incremental adjustments in market architecture and market rules in
order to gradually achieve a truly competitive electricity market. (Hogan, 2002).
The third package is since complemented with further rules in order to facilitate
the free flow of electricity across Europe (European Commission, 2013b).
In order to understand the impact of different reform proposals on the operation
of the market, dynamic market modelling tools can be applied. Even though
such models do not forecast the future state of the market, they do evaluate
whether the market would operate and evolve as intended. Using such models,
insights on the sensitivity of market design parameters against potential shocks
or market imperfections could be generated and pro-actively addressed.
Also market participants benefit from applying dynamic market modelling tools.
The evolution of the electricity market to an unfamiliar environment indeed
poses two risks (Larsen & Bunn, 1999). Firstly, it results in a market where
all market participants have very little understanding of how it would operate
in the short term. Secondly, the lack of historical data on the evolution of the
market hazes the long term evolution of the market.
From a Market Operator (MO) or Transmission System Operator (TSO) point
of view, such model complements insights on the impact of Flow-Based (FB)
market coupling gained by external parallel test runs (CASC, 2014). With
the anticipated increase of international electricity trade between European
countries and renewable power generation, the exchange of energy is expected
to grow as well. In order to efficiently exploit available interconnector capacities,
FB market coupling on the day-ahead market is proposed as an efficient way to
decrease average annual electricity prices and overall system operation costs.
Policy coordination — i.e. a common strategic view on security of European
energy supply, efficient use of available resources and free international electricity
trade — are necessary in order to combat future challenges of economic growth
and climate change (Capros & Mantzos, 2005).
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1.1.2 Importance of developing market rules and regulations
1.1.2.1 Intentional strategic gaming behaviour
Liberalising electricity markets did not produce the expected competitive results
due to strategic gaming behaviour. Liberalising the British Electricity Spot
Market for example lead to an effective duopoly (Green & Newbery, 1992).
Although a third generator was set to enter the market with base load production
plants to increase competition, the allowance of entry of only a single additional
supplier was heavily criticised for being insufficient to encourage competitive
behaviour (Green, 1996). Divestiture initiatives resulting in at least five successor
generators were argued to lead to lower levels of strategic gaming behaviour and
electricity prices. It would furthermore result in less inefficiencies than incurred
at the time through generation capacity expansion.
The inadequacy of the England and Wales electricity market rules and structure
governing its operation has been pointed out as culprit for its failure (Wolak
& Patrick, 2001). It is argued that few major generators were presented with
opportunities to earn revenue substantially in excess of their variable costs.
The strategic use of market rules for their own advantage was supported by
an analysis of four fiscal years of emerging market clearing prices, traded
energy volumes and submitted price-quantity pairs to the MO. Empirical
research studying prices and volumes of bilateral contracts and the spot
market supports the notion that changing the market design would increase
competition (Herguera, 2000; Green, 1999; Wolfram, 1999).
Finally, the constrained physical electrical network facilitated the exercise of
market power in the British Electricity Spot Market (Cardell et al., 1997). The
fundamental concentration of generation ownership1 led to strong market power
an adequate market has to address (Joskow & Schmalensee, 1988; Schmalensee
& Golub, 1984). From this perspective, the TSO has a key supporting role
within the operation of the electricity market in order to provide a foundation of
efficient pricing and low-barrier access (Hogan, 1998; Hogan, 2000). A market
in which the TSO overcomes the barriers posed by network constraints by
means of coordinated dispatch was proposed (Singh et al., 1998). The efficient
management of costs associated with transmission constraints in such market
reinforces the need for market analysis with more realistic network models.
Intentionally taking advantage of few dominant sellers in a relatively small
market, infrastructure constraints, and the inadequacy of market designs to
represent the essential complexity in electricity systems was also observed in
California (Borenstein et al., 2000; Hogan, 2003; Blumstein et al., 2002), Norway,
1An isolated market created by transmission bottlenecks.
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Australia and Canada2. Two major types of market power were distinguished:
economic withholding and physical withholding (Lusan et al., 1999). Economic
withholding occurs when a generator inflates the market clearing price at which
the supplied energy is sold above competitive price levels. When pursuing
physical withholding, a generator increases its profit by restricting energy
generated. The artificial supply scarcity increases the price which compensates
for the decrease in volume sold if successfully exercised.
1.1.2.2 Inherent complexities of electricity trading
Intentional exercise of market power is however not the only cause of an inefficient
use of available resources. Firstly, to ensure the reliability of the electricity
system, electrical energy consumed and generated have to match. Due to the
stochastic nature of electricity consumption, energy demand cannot be perfectly
predicted at the time generators need to decide their Unit Commitment (UC)
and Economic Dispatch (ED) schedules. Demand uncertainty introduces the
exposure of a generator to profit risks. As risks always need to be offset by
an adequate reward, it is a natural behaviour of a generator to cover them by
shading its prices to higher-than-competitive levels.
Secondly, the portfolio’s technical and economic constraints prevent a generator
to continuously follow demand in the absence of economically viable short-
term storage plants and as long as consumers are unable to respond to real-
time prices. Additionally, available market instruments are not capable to
fully reflect these underlying temporal complexities, leading to unintended
dispatch inefficiencies (Cramton, 2003). Both are impediments to the
emergence of competitive market clearing prices, even if all generators behave
competitively (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2000).
Finally, imperfect market information provided with delay prevents an efficient
use of available resources (Albuyeh & Kumar, 2003; Qiu, 2013). The publication
of real-time information is a prerequisite for a generator to efficiently control
their portfolio consisting of geographically dispersed plants which simultaneously
participate in multiple markets, organised in different time frames.
Thus, although the market clearing price is locally increased, an expensive plant
must run in order to ensure local electricity system stability, for the alternative
of forced load shedding induces a much higher cost (Jurewitz & Walther, 1997).
Therefore the price increase can be seen as a temporary locational rent. Allowing
generators to earn this rent in the short term promotes new local investments
in the long term, thereby spurring an efficient use of resources.
2No symptoms of strategic gaming behaviour were found in the PJM or New York electricity
market.
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1.2 Objective and scope
In hindsight, the myriad problems related to observed behaviour of generators
could have been anticipated given network constraints, few dominant sellers in
a relatively small market, complex market designs, price-inelastic consumers,
reductions in generation capacity, unavailability of perfect information provided
in real-time, and portfolio economics and technical characteristics (Woo et al.,
2003; Borenstein et al., 2008).
This does not mean the industry was better off remaining strictly regulated.
Although the restructured electricity markets may be argued to be more costly
for consumers than their regulated predecessors in the short term, liberalisation
is indispensable for evolving to a more efficient long term market equilibrium.
Indeed, maintaining reliable electricity grids without building lots of new
transmission lines and conventional power plants requires expansive and open
electricity markets and new forms of regulations.
The main research objectives of the work are summarised as:
• Designing, implementing and validating strategic gaming behaviour,
exercised by generators while accurately taking into account competitors’
and consumers’ behaviour, market design parameters, unavailability of
perfect information, and portfolio economics and technical characteristics
• Designing, implementing and validating an agent-based simulation
platform capable of assessing the robustness of a specific market design
subject to the strategic gaming behaviour of market participants
Hence, the central research question is formulated as
How would the state of an interconnected electrical system evolve after clearing
the day-ahead market as organised under the European Power Exchange (PX)
model, subject to strategic gaming behaviour?
Such a model can be applied to support policy decision making processes
aiming at facilitating day-ahead crossborder trade between European countries,
ensuring an efficient use of limited network capacity and massively integrating
Renewable Energy Sources (RES). The availability of such a common platform
would facilitate the convergence towards an efficient European market.
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1.3 Outline and structure
The central research question is solved by addressing three lower level research
question categories.
Market participant’s offering strategy Which important market designs, instated
in European electricity markets, influence the behaviour of generators
(chapter 2)? How are the inherent complexities of electricity trading
accurately modelled and how is intentional strategic gaming behaviour
formally described (chapters 3 and 4)?
Electricity market simulation platform Which modelling techniques are suited
to dynamically simulate the operation of the electricity market and what
are their limitations (chapters 5)? How to create a dynamic simulation
model overcoming the limitations of alternative, existing ones (6)?
Synthesis What are the contributions, the practical relevance and limitations
of the deveoped dynamic simulation model? (chapter 7)
Part I presents the strategic gaming behaviour a generator pursues when
submitting price-quantity pairs to the MO of the day-ahead market. The
offering strategy integrates portfolio constraints and plant economics, models
strategic gaming behaviour by means of step-wise demand curves, and creates
step-wise discrete supply curves for various market designs parameters.
Chapter 2 introduces the market designs and structures which shape existing
European day-ahead electricity markets. By linking their effect on market
participants’ profit, the chapter provides the motivation to design, implement
and validate a novel profit-maximising offering strategy.
Chapter 3 presents a novel coordinated UC and ED Mixed-Integer Linear
Problem (MILP) model for finding the scheduling solution of a portfolio
consisting of thermal, hydropower and RES plants. The model approaches the
problem from the perspective of strategic and flexible dispatch as is required
from a generator operating in a power system characterised by massive RES
integration. Profit of a generator is shown to increase in electricity systems
with medium to high price volatility.
Chapter 4 presents the novel profit risk hedging offering strategy. Both simple
and complex price-quantity pairs are created with the objective to mitigate the
emergence of a significantly infeasible accepted dispatch schedule. While the
offering strategies found in literature mostly set prices of price-quantity pairs
equal to competitive or expected price levels, the introduced offering strategy is
shown to outperform the former when applied to a realistic market setup.
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Part II presents the design of the developed agent-based model. Assessing
its performance in an alternative, open-source short-term electricity market
modelling tool indicates the presented agent-based simulator models the required
complexity to provide a common framework to all stakeholders in order to
facilitate the convergence towards an efficient European target market design.
Chapter 5 presents the motivation for the design, implementation and validation
of a novel simulation platform to dynamically simulate the operation of the
European electricity market. A review of the existing theoretical modelling
frameworks indicates that a hybrid model — consisting of an evolutionary model
complemented by a detailed supply function equilibrium model — produces
results close to what has been observed in reality. A discussion of the properties
of three recently developed large-scale Agent-based Computational Economics
(ACE) models reveals the need to create a simulator whose methodology is
supported by a sound theoretical framework in terms of generators’ strategic
learning behaviour, subject to relevant market design parameters.
Chapter 6 presents the large-scale ACE model for the operation of short term
electricity markets. The simulation tool advances the state-of-the-art in five
ways. Firstly, generators own a portfolio consisting of thermal, hydropower and
RES plants. Secondly, both a transmission grid with limited capacity as well as
price-responsive demand can be modelled. Thirdly, generators pursue a total
profit-maximisation objective by combining physical and economic withholding
strategy while explicitly taking into account underlying technical constraints
and plant economics. Fourthly, each generator updates its strategic decisions
by evaluating (1) whether it is more profitable to behave competitively than
strategically, (2) which crossborder exchange opportunities or threats exist,
(3) which market power it potentially has and (4) which amount of renewable
supply should be submitted in the day-ahead market. Lastly, by explicitly
taking into account relevant market design parameters, the simulator is capable
of answering research questions other than which pricing mechanism to impose.
Chapter 7 illustrates how the presented contributions address the central research
question. Since the research work extends the efforts KU Leuven carried out as
work package leader during the OPTIMATE project, its future practical impact
is mentioned in addition to research recommendations.

Part I
Market Participant’s Offering Strategy
9

Chapter 2
Restructured electricity
market
The evolution of day-ahead electricity market designs has been caused by
discrepancies between the intended and actual operation of the market. Chapter
1 introduces strategic gaming behaviour and the inherent complexity of the
electricity market as reasons why discrepancies occur. It also illustrates how
adapting the market design and structure potentially mitigates unintended
behaviour exercised by market participants.
Any change in market design influences the maximum profit a generator is able to
obtain during each market session. A change in market design parameters hence
triggers a change in the behaviour of each affected generator. This chapter
therefore provides the motivation to design a generator’s profit-maximising
offering strategy subject to the incumbent market design.
Section 2.1 presents an overview of the operation of a European electricity
market. The instated market design parameters are discussed in section 2.2.
Their influence on the generator’s behaviour is introduced in section 2.3. These
parameters are expected to gain importance in the near future when considering
the European commitment to enhance the competitive operation of the electricity
market, to facilitate crossborder trade and to integrate Renewable Energy
Sources (RES). Finally, the conclusions of this chapter and their relevance to
following chapters are elaborated in section 2.4.
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2.1 Structure of liberalised electricity markets in
mainland Europe
More than two decades of global experience in restructuring electricity markets
resulted in the convergence to two categories of market frameworks, each one
evolved geographically in mainland Europe and the U.S.A. (Oksanen et al., 2009).
Each market framework is affected by the market restructuring process, in turn
depending on the technical conditions of the existing intra- and interregional
transmission network, the degree of horizontal restructuring and privatisation
of the electricity generation assets and the degree to which regulatory bodies
surveil the operation of the market.
Focusing on the European electricity market framework, a Market Operator
(MO) operates the Power Exchange (PX) in each bidding area to set the day-
ahead and intra-day market clearing price and traded energy volume. Generators
and retail companies are allowed to sign bilateral agreements and trader
companies are allowed to use financial markets for long-term settlements. Short-
term settlements are the responsibility of the Transmission System Operator
(TSO) in order to maintain a secure transmission system within its control area.
The borders of the control area generally coincide with the ones of the bidding
area except for Germany, where the bidding area is divided in four control areas,
and Italy where three bidding areas are allocated to a single control area.
Although long- and medium-term markets are expected to gain importance,
electricity day-ahead spot markets remain the most relevant, given they are
considered as a reference for all other transactions. In each European bidding
area, day-ahead spot market sessions are organised as a series of 24 hourly
market rounds. Each market round is organised as a double-sided, uniform
priced, sealed-bid auction in which each participating generator and retail
company submits a price-quantity curve. Each market participant is unaware
of the price-quantity curves submitted by its competitors.
Each price-quantity curve is composed of multiple price-quantity pairs. Market
participants within a bidding area must submit price-quantity pairs to the
responsible PX before the market session’s gate closure time. The aggregated
demand curve is sorted in terms of decreasing price while the aggregated supply
curve is sorted in terms of increasing price. The emerging market clearing
price is obtained by optimising social welfare, by assigning transactions from
companies who supply electrical energy at low cost to consumers or retailers
who value the electrical energy the most. From the market clearing onward up
to delivery time, the TSO is responsible to address network congestion and to
ensure reliability of the electricity system within its control area.
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Physically interconnected bidding areas are economically connected through
an implicit market coupling mechanism in which a central coordination unit
algorithm calculates the available crossborder transmission capacities between
the coupled areas. Given the available capacities, price-quantity pairs between
bidding areas are matched to maximise total social welfare in all involved bidding
areas. Each MO consequently receives either the complete set of price-quantity
pairs if price coupling is imposed, or only the exchanged volumes between
bidding areas in case of volume coupling.
The market coupling process benefits bidding areas characterised by higher prices
compared to neighbouring bidding areas since it facilitates price convergence.
The European Price Coupling of Regions (PCR) project is currently in full
progress of implementation. Following the Trilateral Market Coupling between
France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark have joined to
form the Central Western European (CWE) regional market coupling. Following
simulation tests starting from August 2013, the Northwest Market Coupling
is targeted to go live in November 2013 which then also includes the Baltic
countries, Nordic countries and the U.K (ACER, 2011). The final objective is
to couple all remaining European bidding areas by late 2014, albeit the project
has been struck with delays.
2.2 Market design options
2.2.1 Domestic day-ahead markets
Despite similarities, significant differences in terms of design and structure of the
electricity market are observed across European bidding areas (Sánchez Mará,
2010; Ockenfels et al., 2008).
Since the liberalisation of the electricity market in Europe, a variety of complex
market designs have emerged. Market designs as implemented in Belgium,
Germany, Denmark-Scandinavia-Estonia, the Iberian Peninsula, France,
Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands have recently been analysed (Barquín
et al., 2010). Additionally the analysis provides expected evolutions for each
market design per geographical region. The content of the report is concisely
described to illustrate the differences in market designs in the European context.
In general, three main design philosophies are identified: the Central-Western
European, Southern European and the Nordic Platform philosophy (Weber &
Schröder, 2010; Barquín et al., 2010; Rivero et al., 2011). A detailed overview
per country is included in appendix A.
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The Central-Western European Platform philosophy is based on non-compulsory
energy-only day-ahead and intra-day markets. Both markets require portfolio
bidding: the disclosure of generation programmes of individual power plants
when submitting price-quantity pairs is not obligatory. Market participants
must however act as a Balancing Responsible Party in order to ensure the
actual delivery of accepted energy volumes. Germany, Belgium, France, the
Netherlands and continental Denmark are categorised under this philosophy.
Each bidding area is characterised by a single price as redispatch costs to solve
internal congestion issues are socialised. Market clearing prices are typically
bounded between e−3000/MWh and e3000/MWh. The only exception is
Switzerland, which does not allow negative prices to emerge.
The Southern European Platform philosophy is based on energy price markets
complemented with capacity payment markets. Unit bidding is mandatory
and typically requires price-quantity pairs to be submitted by physical power
plants in order to determine the specific network power injection and withdrawal
points. Since unit bidding is instated, multiple1 intra-day markets are organised
daily. Available instruments therefore require the representation of technical
plant characteristics. The market participant is still allowed to rearrange its
dispatch in over-the-counter markets. Negative prices are not permitted, while
positive prices are tightly regulated, with an instated market ceiling price of
e180.3/MWh in the Iberian bidding area.
The Nordic Platform philosophy is based on energy-only day-ahead markets
connected by market splitting and a continuous intra-day market. In both
markets, portfolio bidding is required because the high integration of hydropower
generation capacity. Additionally, different zonal prices within a bidding area
arise in case security studies show a violation of internal transmission network
constraints. Negative and positive prices are permitted to a smaller extent:
prices are allowed to emerge between e−200/MWh and e2000/MWh.
Even though the Nordic, Central-West and Southern European region price
coupling targets under the PCR flagship project already involve a degree
of convergence in market structure, the duration and timing of the market
session, the granularity of the market rounds and when to organise the gate
closure times are still topics for discussion (Holttinen, 2005). After all, time
determinants in power markets have been historically established for electricity
systems dominated by traditional generation facilities subject to intertemporal
constraints. The rapid transformation of the European electricity system
towards one characterised by large-scale RES integration requires a trade-off
between time determinants which reduce forecast error risk to those which
reduce operational risks.
1Currently six intra-day markets are organised.
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2.2.2 Congestion management mechanisms
Two congestion management mechanisms exist in order to account for limited
transmission network capacity between bidding areas: market coupling and
market splitting. Both use Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) values calculated by
each TSO based on their knowledge of the transmission grid in their own control
area, followed by a reconciliation process with neighbouring TSOs. Under a
market coupling scheme, social welfare is first optimised per bidding area before
areas are coupled to maximise total welfare. Under a market splitting scheme,
social welfare is first maximised over all involved bidding areas. From this
optimal position, welfare is gradually reduced in order to alleviate violations of
the transmission network capacity.
Besides the use of NTC market coupling, the innovative Flow-Based (FB)
market coupling is proposed by the European Network of Transmission
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) to more clearly describe the
interdependency of commercial crossborder transactions between regional
bidding areas and the emerging physical power flows on all crossborder
interconnections. Although more complex calculations are required compared
to NTC, FB market coupling accounts for the netting of the induced power flow
on each interconnector between neighbouring areas by evaluating the impact of
all crossborder transactions on the particular transmission line.
The FB market coupling mechanism therefore yields a more efficient use
of the physical infrastructure, in turn facilitating crossborder trade and
supporting regional power market integration in a single pan-European electricity
market (Kurzidem, 2010). This is especially true for bidding areas located in the
highly meshed Central and West European transmission network. In longitudinal
systems such as France-Spain or Sweden-Finland, FB market coupling rather
increases market coupling complexity without providing significant advantages.
2.2.3 Renewable support mechanisms
Different RES support mechanisms spur different patterns of renewable invest-
ments needed to increase the share of renewable supply (European Commission,
2012; European Commission, 2012). Although many RES support mechanisms2
exist, even within the same bidding area, and although the same mechanisms
differ in implementation details between control areas, three broad categories
are discussed in accordance to the definitions used in the EC 2009/28
directive: feed-in tariff, market premium and tradable green certificate scheme
(European Parliament, 2009).
2Tax reductions or direct subsidies are for example also support mechanisms.
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Feed-in tariffs prioritise RES access and dispatch over any other technology.
Remuneration is independent of the market clearing price to guarantee an
adequate return on investment within a price-volatile electricity market.
Market premiums increase exposure to market clearing price volatility by only
guaranteeing a supplementary price mark-up on top of the emerging market
clearing price for the supplied renewable energy during each market round.
Dispatch and remuneration are therefore only partially guaranteed because the
generator bears the RES injection forecast risk.
The tradable green certificates scheme remunerates the RES generator with green
certificates for each supplied unit of renewable energy. Each green certificate
is obtained in addition to the revenue obtained by supplying the market with
renewable energy at the market clearing price. The price of each certificate is
determined by a separate green certificates market in which the demand for
certificates is regulated by authorities by imposing minimum ownership volumes
on all market participants.
Maturing renewable energy technologies and the increasing regulation needs of
the TSOs gradually shift the goal of support mechanisms towards representing
more price elasticity. Although such a shift is seen between the price-inelastic
feed-in tariff scheme and the more price-elastic green certificate scheme, the
final objective is to fully expose RES suppliers to the price-volatile electricity
market (CEER, 2010). Some proposals, such as shortening the gate-closure
horizon, a reduction of the trading periods length and a shift of trading period,
might increase overall market efficiency compared to the current situation with
support schemes (CEER, 2010; Holttinen, 2005; Newbery, 2010).
2.3 Behaviour of generators
2.3.1 Operating in the European electricity spot market
In a liberalised electricity market, profit resulting from electricity trade is the
driving force behind all activities. Maximising profit day-ahead of delivery
time exposes generators to risks resulting from: (1) limited access to delayed
information, (2) demand forecast uncertainty, (3) competitors’ behaviour, (4)
RES power levels, (5) unexpected events such as outage of a thermal power
plant or transmission line, (6) the impact of previously made decisions in terms
of bilateral contracts or long-term obligations towards large customers, (7) the
impact of concurrently organized auctions (e.g. ancillary services) or future
ones (e.g. balancing markets), (8) operating constraints inherent to each type
of generation plant and (9) transmission constraints.
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All uncertainties affect the actual emerging market clearing price in each market
round. Short-term, day-ahead price predictions typically exhibit white-noise
errors ranging from 5% to 12%, severely harming the profit of the generator if its
decisions do not adequately account for the price uncertainty range (Contreras
et al., 2003; Delarue et al., 2010). Generators consequently face two complex
problems. They first need to decide the optimal dispatch schedule of each
generation technology in their portfolio and then they need to formulate the
preferred dispatch schedule as a set of price-quantity pairs so that this optimal
dispatch schedule is accepted by the MO.
Although not all risks can be taken into account, the assumption that all
market information is reflected by the market clearing price forecast is not
sufficiently adequate to account for competitors’ behaviour. Especially in
oligopolistic market settings the generator will rather use residual demand
curves to represent a relationship between its own portfolio power level and the
emerging market clearing price (Berzal et al., 2001). Although each market
round is organised as a sealed-bid auction, market participants are still capable
of discovering their own residual demand curve.
In case the MO only feedbacks the emerging market clearing price and accepted
volumes to each market participant, each market round one discrete point of
the residual demand curve is revealed. Since the frequency of change of the
underlying physical assets of competitors is much lower than the frequency
of feedback, the market participant is capable of predicting a distribution of
residual demand curves (Portela et al., 2012; Sanchez, 2006). Alternatively, the
residual demand curve is directly deducted in case the aggregated demand and
supply curves are published in a pursue to enhance data transparency and price
signal provision among market participants.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the subtraction of the aggregated demand curve
with the aggregated supply curve to obtain the residual demand curve a new
entrant would face in the Iberian electricity market on January, 1, 2012. One
can observe that demand is almost fully met by low-cost generation capacity
as is typical for bidding areas characterised by a large integration of renewable
energy sources. Therefore, the residual demand curve has very limited potential
for additional positive volumes to be supplied at profitable prices.
The residual demand curve is thus composed of both demand and supply price-
quantity pairs. When supplying the residual demand curve, the generator either
dispatches its portfolio to actually supply demand, or to push competing supply
price-quantity pairs to a less favourable position in the merit order. Since
competitors strive to improve their position in the merit order, the above figures
only present one specific outcome, depending on the pursued offering strategies
by each generator in the bidding area.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregated supply and demand curve of the Iberian electricity
market as emerged for the first market round on January, 1, 2012
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Figure 2.2: Residual demand curve faced by a new entrant, as calculated from
figure 2.1 (shaded areas correspond)
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Economic literature generally labels offering strategies deviating from submitting
all available capacity at variable cost as strategic gaming behaviour. The market
participant is then said to exercise its market power potential. Economists
define market power as the ability to profitably steer the market price away
from its competitive level (Stoft, 2002). The exercise of market power in a
liberalised market hence describes an expected response from generators to
unilaterally increase their profit.
The legal definition alternatively defines market power as the ability to profitably
sustain elevated prices through the unilateral restriction of supply by a dominant
firm or by the restriction of supply arising from the coordinated, collusive
restriction of supply decisions by multiple firms acting in a coordinated
fashion (Cramton, 2004). Competition authorities bear the responsibility to
mitigate this fraudulent type of strategic gaming behaviour. The focus of
strategic gaming behaviour is therefore limited to the economists’ definition by
assuming perfectly functioning regulatory and governmental instances.
2.3.2 Influence of the market structure and design
An efficient market design provides incentives to satisfy current and future
demand levels with a least-cost, reliable supply of electricity. The experiences
from the in chapter 1 described market failures highlight the importance
of understanding the preferences and constraints of market participants.
Competitive theory has been proven unsatisfactory to describe realistic
behaviour under the same market structure and design (Weber, 2011). Moreover,
strategic gaming behaviour is highly sensitive to the market design and structure.
Table 2.1 lists potential influences of the market design and structure parameters
mentioned in section 2.2 on market participants’ behaviour.
Firstly, timing issues are relevant when integrating RES in the operation of the
electricity market. Moving the gate closure time closer to the start of the market
session is argued to lead to an increased use of the spot market which might
foster liquidity and might attract new market participants. The improvement
in renewable power level forecasts leads to a more accurate dispatch schedule
on their part. Consequently, the additional supply of renewable energy reduces
incentives for exercising strategic gaming behaviour.
Reducing the duration between the gate closure time and the start of the
market session on the other hand leads to undesired operational consequences
for traditional generation plants as they need sufficient preparation time for
being committed and actively dispatched. A similar reasoning holds for reducing
the market round granularity and the duration of the market session.
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Parameter Category Potential influence
gate closure time
timing issues exposure to future balancing costsmarket round granularity
market session duration
limit orders
price-quantity pair complexity preferred dispatch schedule formulationblock ordersflexible orders
market orders
market ceiling price price regulation incentive towards strategic behaviourmarket floor price degree of protection against losses
feed-in tariff scheme
renewable support scheme imbalance cost exposureprice risk exposurepremium schemegreen certificate schme
available transfer capacity coupling type incentive towards strategic behaviourflow-based calculation
unit bidding offering type preferred dispatch schedule formulationportfolio bidding
pay-as-bid pricing pricing scheme incentive towards strategic behaviouruniform pricing
Table 2.1: Market design parameters influencing generator’s behaviour
Secondly, the use of complex price-quantity pairs supports the convergence to a
stable short and long term price equilibrium as they facilitate the integration
of conventional plants with intertemporal technical and economic constraints.
They additionally provide the tools for a generator to hedge against price
uncertainty and profit risks. Both effects beneficially impact the economic
efficiency of the electricity market operation.
The increase in efficiency comes at a severe increase in computational cost to
carry out the market clearing and coupling process. Indeed, complex price-
quantity pairs increase the likelihood of a non-existing or suboptimal final market
clearing price solution to emerge. Two main causes are identified for this increase
in computational cost: (1) the need for heuristic search techniques to solve such
complex problems, and (2) practical limitations in available computation time
or in number of possible search iterations (Poli & Marracci, 2011).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the effect during the first market round on January 1, 2012
in the Iberian electricity market. The rejection of complex price-quantity pairs
results in a price increase to e46.02/MWh, from e25.13/MWh. The increased
residual demand curve price elasticity indicates an opportunity loss to reduce
market power potential due to computational limitations.
Thirdly, tight price regulation reduces the opportunity to benefit from strategic
gaming behaviour by physical or economic withholding. On the other hand,
relaxing price regulation to a large range of allowed prices theoretically favours
investments in flexible plants while supporting the discovery of long term stable
equilibria since price signals are not exogenously distorted.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of complex pairs during the first market round of January, 1,
2012 of the Iberian electricity market
Practical experience tends to confirm theory as low market ceiling prices
constitute a price reference for generators at which price-quantity pairs should
be submitted. They are also argued to distort demand’s willingness to pay in
the event of capacity bottlenecks (Weber & Schröder, 2010). Similar arguments
are made regarding an insufficiently low market floor price from the perspective
of investing in storage facilities or expressing true costs when facing a shut-down
at high start-up costs.
Fourthly, from the perspective of renewable support schemes, the generator
only anticipates price risk under the market premium or green certificate
scheme. Under both schemes, RES would be dispatched at the negative price
of the market premium or the negative price of the price received on the green
certificate’s market. Consequently, prices are supposedly more volatile under
a feed-in tariff scheme due to the guaranteed dispatch and lack of balancing
responsibility for the owners of RES. Although it is argued that investment in
more supply flexibility is attracted as a consequence, the level of investment
has not been proven significant in practice (Barquín et al., 2010).
Fifthly, the target for future market design is a single price coupling, at least on
a broad regional basis. In other words, one single matching algorithm determines
the emerging market clearing prices and accepted price-quantity pairs in each
bidding area. However, even under such target market design, structural
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congestions between bidding areas can be exploited by market participants to
increase market clearing prices locally. FB market coupling is being advocated
as a more efficient, less risk-averse method for allocating scarce transmission
line capacity compared to the NTC market coupling.
Lastly, regarding the offering type, portfolio bidding allows generators to
reschedule the dispatch of plants in their portfolio based on the accepted
dispatch schedule, therefore allowing a more efficient, least-cost dispatch. Unit
bidding on the other hand facilitates transparency and therefore increases
regulatory influence, resulting in generators to be less tempted to exercise
market power to the full extent of the available potential.
2.4 Conclusion and contribution
This chapter introduces existing designs and structures of day-ahead electricity
markets developed over the past decades. The focus lies on the European
electricity market framework organised as the PX model.
By comparing existing European electricity market designs, three broad
categories of parameters shaping the design and structure of a typical European
day-ahead electricity market are identified: domestic day-ahead market, market
coupling mechanism and RES support schemes. In each category, the market
design parameters influence the strategic gaming behaviour of generators since
each parameter affects the maximum profit it can obtain during each market
session, both during day-ahead and real-time.
Taking into account all uncertainties each market participant faces when
participating in the day-ahead electricity spot market, it is subject to significant
profit risks which have to be adequately accounted for. The generator is thus
required to determine the price-quantity pairs which optimise its total profit
after being submitted to and accepted by the MO.
Consequently, this chapter provides the motivation to design, implement and
validate strategic profit-maximising behaviour exhibited by a generator when
creating price-quantity pairs to submit to the MO during the day-ahead
electricity market. The designed behaviour has to account for the effect of the
target market design parameters mentioned.
The design of generators’ strategic gaming behaviour is described in following
chapters. Chapter 3 covers the design, implementation and validation of the
Unit Commitment (UC) and Economic Dispatch (ED) process, while chapter 4
covers the design, implementation and validation of the offering strategy.
Chapter 3
Unit Commitment and
Economic Dispatch
The liberalised electricity market requires generators to deploy their available
generation capacity under price uncertainty. This uncertainty gradually reduces
when approaching the time of power delivery. Perfect anticipation to price
uncertainty is thus only achieved when a generator is capable of continuously
adjusting the power level of the generation plants in its portfolio according to
updated, more accurate price forecasts.
The technologies in the generation portfolio are however not endlessly
controllable or flexible. The decision on how to efficiently dispatch each plant
has to be made well in advance of the actual time of power delivery. Unit
Commitment (UC) and Economic Dispatch (ED), complemented by an adequate
offering strategy, manage the generator’s profit risk due to price uncertainty.
This chapter describes the scheduling problem faced by a generator owning
a portfolio consisting of thermal, hydropower and renewable plants from the
perspective of strategic and flexible dispatch. It optimises total profit given
residual demand curves the generator faces in each market round of the market
session. Technical constraints and plant economics are modelled for each plant
type with a focus on modelling thermal plants because of their inflexibility and
large presence in the EU271 electricity generation mix.
1Croatia joined the European Union in July, 2013. No EU28 statistics are yet available.
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This chapter presents incremental and innovative contributions to the state-
of-the-art literature as it approaches the problem from the perspective of
flexible dispatch. The approach and its contributions are derived from previous
publications (Maenhoudt & Deconinck, 2012; Maenhoudt & Deconinck, 2013a).
The first contribution is found in the presentation of a novel Mixed-Integer
Linear Problem (MILP) formulation which explicitly represents the formal
constraints of each of the different operational phases. Secondly, fixed thermal
gradient limits and constraints concerned with modelling the thermal minimum
stable power level duration before changing ramping direction, are relaxed.
Instead, the gradient is dynamically calculated based on the power level and a
violation of the minimum stable power level duration is allowed at the expense
of incurring supplementary maintenance costs. Finally, the detailed model of
the operation of thermal plants is complemented with hydropower plants and
Renewable Energy Sources (RES). All mentioned plant types are modelled so
that they are able to cooperate in a coordinated manner in order to maximise
profit subject to elastic demand and competitors’ behaviour.
The innovative contribution is found in deciding the strategic RES quantity to
be submitted to the Market Operator (MO) so that total profit is maximised.
The decision reflects a trade-off between expected future balancing costs and the
gained profit on the day-ahead market. Instead of assuming RES injection as
negative demand, the generator rather exploits the superior position of RES in
the merit order to influence day-ahead market prices at the cost of an increased
expected balancing cost.
Validation cases are presented to illustrate the performance of the novel UC
and ED formulation. Case studies are selected from literature based on the
availability of results to which obtained results are benchmarked. The three
presented case studies investigate the impact on profits from dynamically
calculating the gradient limits, additionally incurring gradient costs and
dispatching the portfolio in a coordinated manner.
3.1 Introduction
Three types of plants are distinguished in a typical generation portfolio: RES2,
energy storage and thermal plants. RES are highly variable as significant
differences in power levels, resulting from variations in weather conditions,
occur. They only allow for limited control since, even with the installation
2Although renewable energy sources include biomass, geothermal, wind, solar and
hydropower plants, this dissertation defines renewables in the narrow context of uncontrollable,
stochastic energy sources such as wind and solar plants.
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of power electronics allowing for curtailment, the instantaneous power level
is stochastic and shows significant differences locally (Jónsson et al., 2010).
Renewables are interesting from an economic perspective as their variable costs
are practically non-existent.
The most economically relevant energy storage sources are hydropower plants.
This generation technology is both flexible and controllable at a low variable
cost. Its exploitation however is highly dependent on geographical requirements
such as the presence of a river or a steep elevation, thereby drastically reducing
its applicability (Yu et al., 2011). Their share in the generation technology
mix is therefore limited except in bidding areas with an abundance of such a
topography, such as in Nordic countries or the Alps.
Thermal plants such as nuclear or fossil fuel power plants are controllable. Each
thermal plant however is subject to intertemporal constraints, allowing for a
thermal flexibility spectrum ranging from very low to reasonably high flexibility.
Generally, inflexible plants tend to cover base load demand while more flexible
ones are used to cover mid load and peak demand. Typically, the variable cost3
of flexible thermal plants is smaller than that of inflexible ones.
Thermal plants are currently highly represented in the EU27 electricity
generation mix. In 2010, their share of total available generation capacity
was 78.3%4 followed by an 11.9% share of hydropower plants and a 9.0% share
of RES5 (European Commission, 2012). Although new RES investments have
slowed in 2012, their share is expected to increase at the expense of thermal
generation plants according to short-term predictions on the future composition
of the electricity generation mix in Europe (IEA, 2012).
Increasing the share of RES is led by policy instead of demand growth: European
electricity consumption has not significantly changed over the past decade and
is expected to decline slightly in the short to medium term. The massive
integration of RES in the European electricity generation mix will therefore
demand greater flexibility on the supply side in order to ensure electricity system
reliability, even if real-time demand response or economically viable energy
storage technologies are available in the medium term (Traber & Kemfert, 2011).
As demand-side flexibility is currently insufficient to cope with RES supply
fluctuations, electricity prices exhibit more volatile and complicated patterns
with increased RES integration. Electricity prices often appear intractable, so
that many forecast tools predict the price distribution by taking into account a
detailed definition of the physical system of generation and transmission, and
3Depending on the cost of CO2 emissions.
427.4% nuclear, 24.7% solid and 2.6% liquid fossil fuels, and 23.6% gaseous fossil fuels.
54.5% wind, 0.7% solar and 3.7% biomass; the remainder tidal wave and geothermal.
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the drivers of demand. More sophisticated statistical processes already provide
better price forecasts (Harris, 2006a), of which time series analysis (Nogales
et al., 2002; Contreras et al., 2003), neural networks (Mandal et al., 2007) and
fuzzy regression models (Niimura & Nakashima, 2001) are the most popular
ones to accurately predict short-term market clearing prices.
Besides improvements in forecasting techniques, the utilisation efficiency
of generation plants is augmented by comprehensive UC and ED models.
Considering the current and future European target electricity generation
mix (European Commission, 2010; European Commission, 2012), thermal
plants are modelled more in detail compared to hydropower and RES plants.
The modelling scope of the latter is limited to wind and solar farms.
The scope is limited to the day-ahead spot market, i.e. no simultaneously
organized automatic generation control or reserve markets are modelled. Instead
it is assumed that arbitrage between markets has already taken place and that
its effects are integrated in the parametric input values (Frangioni et al., 2009).
3.2 State-of-the-art
3.2.1 Thermal power plant modelling
3.2.1.1 Literature overview
Long before liberalisation of the electricity market, a truncated heuristic
method was used to minimise both generation and start-up costs, while fulfilling
spinning reserves, load, and crew requirements (Pang & Chen, 1976). Technical
constraints are limited to minimum and maximum power limits. The start-up
and shut-down phase of the plant is not explicitly modelled but approximated
by a step function. The method only guarantees near optimal feasible schedules
due to the enormous computational efforts.
Lagrangian relaxation has been widely applied to solve cost-based thermal UC
problems in which the generation and start-up costs are minimised subject
to load and spinning reserve requirements, minimum and maximum power
limits, and the minimum up and down times (Merlin & Sandrin, 1983). The
problem is formulated more in detail by imposing ramping limits and exponential
start-up costs (Bard, 1988). Linear transmission constraints based on a direct
current power flow model have also been included (Tseng et al., 1999). Finally,
Lagrangian relaxation techniques to solve price-based UC formulations including
fuel and emission constraints are also proposed (Shahidehpour et al., 2002a).
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Lagrangian relaxation outperforms alternative methods in computation time
when applied to large-scale scheduling problems, although the convergence to a
feasible or optimal solution is not guaranteed (Borghetti et al., 2003; Zhai et al.,
2002). Recent improvements in methodology however attempt to mitigate these
disadvantages (Seki et al., 2010; Ongsakul & Petcharaks, 2004).
The widely applied MILP formulation guarantees convergence to an optimal
scheduling solution and allows for explicitly formulating technical and economic
constraints. Expected wholesale and reserve market prices, generation costs, non-
linear start-up and shut-down costs are incorporated in the profit-maximising
objective function subject to capacity constraints, gradient limits and minimum
up and down times (Arroyo & Conejo, 2000). Recently, the start-up and
shut-down trajectories were formulated more in detail (Arroyo & Conejo,
2004; Ostrowski et al., 2010). By focusing on computational efficiency, the
number of constraints and their complexity has also been reduced (Carrion &
Arroyo, 2006). The MILP formulation has also been applied to simultaneously
considering energy, automatic generation control, and reserve markets (Arroyo
& Conejo, 2002). The various thermal operating phases and regions can be
modelled (Simoglou et al., 2010; Simoglou et al., 2012). Increasing the size of
the envisaged portfolio however exponentially increases the computation time.
Evolutionary methods are characterised by similar advantages and drawbacks
as Lagrangian relaxation (Cheng et al., 2000). Only recently they have been
applied as a stand-alone solution technique in large-scale scheduling problems,
with promising results in terms of convergence speed (Ebrahimi et al., 2011;
Damousis et al., 2004; Moghimi Hadji & Vahidi, 2012; Senjyu et al., 2005).
Yet, convergence to a global optimum is not guaranteed. The optimality of the
solution is additionally highly sensitive to the selected learning parameters.
3.2.1.2 Conclusion and contributions
Considering the dominant share of thermal plants in the current and target
EU27 generation mix, their detailed representation cannot be avoided when
modelling the scheduling problem. The above discussion additionally illustrates
that the MILP framework is better suited to represent the thermal plant’s
technical characteristics and economics.
Although convergence to an optimal scheduling solution is guaranteed when
using such a framework, its convergence speed can pose a limitation when
applying the scheduling problem to a realistically-sized portfolio. This drawback
can however be mitigated by using increasingly more performant processing
units and the formulation of tight, computationally efficient MILP formulations.
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The operation of a thermal plant is mainly constrained by its maximum and
minimum stable power limit, fixed gradient limit, fixed minimum up and down
time, fixed minimum stable power level duration and the predefined trajectories
to be followed when starting up and shutting down. The total incurred costs
are the result of non-linear generation costs, exponential start-up costs and
exponential shut-down costs. Maintenance costs are not included in literature.
These dependencies can be modelled in detail to more accurately represent
the thermal plant’s flexibility in an environment characterised by massive RES
integration. From this perspective, the assumption of predefined start-up and
shut-down trajectories and fixed gradient limits restrict the representation of
the plant’s actual operational ability. Additionally, similar to the dependency
of the start-up and shut-down cost on the duration the plant was respectively
inactive or operational, a supplementary maintenance cost is also incurred in
case the minimum stable power level duration is violated. Consequently, the
assumption of a fixed minimum stable power level duration is not an accurate
representation of the actual operational ability of a thermal plant.
The state-of-the-art of thermal plant modelling is therefore advanced by
dynamically calculating the gradient based on the power level and by allowing
supplementary maintenance costs to be incurred when violating the minimum
stable power level duration constraints. Both novelties increase the flexibility
to dispatch the thermal plant in anticipation of forecast market clearing prices.
In support of these contributions, a novel 0/1 MILP formulation is presented
in section 3.3 which explicitly represents each of the operational phases of the
thermal plant, including the hot stand-by phase.
3.2.2 Hydropower plant modelling
3.2.2.1 Literature overview
Two types of hydropower plants are distinguished: pumped-hydro storage plants
and run-of-river plants. The former transforms potential energy held by the
water mass in its reservoir to electricity when discharging and vice versa when
pumping (Deane et al., 2010). Run-of-river plants transform the kinetic energy
held by the water mass in a river to electricity.
The run-of-river plant is in most cases complemented with a pondage, reducing
exposure to river flow seasonality and making it possible to regulate the water
flow — and thus power level — to some extent. While the dispatch of pumped-
hydro storage plants is driven by load balancing or price arbitrage, run-of-river
plants serve as peaking power or must run plants.
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Short-term management of the available water in the reservoir allows hydropower
plants to store and transfer energy to market rounds when its use is most
profitable (Rangel, 2008). The majority of installed hydropower capacity in the
EU27 are of the run-of-river plant type6 although this share is expected to rise
due to its vast untapped potential (European Commission, 2013a).
Typically, both hydropower plant types are assumed not to be subject to
intertemporal constraints (Ambec & Doucet, 2003). The water reservoir
minimum and maximum capacity limits are important factors for the operation
of the plant: in case the maximum capacity limit is reached, the plant discharges
in order to avoid spillage while water is treated as a scarce commodity in case
the minimum capacity limit is reached.
Water inflow is generally treated as deterministic although weather conditions
affect the reservoir’s water inflow (Barroso et al., 2002). The scarcity of water is
hence modelled as the opportunity cost of immediate water discharge compared
to storing it for future use. The cost increases when weather conditions are dry
and is assumed known or forecasted based on historic data (Johnsen, 2001).
Hydropower depends on the turbine outflow and the head in the reservoir,
which is in turn a function of the amount of water stored in the reservoir,
the turbine outflow and spillage (Diniz & Maceira, 2008). The power level
of the hydropower plant is proportional to the turbine outflow rate and final
reservoir volumes and is guided by future cost functions or specific target
values obtained from long-term scheduling models. A multi-stage stochastic
programming model better hedges against uncertainty of water inflows (Baslis
& Bakirtzis, 2011). A compact MILP framework can be used to solve such a
scheduling problem of cascaded run-of-river plants and pumped-hydro storage
plants when pursuing a profit-maximisation objective. However, the required
modelling accuracy heavily depends on the specific hydropower plants addressed
and their cascading topology.
In contrast to the previously-used models of self-replenishing hydro reservoirs,
the pumping ability is explicitly taken into account when modelling pumped-
hydro storage plants (Schill & Kemfert, 2011). A game-theoretic model has been
applied to study the utilisation of storage under imperfect electricity market
conditions. Although it is argued that storage utilisation and storage-related
welfare effects depend on the storage owner and its ability to exert strategic
gaming behaviour, no results could be obtained to support this claim when
applying the model to the German power market.
6Although no distinction between the two types is made in the EU27 statistics, synthesis
of data from various sources result in a 45 GW installed pumped-hydro storage capacity.
Comparing with the EU27 statistics, this amounts to a current share of 32.1% of all hydropower
plants.
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3.2.2.2 Conclusion and contributions
Since the required modelling accuracy heavily depends on the specific
hydropower portfolio topology addressed and their share in the current and
target EU27 generation mix remains rather small compared to other generation
technologies, a general model of hydropower plants is created. Besides the
minimum and maximum capacity limits and the discharge or pumping limits,
the minimum water inflow and the opportunity cost of water discharge are
assumed to be readily obtained from long-term hydropower planning models or
preliminary weekly scheduling models. They are therefore assumed to be input
parameters to the short-term UC and ED.
The constraints which guide final reservoir volumes towards a future cost
function or specific target value restrict the flexible operation of the hydropower
plant. This assumption is hence relaxed in order for the generator to deviate
from its planned dispatch schedule in case it is more profitable to do so. A range
of future cost functions and specific target values is therefore included in the
problem formulation. Similar to the opportunity cost of water, these parametric
values are assumed to be decided exogenously by medium- to long-term models.
3.2.3 Wind and solar plant modelling
3.2.3.1 Literature overview
Fluctuating intermittent generation characteristics are dealt with in literature by
two approaches: storage and risk minimisation. The former converts renewable
energy to a different form that can be stored and used when desired via
e.g. compressed air facilities, plug-in electrical vehicles or pumped-hydro
storage plants (Castronuovo & Peas Lopes, 2004; Brown et al., 2008). The
latter calculates the day-ahead submitted renewable energy source quantity
by minimising the expected costs of imbalance charges during the imbalance
settlement by the Transmission System Operator (TSO) (Matevosyan & Soder,
2006). No distinction is made between the different types of intermittent
generation technologies.
The former approach envisages electricity storage as a strategy for integrating
large amounts of RES into the electricity system (Barton & Infield, 2004).
Nevertheless, storage capacity in electricity markets with imperfect competition
is not fully utilised so that social welfare is not maximised (Schill & Kemfert,
2009). A stochastic MILP framework generally provides similar solutions as its
deterministic counterpart (Tuohy & O’Malley, 2011; Meibom et al., 2011).
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Renewable energy sources are generally modelled as negative demand while its
integration is mostly assumed within a wind feed-in scheme and approached
from the perspective of maximising system level efficiency. These analyses
typically assume RES dispatch priority over conventional plants. In case RES
actively participates in the market, such as under the premium scheme or
green quota scheme, their back-up and balancing capabilities should be taken
into account during the UC and ED problem formulation by each generator
individually: a coordinated dispatch with other available generation technologies
in the generator’s portfolio indeed results in a reduction of imbalance charges
compared to the uncoordinated dispatch (Garcia-Gonzalez et al., 2008).
3.2.3.2 Conclusion and contributions
The combination of using storage and minimising imbalance risk when handling
the dispatch of RES during the UC and ED model is innovative. The dispatch
of RES is coordinated with flexible hydropower plants in order to maximise
profit subject to elastic demand and competitors’ behaviour. At the same time,
risk towards future balancing costs is reduced by calculating the expected cost
of balancing requirements for each coordinated RES and hydropower portfolio
dispatch. Consequently total profit is maximised as a trade-off between the
expected future balancing cost and the additional gained profit on the day-ahead
market. This novel modelling approach is innovative as the generator is capable
to partially reserve hydropower capacity to profit from high balancing prices on
real-time markets or during the imbalance settlement with the TSO.
3.3 Model formulation
3.3.1 Objective function
The deregulated electricity market shifted the objective function of a generator
from an obligation to economically supply demand towards a profit-driven free
choice to supply paying customers (Shahidehpour et al., 2002a). The latter
objective is formally represented by
T∑
t=1
(
µ(t) − C(t)
)
(3.1)Maximise
C(t) = CP(t) + CS(t) + CD(t) + CG(t) + CH(t) + CR(t)with
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Figure 3.1: Modelled revenue calculation
It describes the profit over all market rounds t during the to-be-cleared market
session d by subtracting the anticipated costs C(·) from the anticipated revenue
µ(·), obtained from the coordinated dispatch of the portfolio. The total cost
respectively includes generation (CP(·)), start-up (CS(·)), shut-down (CD(·))
and supplementary maintenance costs CG(·). Cost CH(·) and CR(·) are incurred
when dispatching hydropower and RES plants respectively.
3.3.2 Revenue calculation
The revenue is calculated by matching the portfolio dispatch and the residual
demand curve the generator faces during each market round. Figure 3.1
illustrates how each price-quantity pair b of the residual demand curve is
supplied by increasing energy dispatch levels Q(·) of the portfolio. Each price-
quantity pair b is supplied up to Q(b, t) starting from a minimum required
supply of Q(b, t). The minimum required supply is not explicitly indicated.
Pair b+ 1 is only supplied if pair b has been fully supplied.
The volume of the residual demand curve is ensured to be larger than the
generation capacity available to the generator by adding a price-quantity pair
at market floor price. The hierarchy and boundary conditions of supplying the
residual demand curve’s price-quantity pairs in each market round is ensured by
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Q(t) =
B∑
b=1
(
Q(b, t) + L(b, t) ∗
( b−1∑
b ′=1
Q(b ′, t)
))
(3.2)
Q(b, t) ≥ L(b, t) ∗Q(b, t) (3.3)
Q(b, t) ≤ L(b, t) ∗Q(b, t) (3.4)
B∑
b=1
L(b, t) = 1 (3.5)
Price-quantity pairs are supplied according to decreasing price levels so that
only one pair is partially supplied. This marginal price-quantity pair is indicated
by variable L(·) and sets the maximum anticipated market clearing price. The
revenue is subsequently calculated by multiplying the portfolio dispatch level
with the price λ(·) of the marginal price-quantity pair:
µ(t) =
B∑
b=1
([
Q(b, t) +
(
L(b, t) ∗
b−1∑
b ′=1
Q(b ′, t)
)] ∗ λ(b, t)) (3.6)
This revenue is referred to as the maximum anticipated revenue under both
uniform and pay-as-bid pricing scheme. It is attained only when complemented
with a perfect offering strategy.
The total supplied energy is obtained by
Q(t) =
K∑
k=1
Q(k, t) (3.7)
Q(kt, t) =
I(kt)∑
i=1
Q(kt, i, t)with
Q(kt, i, t) = γ ∗ P(kt, i, t) ∃kt ⊂ k
Q(kh, t) = γ ∗ (V(kh, t) +W(kh, t) + X(kh, t) − Z(kh, t)) ∃kh ⊂ k
Q(kr, t) = γ ∗ Y(kr, t) ∃kr ⊂ k
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The supplied energy is obtained by multiplying the power level of each plant k
at each market round with market round granularity γ. Pumping of hydropower
plants consumes power and is subtracted from the total power generation.
3.3.3 Thermal plant constraints
3.3.3.1 Units’ Operational Phases
Besides the start-up (φS(·)), shut-down (φD(·)) and production (φP(·)) phase,
also the hot stand-by phase (φH(·)) is modelled as an operational phase of a
thermal plant. During hot stand-by, fuel is consumed to keep the unit’s core
at high temperature without generating power. In contrast to shutting down,
hot stand-by avoids start-up costs and a violation of the minimum duration of
inactivity at the expense of supplementary fuel consumption costs.
The hot stand-by phase is entered after the shut-down phase, while the start-
up phase is initiated once exiting hot stand-by. The transition between all
operational phase is hence modelled by
φ^S(kt, i, t− 1) ≤ φS(kt, i, t) + φP(kt, i, t) + φH(kt, i, t) (3.8)
φS(kt, i, t− 1) ≤ φS(kt, i, t) + φP(kt, i, t) (3.9)
φ^D(kt, i, t) ≤ φD(kt, i, t− 1) + φP(kt, i, t− 1) + φH(kt, i, t− 1) (3.10)
φD(kt, i, t− 1) ≤ φD(kt, i, t) + φ^D(kt, i, t) (3.11)
φD(kt, i, t) ≤ φP(kt, i, t− 1) + φD(kt, i, t− 1) (3.12)
φP(kt, i, t− 1) ≤φP(kt, i, t) + φD(kt, i, t)
+ φ^D(kt, i, t) + φH(kt, i, t)
(3.13)
φP(kt, i, t− 1) + φS(kt, i, t− 1) + φ^S(kt, i, t− 1) ≥ φP(kt, i, t) (3.14)
φ^HD(kt, i, t) ≤ φS(kt, i, t) + φP(kt, i, t) (3.15)
φ^HS(kt, i, t) ≤ φD(kt, i, t) + φP(kt, i, t) (3.16)
φ^HS(kt, i, t− 1) − φ^HD(kt, i, t) = φH(kt, i, t) − φH(kt, i, t− 1) (3.17)
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The start-up phase is initiated by a start-up moment (φ^S(·)) and leads to the
production phase. The shut-down phase is entered from the production phase
and is terminated by the shut-down moment (φ^D(·)) or by entering the hot
stand-by phase. The hot stand-by phase has a hot stand-by initiation (φ^HS(·))
and termination (φ^HD(·)) moment coinciding either with the start-up moment
or shut-down moment. The production phase is initiated after having started
up or after having completed the start-up phase. The production phase is
terminated by shutting down or by entering the hot stand-by phase.
Mutually exclusive phases and moments are prevented to co-exist by
φ^S(kt, i, t− 1) + φ^D(kt, i, t) ≤ 1 (3.18)
φS(kt, i, t) + φD(kt, i, t) ≤ 1 (3.19)
φ^HS(kt, i, t− 1) + φ^HD(kt, i, t) ≤ 1 (3.20)
ζ(kt, i, t) = φS(kt, i, t) + φD(kt, i, t) + φP(kt, i, t) + φH(kt, i, t) (3.21)
φ^S(kt, i, t− 1) − φ^D(kt, i, t) = ζ(kt, i, t) − ζ(kt, i, t− 1) (3.22)
A thermal unit operating in any of the operational phases is considered
operational while, in the other case, it is considered inactive. Any operational
phase starts with a start-up moment and ends with a shut-down moment.
Whether or not a unit is operational is denoted by ζ(·).
Finally, phases are related to the minimum and maximum power level by
P(kt, i, t) − (P(kt, i) ∗ ζ(kt, i, t)) ≥
−P(kt,i) ∗ (ζ(kt, i, t) − φP(kt, i, t))
(3.23)
P(kt, i, t) − (P(kt, i)∗ζ(kt, i, t)) ≤
(P(kt, i) − P(kt,i)) ∗ φP(kt, i, t) − (P(kt, i) ∗ φH(kt, i, t))
(3.24)
No generation is allowed during hot stand-by, even though the unit is considered
operational. The start-up and shut-down phase bridge the unstable power level
range between zero and the minimum power level. The plant operates in the
stable power level range between the minimum and maximum power level.
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Figure 3.2: Modelled operational phases of the thermal unit
The interactions between phases, moments and the associated power level
limits are schematically illustrated in figure 3.2. The formulation of operational
phases provides the appropriate framework to dynamically calculate the up-
and downward gradient limits.
3.3.3.2 Dynamic Gradient Calculation
Figure 3.3 illustrates the dynamic change in the up- and downward gradient
limit in terms of the power level of the unit. The upward gradient during the
start-up phase is denoted by a dotted line; the downward gradient during the
shut-down phase by a dashed line. It is not possible to ramp down during the
start-up phase and to ramp up during the shut-down phase. Both upward and
downward ramping limits during the production phase are denoted in solid lines.
The feasible gradient region is denoted in grey.
In contrast to the assumptions found in literature, the upward ramping limit
during the start-up phase is relaxed when approaching the minimum stable
power level since the production phase is already reached within the same
market round. Similarly, when ramping down from the production phase to the
shut-down phase, the full flexibility of the unit is neglected in case dynamic
calculation is not taken into account. The assumptions made in literature
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Figure 3.3: Modelled dynamic gradient limits
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Figure 3.4: Modelled fixed gradient limits in literature
are shown in figure 3.4. The feasible gradient region is clearly enlarged when
dynamically calculating the gradient limits.
To formally represent the gradient limits in terms of power level, the complete
power level range of the thermal plant is divided into operational zones. The
upper and lower power level limits of each operational zone r are defined by
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(ψ(kt, i, r) −ψ(kt, i, r)) ∗ L(kt, i, t, r) ≤ P(kt, i, t, r) (3.25)
P(kt, i, t, r) ≤ (ψ(kt, i, r) −ψ(kt, i, r)) ∗ L(kt, i, t, r− 1) (3.26)
L(kt, i, t, 0) = φS(kt, i, t) + φD(kt, i, t) + φP(kt, i, t) (3.27)
The lower power limit ψ(·) and upper power limit ψ(·) of each zone is not
explicitly indicated in the equation but can be deducted from the indicated
power levels in figure 3.3. Equation (3.27) ensures operational zones are entered
once the unit is operational.
The thermal unit might not be able to produce in a range of power levels due
to technical issues such as vibration in a shaft bearing or due to limitations in
the operation of steam valves (Lee & Breipohl, 1993; Su & Chiou, 1997; Chen
& Chang, 1995). In case zone r is a prohibited zone, it is easily modelled within
this novel thermal plant formulation by adding the equation L(·, r) = L(·, r+ 1).
The dynamic maximum downward and upward gradient limits are calculated
from the technical start-up (κU(·)), shut-down (κD(·)), up (κPU(·)) and down
(κPD(·)) gradient limits:
κD(kt, i, t) ≤ κPD(kt, i)
+ κD(kt, i, t) − (κD(kt, i) ∗ (φS(kt, i, t) + φD(kt, i, t)))
+
[(∑
r2
P(kt, i, t, r2)
)
− κPD(kt, i)
] ∗ [κPD(kt, i) − κD(kt, i)]
κPD(kt, i)
(3.28)
κU(kt, i, t) ≤ κPU(kt, i)
+
[
κU(kt, i) − κPU(kt, i)
] ∗ [κU(kt, i) − (∑r1 P(kt, i, t, r1))]
κU(kt, i)
(3.29)
∀r1 ∈ [P(kt, i) − κU(kt, i) . . . P(kt, i)]for which holds
∀r2 ∈ [P(kt, i) . . . P(kt, i) + κPD(kt, i)]
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The minimum up- and downward gradient limits during the start-up and shut-
down phase are modelled by
κU(kt, i, t) ≥ −
(∑
r3
P(kt, i, t, r3)
)
+ κU(kt, i) ∗ (φS(kt, i, t) + φ^S(kt, i, t) + φ^HS(kt, i, t))
(3.30)
κD(kt, i, t) ≥
(∑
r4
P(kt, i, t, r4)
)
−
(
κD(kt,i, t) ∗ (1− φD(kt, i, t))
) (3.31)
∀r3 ∈ [P(kt, i) − κU(kt, i) . . . P(kt, i)]for which holds
∀r4 ∈ [0 . . . κD(kt, i, t)]
All equations model the gradient as represented in figure 3.3. Consistency is
ensured by
κU(kt, i, t) ≤ κU(kt, i) ∗ (1− φD(kt, i, t)) (3.32)
κU(kt, i, t) ≥ κU(kt, i, t) (3.33)
κD(kt, i, t) ≥ κD(kt, i, t) (3.34)
An upward gradient during the shut-down phase is eliminated while ensuring
the minimum gradient limit is always lower than the maximum one. The power
level of each operational zone is aggregated to the power level of the unit by
P(kt, i, t) =
R∑
r=1
P(kt, i, t, r) (3.35)
The dynamic maximum and minimum upward and downward gradient limits
are linked to the maximum and minimum allowed change in power level by
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P(kt, i, t) ≤ P(kt, i, t− 1) + κU(kt, i, t− 1) − κD(kt, i, t− 1) (3.36)
P(kt, i, t) ≥ P(kt, i, t− 1) + κD(kt, i, t− 1) − κU(kt, i, t− 1) (3.37)
The change in supplied energy is obtained by applying the market round
granularity as introduced in equation (3.7).
3.3.3.3 Gradient Costs
In contrast to assumptions in literature, the minimum stable power level duration
can be violated at the expense of incurring supplementary maintenance costs.
A profit-maximising generator would violate the minimum stable power level
duration if the cost for increased flexibility is offset by the gain of profitably
supplying the market at a larger quantity. Hence, the assumption of a fixed
minimum stable power level duration is insufficient when modelling strategic
gaming behaviour in a liberalised market environment.
The gradient cost is dependent on the up- (νU(·)) or downward (νD(·)) ramping
direction, and the minimum stable power level duration t·≡(·):
CG(kt, i, t) ≥
CGU(kt, i, t, tU∼) ∗ (νU(kt, i, t) + νD(kt, i, t− tU∼) − 1)
(3.38)
CG(kt, i, t) ≥
CGD(kt, i, t, tD∼) ∗ (νD(kt, i, t) + νU(kt, i, t− tD∼) − 1)
(3.39)
tU∼ = 1 . . . tU≡(kt, i)for which holds
tD∼ = 1 . . . tD≡(kt, i)
The gradient cost per unit is aggregated on a portfolio level by
CG(t) =
K∑
k=1
CG(kt, t) =
I(k)∑
i(k)=1
CG(kt, i, t) (3.40)
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Supplementary costs are allowed to be different when ramping up after having
ramped down than when ramping down after having ramped up.
Consistency regarding the ramping direction ν·(·) is achieved by
φS(kt, i, t) + φ^S(kt, i, t) + φ^HD(kt, i, t− 1) ≤ νU(kt, i, t) (3.41)
νU(kt, i, t) ≤ φS(kt, i, t) + φP(kt, i, t)
+ φ^S(kt, i, t) + φ^HD(kt, i, t− 1)
(3.42)
φD(kt, i, t) ≤ νD(kt, i, t) (3.43)
νD(kt, i, t) ≤ φD(kt, i, t) + φP(kt, i, t) (3.44)
νU(kt, i, t) + νD(kt, i, t) ≤ 1 (3.45)
Ramping upward is enforced during the start-up phase and after terminating
the hot stand-by phase. No such obligation is instated to ramp up during the
production phase. Similarly, ramping down is mandatory during the shut-down
phase but optional during the production phase. A unit is prohibited to ramp
up and down during the same market round.
3.3.3.4 Generation, start-up and shut-down costs
The generation cost is represented by
CP(kt, i, t) =
R∑
r=1
(
P(kt, i, t, r) ∗ ηt(kt, i, r)
)
+
(
CP0(kt, i) ∗ (ζ(kt, i, t) − φH(kt, i, t))
)
+
(
CPH(kt, i) ∗ φH(kt, i, t)
)
(3.46)
It takes into account sunk operating costs (CP0(·)) and fuel consumption costs
for operating during hot stand-by (CPH(·)).
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The fuel consumption in any other operational phase exhibits a quadratic
function in terms of the unit’s power level. In order to maintain a linear
formulation, the fuel cost curve is linearly interpolated by using linear cost
slopes (ηt(·)). Each linear cost slope is defined per operational zone r. The
modular formulation of operational zones makes it easy to add zones in order
to accurately represent the quadratic shape of the fuel cost curve.
Start-up and shut-down costs depend on the temperature of the unit’s core,
resembling an exponential curve before reaching an equilibrium after a time
period denoted by the minimum operational duration τON(·) and minimum
inactive duration τOFF(·). Even though an explicit constraint is mostly instated
in literature to prevent starting up or shutting down before the respective
minimum duration has been reached, these minimum durations can be violated
at the expense of incurring supplementary maintenance costs.
The total cost when starting up or shutting down a thermal unit is calculted by
CS(kt, i, t) ≥
[
φ^S(kt, i, t) −
t−1∑
t ′=t−td
ζ(kt, i, t
′)
] ∗ CSU(kt, i, td) (3.47)
CD(kt, i, t) ≥ CDD(kt, i, tu)∗
[
φ^D(kt, i, t) −
t−1∑
t ′=t−tu
(1− ζ(kt, i, t
′))
] (3.48)
∀td ∈ [1 . . . τOFF(kt, i)]for which holds
∀tu ∈ [1 . . . τON(kt, i)]
The exponential shape of both cost functions is interpolated per market round
by the step-wise functions CSU(·) and CDD(·). All unit costs are aggregated
on a portfolio level using
CP(t) =
K∑
k=1
CP(kt, t) =
I(k)∑
i=1
CP(kt, i, t) (3.49)
CS(t) =
K∑
k=1
CS(kt, t) =
I(k)∑
i=1
CS(kt, i, t) (3.50)
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CD(t) =
K∑
k=1
CD(kt, t) =
I(k)∑
i=1
CD(kt, i, t) (3.51)
3.3.4 Hydropower plant constraints
3.3.4.1 Target discharge levels
Each hydropower plant has a specific maximum target discharge level per
market session in order to preserve the long-term profitability of the plant due
to stochastic inflow levels. In contrast to discussed literature, three categories
of discharges are considered: planned, residual and future energy.
Planned energy (QP(·)) is the actual discharge capacity planned during the
market session. Residual energy (QR(·)) is the cumulative unused discharge
potential from previous market sessions while future energy (QF(·)) relates to
energy capacity allocated to the next market session. Each of the discharge
categories are input parameters to the short-term UC and ED, but are
exogenously obtained from a medium-term planning tool (Doquet et al., 2008).
The maximum allocated discharge level during the market session, for each
discharge category, is described by
T∑
t=1
(V(kh, t) + Vr(kh, t)) ∗ γ ≤ QR(kh, d) (3.52)
T∑
t=1
(W(kh, t) +Wr(kh, t)) ∗ γ ≤ QP(kh, d) +
T∑
t=1
(Z(kh, t) ∗ γ) (3.53)
T∑
t=1
(X(kh, t) + Xr(kh, t)) ∗ γ ≤ QF(kh, d) (3.54)
No constraints are formulated to force a target dispatch schedule to be followed:
the hydropower plant is allowed to deviate from the planned energy discharge
depending on whether such deviation would result in the most profitable set of
maximum anticipated market clearing prices. Thus, in contrast to alternative
models found in literature, the hydropower plant is not obliged to reach a
predetermined water reservoir level at the end of the market session.
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Profitability differs between each discharge category. Planned energy is only
supplied to the market in case the market clearing price exceeds the water
value during the market session. Residual energy is available in case not all
planned energy has been dispatched during previous market sessions or in case
the reservoir level threatens to reach its maximum capacity.
The cost of residual energy is therefore lower than the water value but never
negative. Dispatching future energy poses an additional risk as it reduces the
planned dispatch level during future market sessions. Hence, the associated cost
is higher than the water value. The water value for each discharge category is
retrieved from an exogenous medium-term planning model.
The generator is also capable of reserving part of the total available discharge
capacity. Reserved hydropower is not submitted to the MO on the day-ahead
market, but withheld to support future balancing requirements. The reservation
of hydropower must however comply with the short-term discharge levels.
3.3.4.2 Technical capacity limits
The minimum and maximum technical discharge limits are enforced by
V(kh, t) + Vr(kh, t) +W(kh, t) +Wr(kh, t)
+ X(kh, t) + Xr(kh, t) ≤ νD(kh, t) ∗ PD(kh)
(3.55)
V(kh, t) + Vr(kh, t) +W(kh, t) +Wr(kh, t)
+ X(kh, t) + Xr(kh, t) ≥ νD(kh, t) ∗ PD(kh)
(3.56)
The amount of water to be pumped is limited by
Z(kh, t) + Zr(kh, t) ≤ νP(kh, t) ∗ PP(kh) (3.57)
Z(kh, t) + Zr(kh, t) ≥ νP(kh, t) ∗ PP(kh) (3.58)
Finally, simultaneously pumping and discharging is prohibited by
νP(kh, t) + νD(kh, t) ≤ 1 (3.59)
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The minimum and maximum reservoir limits are implicitly enforced by reducing
or increasing the maximum discharge levels per discharge category, or by
changing the associated water values. Since these parameters are determined
by a medium-term planning model, their creation is not further discussed.
3.3.4.3 Dispatching cost
The cost for dispatching the hydropower plant is embedded in the water value
associated to each type of energy. Water values are exogenously calculated
based on the typical characteristics of the hydropower plant, the state of its
reservoir level and the expected day-ahead market clearing price over a limited
horizon of future market sessions, commonly 1 year. The dispatching cost of
the hydropower plant in each market round is therefore fully described by
CH(t) = (γ ∗ V(kh, t) ∗ ηh,R(kh, d)) + (γ ∗W(kh, t) ∗ ηh,P(kh, d))
+ (γ ∗ X(kh, t) ∗ ηh,F(kh, d)) − (γ ∗ Z(kh, t) ∗ ηh,Z(kh, d))
(3.60)
3.3.5 Wind and solar plant constraints
In case the feed-in tariff scheme is imposed, the generator does not submit price-
quantity pairs to supply renewable energy to the day-ahead market. Rather, any
RES plant is considered as must-run. The TSO is subsequently responsible for
maximising the injection of renewable energy subject to transmission constraints.
In this case, renewable energy can be considered as a negative demand shift,
thereby eliminating the need for its representation in the UC and ED model.
In case the incumbent support scheme allows RES participation on the day-
ahead market, as is the case under e.g. the green quota and premium scheme,
the generator already needs to submit a renewable quantity to the MO in order
to avoid excessive balancing costs due to the associated uncertainty on the
plant’s actual power level at delivery time. Hence, the RES quantity to submit
has to be taken into account in the UC and ED model.
3.3.5.1 Allowed quantity range
In contrast to conventionally submiting the expected RES power level, the RES
quantity to submit is selected from an allowed range using the mean (Pµ(·))
and standard deviation (Pσ(·)) of the RES dispatch forecast:
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Y(kr, t) ≤ Pµ(kr, t) + R(kr, t) ∗ Pσ(kr, t) (3.61)
Y(kr, t) ≥ Pµ(kr, t) − R(kr, t) ∗ Pσ(kr, t) (3.62)
Parameters R(·) and R(·) indicate the up- and downward risk in the form of the
statistical standard score.
The approach maximises the day-ahead profit subject to the submitted RES
quantity, the dispatching cost of the remaining plants in the portfolio and
the emerging market clearing price in function of the portfolio dispatch level.
Consequently, coordinated dispatch flexibility between the RES plant and the
temporally constrained thermal plants in the portfolio, is facilitated.
In case the generator additionally owns hydropower plants, discharge or pumping
capacity can be reserved for future self-balancing requirements. The reservation
of hydropower is linked to the RES forecast uncertainty by H(·) and H(·):
Vr(kh, t) +Wr(kh, t) + Xr(kh, t) − Zr(kh, t)
≤
Kr∑
kr=1
(H(kr, t) ∗ Pσ(kr, t))
(3.63)
Vr(kh, t) +Wr(kh, t) + Xr(kh, t) − Zr(kh, t)
≥−
Kr∑
kr=1
(H(kr, t) ∗ Pσ(kr, t))
(3.64)
In case prices of intra-day markets, real-time markets or imbalance charges after
the imbalance settlement can be adequately forecasted, above equations are
complemented with information on which future balancing costs to expect, given
the coordinated dispatch of hydropower plants and the RES plant. For this
purposeM scenarios of submitting RES quantity ρr(·) and reserving hydropower
ρh(·) are evaluated in terms of expected future balancing cost.
The expected future balancing cost associated to each scenario m is exogenously
calculated using stochastic optimisation taking into account the RES forecast
uncertainty, the water value of energy reserved, and estimations of intra-day
and real-time liquidity. They are estimated using either historic experience, or
agent-based models to account for strategic gaming behaviour (Trinh, 2013).
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By introducing the expected future balancing cost when dispatching the RES
plant, a trade-off between maximising day-ahead profit and minimising the
expected cost of future balancing requirements is achieved. Hence, objective
function (3.1) maximises total expected profit. The expected cost for future
balancing requirements can be negative, e.g. because of strategic gaming
behaviour, indicating a profit can be gained on intra-day and real-time markets.
Each scenario m representing a decision ω(·) on the submitted RES quantity
(ρr(·)) and the reserved amount of hydropower (ρh(·)) for all RES farms, is
integrated by
Y(kr, t) −
M(kr)∑
m=1
ω(kr, t,m) ∗ ρr(kr, t,m) = 0 (3.65)
Kh∑
kh=1
(Vr(kh, t) +Wr(kh, t) + Xr(kh, t))
−
Kr∑
kr=1
M(kr)∑
m=1
ω(kr, t,m) ∗ ρh(kr, t,m) = 0
(3.66)
Only one scenario can be pursued per RES plant:
M(kr)∑
m=1
ω(kr, t,m) = 1 (3.67)
3.3.5.2 Dispatching cost
The total RES dispatching cost equals the expected future balancing cost ρc(·)
minus existing subsidies (pi(·)), corresponding to e.g. the received premium or
the price of green certificates depending on the instated RES support scheme.
The operational cost for a RES plant is considered negligible:
CR(t) =
M∑
m=1
(ρc(kr, t,m) ∗ω(kr, t,m)) − pi(kr, t) ∗ Y(kr, t) (3.68)
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3.4 Impact of the contributions of the model
Following case studies assess the performance of the presented UC and ED model.
Results are compared with results retrieved from literature to quantitatively
position the presented model to alternative ones. Benchmarking with literature
moreover increases model credibility. The simulation setup of each of the
three seperate case studies retrieved assesses the impact of each contribution in
isolation from the other in order to facilitate the interpretation of results.
All presented cases were implemented in GAMS 23.9.3 and solved with CPLEX
on a 2.27 GHz processor (Rosenthal, 2012).
3.4.1 Dynamic gradient limits and hot stand-by phase
To assess the impact of dynamically calculating the gradient limit, the results
of the presented model are compared with results retrieved from a benchmark
case study assuming fixed gradient limits (Arroyo & Conejo, 2004). The case
study encompasses a single thermal plant consisting of a single unit, owned by
a generator active in a perfectly competitive market environment. Since low
prices encourage a shut-down and start-up of the plant, dynamically calculating
the gradient limits is expected to facilitate this process and to significantly
impact the final profit. An hourly market round granularity is assumed.
The generation cost is linear with a fuel cost of e38/MWh. Sunk operating
cost are equal to e100/h. The shut-down cost is independent of the operational
duration and equals e56. Similarly, the cost incurred at start-up equals e850.
Supplementary maintenance costs are not considered.
The gradient limit during the start-up phase is 38 MW/h, during the shut-down
phase 40 MW/h. The maximum technical power level is 294 MW. The minimum
stable power level equals 112 MW. The maximum ramp-up and ramp-down
rates during the production phase are 60 MW/h and 50 MW/h respectively.
Both the start-up and shut-down phase lasts 3 hours. Minimum operational
and inactive durations are 3 hours. The unit has already been operating for 11
hours and produces 170 MW during the last hours of the previous day.
The residual demand curve in each market round consists of a single price-
quantity pair priced at λ(1, t). Hourly prices are denoted in table 3.1.
During market rounds 1 to 8, prices are lower than the plant’s fuel cost, providing
an incentive to shut down the plant. From market round 8 onward, a significant
jump in prices is observed, giving the incentive to the generator to restart
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Hour λ(1, t) Benchmark Presented[e/MWh] [MW] [MW]
1 26.950 120 120
2 25.817 112 78.4
3 22.209 70 38.4
4 21.219 30 0
5 19.668 0 0
6 19.800 0 0
7 24.167 0 38
8 26.950 37 76
9 40.700 75 115.2
10 44.110 112 175.2
11 45.177 172 235.2
12 47.025 232 294
13 47.773 292 294
14 46.200 294 294
15 44.033 294 294
16 44.550 294 294
17 46.200 294 294
18 48.950 294 294
19 48.840 294 294
20 45.100 294 294
21 43.252 294 294
22 44.000 244 244
23 44.000 194 194
24 25.850 144 144
Table 3.1: Price Data and Optimal Generation Schedule
the plant as soon as the minimum inactive duration time has passed. A local
maximum of e47.773/MWh is reached in market round 13, leading to a trade-off
between reducing the power level to avoid supplying at a loss and increasing
the power level to benefit from supplying at highly profitable prices.
By dynamically calculating the gradient limit, this trade-off is expected to
be relaxed, resulting in a more efficient dispatch. Table 3.1 also illustrates
the scheduling solution obtained from the presented model together with the
solution calculated by the benchmark model (Arroyo & Conejo, 2004).
The difference in results between both models is found during market rounds 2
to 12. During the shut-down process as well as the start-up process, the plant
is observed to ramp faster when applying the presented model because gradient
limits are dynamically calculated. Indeed, the plant’s ramping process from
market round 1 to round 2 only lasts 9.6 minutes considering the maximum
downward gradient limit in the production phase. While the benchmark model
implicitly requires the plant to halt its ramping process when the minimum
stable power level is reached, the presented model allows the plant to enter the
shut-down phase for the remaining 50.4 minutes.
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The plant therefore ramps down faster during unprofitable market rounds 1 to
5, thereby reducing the incurred loss. Moreover, by reaching the shut-down
moment one market round earlier, the plant is already able to start up at market
round 7. Adding the increased flexibility during start-up, the plant reaches its
maximum power level two profitable market rounds earlier than the benchmark
model, hence increasing its revenue.
The resulting profit achieved when using the presented model equals e19.39k
compared to a profit of e16.77k without applying dynamic gradient calculation,
equivalent to a profit increase of 15.6%. The profit increases further when the
possibility of a hot stand-by phase is taken into account. Assigning the sunk
operating cost as the cost for operating in the hot stand-by phase increases
the profit to e20.26k, equivalent to an increase of 20.8%, as expensive start-up
costs during market round 7 are avoided.
3.4.2 Gradient costs
To study the impact of supplementary gradient costs, the case study presented
in reference (de la Torre et al., 2002) is selected. Since the envisaged generator
owns a realistically-sized portfolio of 40 thermal units dispersed over 7 plants
with varying technical characteristics, supplementary maintenance costs are
expected to be incurred in exchange for increased portfolio dispatch flexibility.
Unit characteristics between plants are based on the 1996 IEEE RTS test
standard (Grigg et al., 1999). Table 3.2 illustrates the properties of each unit.
Four operational zones approximate the non-linear fuel cost curve. The start-up
cost is considered independent of the duration the unit is inactive. Finally,
the gradient cost is assumed to be exponentially decreasing in terms of the
stable duration, for both ramping directions. The maximum supplementary
maintenance cost is assumed to equal the start-up cost; its minimum equals
10% of the start-up cost.
Although only a relevant case study assuming an oligopolistic environment has
been found in literature, the inclusion of gradient costs is also valuable for a
generator operating in a competitive environment. Dispatch flexibility in an
oligopolistic environment is expected to result in higher prices during market
rounds in which technical constraints prevent the generator from fully exploiting
its market power potential, while, in a competitive environment, dispatch
flexibility is expected to allow for a more cost-efficient portfolio dispatch. The
impact on profit in both environments is however expected to be small due to
the incurment of high supplementary maintenance costs relative to the small
temporary advantage, but is expected to increase with increasing price volatility
or market power potential differences between market rounds.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
# 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
P(·) 12 76 100 155 197 350 400
P(·) 2.4 15.2 25 54.25 68.95 140 100
ηt(·, 1) 23.41 11.46 18.60 9.92 19.20 10.08 5.31(<2.4) (<15.2) (<25.0) (<54.25) (<68.95) (<140) (<100)
ηt(·, 2) 23.76 11.96 20.03 10.25 20.32 10.68 5.38(<6.0) (<38.0) (<50.0) (<93.00) (<118.20) (<227.50) (<200)
ηt(·, 3) 26.84 13.89 21.67 10.68 21.22 11.09 5.53(<9.6) (<60.8) (<80.0) (<124.00) (<157.60) (<280) (<320)
ηt(·, 4) 30.40 15.97 22.72 11.26 22.13 11.72 5.66
κPU(·) 12 76 100 155 180 120 400
κPD(·) 12 76 100 155 180 120 400
CSU(·) 196 1353 1635 2173 2239 10190 0
τON(·) 4 8 8 8 12 24 0
τOFF(·) 2 4 8 8 10 48 0
τD≡(·) 2 4 4 4 6 12 0
τU≡(·) 1 2 4 4 5 12 0
Table 3.2: Unit characteristics per plant type
The price-quantity pairs of which the residual demand curve per market round
is composed, are presented in table 3.3. The table additionally illustrates the
scheduling solution of both the presented as the benchmark model.
Relaxing the fixed minimum stable power level duration constraints triggers
the dispatch of 25 units spread over all plants in the portfolio compared to the
dispatch of only 21 units spread over 4 plants. All units incur larger gradient
costs in return for additional portfolio flexibility to affect each market round’s
emerging market clearing price, except for the units of plant 5 and 6, as they
are most expensive in terms of supplementary maintenance costs.
The added flexibility results in a larger power level during market rounds 3,
13, 14 and 15 compared to the benchmark model. Since anticipated prices are
not affected, the presented model achieves larger revenue during these market
rounds. Added dispatch flexibility also allows the generator to benefit from
higher anticipated prices by supplying less energy during market rounds 17, 18
and 23. Nevertheless, in market rounds 7 to 10, 12, 16 and 21 less revenue is
generated due to a smaller supply without affecting the market clearing price.
The revenue when applying the benchmark model equals e1.92M compared to
e1.87M when applying the presented model. The 2.3% reduction in revenue is
compensated by a reduction in fuel cost by dispatching units more economically,
even including supplementary gradient costs. While the total generation and
start-up cost equal e589.69k and e82.30k respectively for the benchmark case,
the gradient cost when applying the presented model is e20.963k, the generation
cost e510.61k and the start-up cost e84.32k. Profit is increased from e1.245M
to e1.255M by applying the presented model, a marginal increase of 0.8%.
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The observed profit increase can thus be considered negligible for an oligopolistic
generator to provide an incentive to violate the minimum stable power level
duration. The results nevertheless illustrate the capability of a generator to
provide dispatch flexibility, which is especially interesting from the perspective
of system reliability. Gradient costs might therefore gain importance when
inter-market round price volatility is high, as is generally the case for a power
system characterised by a massive RES integration.
3.4.3 Coordinated dispatch
No publication covering the coordinated dispatch between thermal, hydropower
and RES plants in an oligopolistic environment has been found. The residual
demand curves and thermal characteristics of the previous case study are hence
complemented with a hydropower and RES plant. In order to reduce portfolio
flexibility, thermal plant 7 is omitted. The hydropower plant has a daily planned
energy of 3000 MWh at a water value of e25/MWh and a maximum discharge
limit of 200 MW. Maintenance costs are omitted.
In order not to clutter the validation case with imbalance cost data associated
to each coordinated dispatch scenarios m, the submitted RES quantity is
considered to be able to deviate from the expected energy injection level, up-
and downwardly, as long as the reservation level of hydropower minimally covers
the increase in expected imbalance.
The expected imbalance is calculated from its half-folded normal imbalance
distribution while the associated imbalance cost equals the operating cost for
dispatching the reserved hydropower. Intra-day and real-time prices are hence
not explicitly considered so the impact of shorter term markets on the optimal
day-ahead scheduling solution can however not be generalised.
Although in reality the expected imbalance cost would be integrated to assess the
economic benefit in intra-day and real-time markets for deviating the submitted
RES quantity from the forecast, this approach is sufficient to validate the
presented model since both coordinated and uncoordinated approach yield the
same imbalance risk.
The total profit when applying coordinated dispatch equals e1.18M compared
to a profit of e1.13M. The 4.24% increase in profit is obtained because the
coordinated dispatch generally achieves either higher market clearing prices,
or a larger amount of supply at equal market clearing prices, during the most
profitable market rounds of the market session. Deviating from submitting
the mean RES quantity hence increases the portfolio flexibility to manipulate
market clearing prices without affecting expected future balancing costs.
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3.5 Conclusion
A novel coordinated UC and ED MILP model of a portfolio consisting of thermal,
hydropower and RES plants is presented. Profits generated by the portfolio
are optimised subject to residual demand curves the generator faces in each
market round of the market session. Technical constraints and plant economics
are modelled for each plant type although thermal plants are modelled more
in detail because of their inflexibility and their dominant share in the EU27
electricity generation technology mix.
The scheduling problem is approached from the perspective of strategic
and flexible dispatch, as required by a generator in an electricity system
characterised with massive RES integration. Several contributions to literature
have consequently been made. Firstly, the dispatch flexibility of thermal plants
has been accurately modelled: fixed thermal gradient limits have been replaced
by a dynamic gradient calculation and the fixed thermal minimum stable power
level durations before changing ramping direction can now be violated at the
expense of incurring supplementary maintenance costs.
Secondly, a RES quantity deviating from the expected RES supply is strategically
submitted to the MO on the day-ahead market. In contrast to submitting
the expected supply of RES plants as negative demand or envisaging a
collaboration scheme between hydropower and RES plants with the sole objective
of minimising imbalance costs, the presented model envisages such collaboration
scheme in coexistence with the dispatch of the inflexible thermal portfolio to
maximise total profit. The RES quantity are determined as a trade-off between
the expected future self-balancing cost and the additional gained profit on the
day-ahead market from influencing the emerging market clearing price.
Results from applying the model to case studies retrieved from literature show
that modelling the flexible dispatch augments the profit of a generator, especially
in electricity systems with medium to high price volatility. Since the massive
integration of RES is expected to increase price volatility, modelling the flexible
dispatch of a typical portfolio will further gain in importance. Because the
model relaxes the assumptions and constraints existing models incorporate,
the obtained profit will at least be equal or higher than the one obtained by
applying these alternative models. The use of the presented UC and ED problem
formulation throughout the dissertation to solve the scheduling problem is hence
legitimate from the perspective of flexible and strategic dispatch.

Chapter 4
Offering Strategy
Generators deploy their available generation capacity under uncertain price
signals when operating in the electricity market. Price uncertainty is gradually
reduced close to the actual time of delivery. Perfect anticipation to uncertainty
is thus only achieved if a generator is capable of continuously adjusting the
power level of generation plants in its portfolio according to updated forecasts.
The different technologies in the portfolio are however not endlessly controllable
and flexible. As such, the decision on how to efficiently dispatch each plant
has to be made well in advance of the actual time of power delivery. As seen
in chapter 3, Unit Commitment (UC) and Economic Dispatch (ED) models
are well suited as a decision support tool to maximise the profit of a generator.
Without a complementary offering strategy however, the uncertainty of future
profit risk is not adequately managed.
This chapter presents a novel offering strategy the generator should pursue
when participating in the day-ahead spot market as organised under the Power
Exchange (PX) model. The offering strategy aggregates optimal target dispatch
schedules, calculated from residual demand curve forecast confidence intervals,
to create a coordinated set of price-quantity pairs to submit to the Market
Operator (MO) so that the feedback of an infeasible accepted dispatch schedule
is mitigated when the actually emerging residual demand curves deviate from
the anticipated ones used in the UC and ED model. The method hence aims at
obtaining the maximum attainable profit during the market session, i.e. the
profit obtained under perfect knowledge of emerging residual demand curves.
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This chapter is based on references (Maenhoudt & Deconinck, 2013b; Maenhoudt
& Deconinck, 2013c) and containts three innovative contributions.
Firstly, a novel profit risk hedging offering strategy is presented. In contrast
to expected profit maximisation used in literature, the presented offering
strategy succeeds in maximising each market session’s profit while mitigating the
associated risk due to residual demand curve uncertainty. The offering strategy
additionally mitigates imbalances arising from being accepted by the MO to
supply the market according to an infeasible day-ahead dispatch schedule, hence
mitigating exposure to undesired future balancing requirements. This schedule
results from the coordinated dispatch of thermal and hydropower plants, and
Renewable Energy Sources (RES).
Secondly, the offering strategy explicitly represents the technical flexibility of
each plant in the portfolio in both price and quantity. Moreover, the strategy is
not limited to the creation of price-quantity pairs which are valid for a single
market round. The method advances the state-of-the-art in offering strategies
by creating complex price-quantity pairs spanning multiple market rounds for
handling significant deviations from anticipated residual demand curves. The
impact of creating such complex price-quantity pairs on profit risk is assessed
and illustrates a well-performing strategy under imperfect knowledge of the real
residual demand curve distribution.
Thirdly, the performance of the offering strategy is benchmarked against
alternative offering strategies in a realistic market environment. Data are
obtained from the electricity market of mainland Spain, characterised by a large
installed capacity of RES plants. The realistic data are complemented with
a realistic market clearing process which mimics the mechanism as currently
implemented in the Central Western European (CWE) region. The strategy is
benchmarked against both competitive offering strategies found in literature
and against a recently presented oligopolistic strategy. A comparative analysis
illustrates the robustness of the presented offering strategy compared to the
alternative ones. This allows the method to approximate the maximum
attainable profit during the market session at low computational cost.
4.1 Introduction
The price of electricity is the motivation behind all activities of a generator
in a liberalised market. Based on price forecasts for each market round of the
next market session, each generator performs a price-based UC and ED to
maximise its profit. Maximising profit day-ahead of power delivery time exposes
generators to risk resulting from (1) limited access to delayed information, (2)
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demand forecast uncertainty, (3) competitors’ behaviour, (4) RES forecast errors,
(5) unexpected events such as outages of thermal power plant or transmission
lines, (6) the impact of previously made decisions in terms of bilateral contracts
or long-term obligations towards large customers, (7) impact of concurrently
organised auctions (e.g. ancillary services) or future ones (e.g. balancing
markets), (8) operating constraints inherent to each type of power plant and
(9) transmission constraints.
All mentioned uncertainties affect the actual emerging market clearing price in
each market round. Short term price predictions typically exhibit white-noise
errors ranging from 5% to 12%, severely harming the profit of the generator if its
response to above-mentioned risk is not adequately accounted for when creating
price-quantity pairs (Contreras et al., 2003; Delarue et al., 2010). Stochastic UC
and ED models have therefore been developed in order to calculate the target
dispatch schedule which maximises the expected profit under profit risk (David,
1993; Baillo et al., 2004; Simoglou et al., 2010; Plazas et al., 2005; Conejo
et al., 2002). The target dispatch schedule is then translated according to the
available market instruments, typically restricted to price-quantity pairs per
market round. Besides offering the single target dispatch schedule at a single
fixed price, either equalling the variable generation cost or the expected market
clearing price, literature proposes few alternative offering strategies.
4.2 State-of-the-art
4.2.1 Literature overview
Two broad categories of stochastic UC and ED models are identified: either a
user-defined risk factor is included in the objective function, or expected profit
is maximised given the likelihood of occurrence of a set of price scenarios or
price confidence intervals (Xu & Baldick, 2007; Barroso et al., 2011).
The profit risk factor mostly consists of a user-defined risk tolerance parameter
multiplied by the variance of the normally distributed price forecast (Yamin &
Shahidehpour, 2004; Ni et al., 2004). This parameter determines the risk level
the generator is willing to expose itself to. Results obtained by this approach
are proven to be highly sensitive to the value of this parameter. To mitigate
result sensitivity, conditional value-at-risk has been proposed to replace the
price variance as profit risk component in the objective function (Jabr, 2005).
Although results are proven to be more robust, they are also proven to be
more conservative and less optimal. Using conditional value-at-risk is therefore
argued to be more suited to manage medium to long term market risks.
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Price scenario trees are commonly combined with the real options model, or
more recently with the conditional value-at-risk method, to determine a trade-
off between allocating power generation to weekly forward contracts and the
short-term day-ahead spot market (Denton et al., 2003; Garces & Conejo,
2010). Short-term models rather use Monte Carlo simulations to tackle profit
risk (Gountis & Bakirtzis, 2004). Due to the computational intensity of all
methods involving price scenarios, a trade-off is required between the amount of
generated price scenarios and the level of detail at which technical constraints
are modelled. The approach is for the same reason only applicable when a
competitive market environment is envisaged since the price is the only stochastic
variable for which scenario trees are necessary. In an oligopolistic environment,
scenario trees need to be created for the price, volume and number of price-
quantity pairs, thereby rendering the problem computationally intractable.
Besides deploying heuristic or iterative solution techniques such as genetic
algorithms (Azadeh et al., 2012), fuzzy logic (Attaviriyanupap et al., 2004;
Yamin, 2005), control theory (Syothert & MacLeod, 2000) or partical swarm
optimisation (Chaturvedi et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2010) to reduce computation
time or to enlarge the approach’s scope to an oligopolistic market environment,
computational complexity is also reduced by confining price scenarios to
confidence intervals (Conejo et al., 2002; Baringo & Conejo, 2011). Both
approaches however come at the expense of the results being sensitive, either
to the choice of evolutionary input parameters or the choice of the confidence
interval (Boonchuay & Ongsakul, 2011).
All described approaches generally have the same effect on the creation of
price-quantity pairs: they conserve the submitted supply quantity in order to
reduce the generator’s exposure to profit risk. Indeed, when participating in a
perfectly competitive market environment in which uniform pricing is imposed,
reducing the supply quantity reduces profit risk at the expense of incurring
an opportunity cost for not submitting the whole supply capacity. From the
perspective of an oligopoly, the reduction of market participant’s profit risk
cannot be deducted from reducing the supply quantity alone.
The resulting conservative dispatch schedule is then submitted per market
round at a single fixed price either equalling the variable generation cost
or the expected market clearing price. Literature proposes few alternative
pricing strategies (Borenstein et al., 2002; Bushnell & Saravia, 2002; Wolfram,
1999; Joskow & Kahn, 2001; Mansur, 2001) even though it is more and more
argued that this literature benchmark of pricing price-quantity pairs cannot be
considered the norm for a realistic offering strategy (Cramton, 2004). Such a
pricing strategy is rather argued not to mitigate profit risk.
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4.2.2 Conclusion and contributions
Although the discussed approaches provide a framework to maximise expected
profit in the presence of profit risk, the offering strategy either fails to accurately
represent technical constraints and plant economics, its results are highly
sensitive to selected input parameters or the formulation is computationally
intensive due to the need for dense scenario trees in order to make informed
decisions. The approaches moreover unrealistically assume a perfectly known
price distribution and assume computationally-friendly piece-wise linear curves
to be submitted to the MO. These offering strategies consequently cannot be
generalised to be applied in real power markets (von der Fehr & Harbord, 1993;
Wen & David, 2001; Fleten & Kristoffersen, 2007).
Maximising expected profit as objective generally produces rather conservative
dispatch schedules. Downward price risk indeed poses significantly higher profit
risk compared to the opportunity cost when prices are higher than expected.
As a consequence, by integrating profit risk anticipation in the UC and ED
problem formulation, the described approaches reduce the supply quantity to
be submitted to the MO in favour of reduced exposure to downward profit risk.
All of the discussed offering strategy approaches hence yield a trade-off, whether
or not user-defined, between two conflicting objectives: maximising profit versus
minimising profit risk. These objectives are however not necessarily conflicting:
in case prices are lower than expected, the incurred loss in revenue and cost
associated to future balancing requirements depend on the flexibility of the
plants in the portfolio to adjust their power levels according to the dispatch
schedule resulting from the rejection of price-quantity pairs. Integrating the
flexibility of the portfolio to adjust its dispatch schedule to market clearing
prices should allow the generator to both hedge itself against downward price
risk and to pursue profit-maximising opportunities in case emerging market
clearing prices are higher than expected. An effective pricing strategy which
complements the UC and ED scheduling solution is therefore argued to be
better suited to mitigate profit risk.
This chapter presents a novel offering strategy which represents the dispatch
flexibility of the plants in the portfolio to adjust their power level to emerging
market clearing prices. The offering strategy mitigates imbalances between the
target and accepted dispatch schedule due to residual demand curve uncertainty.
The generator then avoids either being contractually obliged to supply at a
loss, being forced to balance its position using secondary markets, or suffering
an opportunity cost in the face of profitable market clearing prices. All three
effects are persistent over time and lead to a reduction in total profit and an
increase in profit risk (Lind & Plott, 1991).
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4.3 Risk-constrained offering strategy
The offering strategy assumes the availability of N target dispatch schedules
spanning the next market session. Each target dispatch schedule n is obtained
by solving a price-based UC and ED of which the general form equals:
T∑
t=1
(λ∗n(t) ∗Qn(t) − Cn(t)) (4.1)Maximise
f(Qn(t)) ≤ A(t)subject to
g(Qn(t)) = B(t)
λ∗n(t) = λn(t)|(Qn(t)=Q∗n(t))with
The scheduling problem optimises the generator’s profit on a portfolio level
given residual demand curve forecast scenario λn(t) and total cost function
Cn(t) for dispatching the portfolio according to dispatch schedule Qn(t). As
a result, all plants’ and units’ optimal target dispatch schedules Q∗n(kt, i, t),
Q∗n(kh, t) and Q∗n(kr, t) to be submitted for each market round t are obtained.
The resulting anticipated market clearing price equals λ∗n(t). Since the offering
strategy aims at representing the dispatch flexibility of the portfolio, target
dispatch schedules are assumed to be obtained by solving the presented UC
and ED problem formulation (chapter 3). Technical and economic constraints
are represented using the short-hand notation f(·), g(·), A(t) and B(t).
Each residual demand curve forecast scenario n throughout the market session
is derived from the residual demand curve forecast distributions in each market
round t by assuming the emergence of all residual demand curves corresponding
to the same percentile of each residual demand curve forecast distribution
per market round. Figure 4.1 illustrates the scenario generation in case three
perfectly competitive residual demand curve forecast scenarios corresponding
to the 5%, 50% and 95% percentile are anticipated. The figure is obtained by
calculating the distribution of emerging market clearing prices in the electricity
market of mainland Spain during the first 71 days of 2008.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the associated target dispatch schedules. For illustrative
purposes, figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the forecast confidence interval in case an
oligopolistic market environment is assumed, as observed in market round 22 of
the electricity market of mainland Spain on January, 24, 2012.
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Figure 4.1: 90% confidence interval of the price forecast distribution in the
electricity market of mainland Spain as calculated from January, 1 to the March,
11, 2008
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Market Round [hour]
Po
w
er
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
Le
ve
l[
1
0
3
M
W
]
5% percentile
50% percentile
95% percentile
Figure 4.2: Example of the target dispatch schedules for each residual demand
curve forecast in figure 4.1
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Figure 4.3: 90% confidence interval of the residual demand curve forecast
distribution at market round 22 in the electricity market of mainland Spain as
calculated from the 1st to 24th of January 2012
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Figure 4.4: Detail of figure 4.3 with the anticipated supply quantity and
anticipated market clearing price indicated
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Simple price-quantity pairs are created in order to handle profit risk due to
residual demand curve uncertainty within the residual demand curve confidence
interval marked by anticipated residual demand curve forecast scenarios λ1(t)
and λN(t). Complex price-quantity pairs spanning multiple market rounds are
formulated in order to mitigate profit risk in case the actual residual demand
curve emerges outside the residual demand curve forecast confidence interval.
The creation of the set of simple and complex price-quantity pairs is elaborated
in the remainder of this section. To aid readability, the formal representation
of a price-quantity pair is denoted as
{Q
O,n
(q), QO,n(q), λO,n(q), tStart, tEnd} (4.2)
in which Q
O,n
(q) corresponds to the indivisible part of the price-quantity pair
which at least needs to be supplied when accepted and QO,n(q) equals to the
maximum volume submitted at price λO,n(q). The created price-quantity pair
is valid from market round tStart to market round tEnd. In case a price-quantity
pair is valid for a single market round, tStart equals tEnd. The creation of such
price-quantity pair type is discussed first.
4.3.1 Constructing price-quantity curves per market round
4.3.1.1 Pricing the quantities of the first residual demand curve scenario
The target dispatch schedule proposes the generator to supply the market with
Q∗1(t) at a maximum anticipated price λ∗1(t). Price λ∗1(t) therefore poses an
upper bound on λO,1(q) of any price-quantity pair q contributing to supply
Q∗1(t), even if the price of the price-quantity pair causes the generator to produce
at a loss during market round t. In fact, as the target dispatch schedule is
optimal, limiting the price of the price-quantity pair to λ∗1(t) keeps the likelihood
of this loss being compensated in following, more profitable, market rounds
consistent with the likelihood of emerging prices to exceed the ones denoted
by the residual demand curve forecast distribution. The likelihood of being
rejected by the MO in market round t, which in turn results in an infeasible
accepted dispatch schedule and associated losses, is consequently reduced.
The lower limit of the price at which the price-quantity pair is submitted, is
determined by the actual cost for dispatching the portfolio to supply Q∗1(t).
Since the dispatching cost differs between plant types and individual plants,
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price-quantity pairs are created per plant or per unit to represent individual
plant economics. Consequently, Q price-quantity pairs are defined: one for each
renewable energy source, one for each unit of each thermal plant and one for
each type1 of dispatched energy of each hydropower plant.
In case supplying the market is profitable during market round t, the generator
should at least pursue a ”cost recovery” pricing strategy. The strategy’s
objective is to generate sufficient revenues throughout the whole market session
to cover the total incurred variable and fixed cost as well as all losses incurred
by supplying the market during unprofitable market rounds, resulting from
dispatching the plant according to its individual target dispatch schedule. Hence,
also RES plants pursue a ”cost recovery” pricing scheme in the presence of
prices lower than the negative value of the incumbent subsidy scheme.
To obtain the ”cost recovery” price-quantity prices per market round, the total
cost to be recovered by dispatching the plant according to its target dispatch
schedule is calculated. The total cost to be recovered equals the total dispatching
cost minus the recovered variable cost. The exact formulation depends on the
plant type for which price-quantity pair q is created. Their relationship is
depicted by the bowtie symbol ./:
C^∗R,1(q, t) =
T∑
t=1
(C∗T,1(q, t) − C
∗
P ′,1(q, t)) (4.3)
in which
C∗T,1(q, t) =

C∗P,1(k, i, t) + C
∗
S,1(k, i, t) q ./ (kt, i)
+ C∗D,1(k, i, t) + C
∗
G,1(k, i, t)
γ ∗ V∗1(kh, t) ∗ ηh,R(kh, d) q ./ (kh, R)
γ ∗W∗1(kh, t) ∗ ηh,P(kh, d) q ./ (kh, P)
γ ∗ X∗1(kh, t) ∗ ηh,F(kh, d) q ./ (kh, F)
γ ∗ (−pi(kr, t)) ∗ Y∗1(kr, t) q ./ (kr)
and
C∗P ′,1(q, t) =

Q∗1(kt, i, t) ∗min (ηt(kt, i, r)|
(
Q∗
1
(kt,i,t)
γ
∈r)
, λ∗1(t)) q ./ (kt, i)
γ ∗ V∗1(kh, t) ∗min (ηh,R(kh, d), λ∗1(t)) q ./ (kh, R)
γ ∗W∗1(kh, t) ∗min (ηh,P(kh, d), λ∗1(t)) q ./ (kh, P)
γ ∗ X∗1(kh, t) ∗min (ηh,F(kh, d), λ∗1(t)) q ./ (kh, F)
−γ ∗min (pi(kr, t), λ∗1(t)) ∗ Y∗1(kr, t) q ./ (kr)
1The types are residual, planned and future energy.
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Increasing the price of the price-quantity pair increases the likelihood of the price-
quantity pair being rejected. This risk is ideally kept as small as possible over all
profitable market rounds. The total cost to be recovered C^∗R,1(q, t) is therefore
distributed proportionally to the yield between the maximum anticipated price
associated to residual demand curve scenario 1 and the variable generation cost.
The ”cost recovery” price mark-up is obtained by
C∗R,1(q, t) = α ∗ (λ∗1(t) − η(q)) + η(q) (4.4)
α =
C^∗R,1(q, t)∑T
t=1 ((λ
∗
1(t) − η(q)) ∗Q∗1(q, t))
(4.5)with
η(q) =

ηt(kt, i, r)|
(
Q∗n(kt,i,t)
γ
∈r) q ./ (kt, i)
ηh,R(kh, d) q ./ (kh, R)
ηh,P(kh, d) q ./ (kh, P)
ηh,F(kh, d) q ./ (kh, F)
−pi(kr, t) q ./ (kr)
in which
Q∗1(q, t) =

Q∗1(kt, i, t) q ./ (kt, i)
γ ∗ V∗1(kh, t) q ./ (kh, R)
γ ∗W∗1(kh, t) q ./ (kh, P)
γ ∗ X∗1(kh, t) q ./ (kh, F)
γ ∗ (Y∗1(kr, t)) q ./ (kr)
and
The final ”cost recovery” price C∗R,1(q, t) at each individual profitable market
round t is then obtained by adding the variable generation cost to the ”cost
recovery” price mark-up. The ”cost recovery” price at unprofitable market
rounds is consistent with the maximum anticipated price associated to residual
demand curve forecast scenario 1 and equals λ∗1(t).
Hence, a lower and upper bound on the price for each price-quantity pair
created to supply Q∗1(t) to the market, are defined. A risk-averse generator
tends to decide the final price of the price-quantity pair equal to the lower bound,
ensuring its cost recovery, while a risk-minded generator tends to choose a price
equal to the upper bound, thereby actively attempting to set the emerging
market clearing price. Any risk behaviour is applicable as they are all consistent
with the likelihood of emerging prices to exceed those denoted by the residual
demand curve scenario.
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The formal representation of the resulting price-quantity pair is given by
{Q
O,1
(q), QO,1(q), λO,1(q), tStart, tEnd} (4.6)
Q
O,1
(q) =

Q∗1(q, t) (1); q ./ (kt, i)
Q∗1(q, t) (2); q ./ (kh, ·)
∆Q∗1(q, t) (3); q ./ (kh, ·)
0 otherwise
in which
QO,1(q) = Q
∗
1(q, t)
λO,1(q) ∈ [C∗R,1(q, t) . . . λ∗1(t)]
tStart = tEnd = t
Q∗1(q, t) ≤ γ ∗ P(kt, i) (1)with
∆Q∗1(q, t) ≥ Q∗1(q, t) (2)
∆Q∗1(q, t) < Q
∗
1(q, t);∆Q
∗
1(q, t) > 0 (3)
∆Q∗1(q, t) = γ ∗ PD(kh) −
q−1∑
q ′=1
[Q∗1(q
′, t)]|q ′./(kh,·)and
The maximum quantity to submit to the MO equals the target dispatch schedule
while the minimum quantity depends on minimum technical limits to supply
energy during market round t. As such, the indivisible part of price-quantity
pairs associated with a thermal unit explicitly represents the start-up trajectory
in case the thermal plant starts up, the shut-down trajectory when shutting
down, or the minimum stable power level in case it operates in its production
phase. Price-quantity pairs associated to a hydropower plant type explicitly
represent the plant’s minimum technical capacity limits. No technical limits
are represented if the price-quantity pair is associated with a RES plant.
Since the risk behaviour of the generator depends on the environment it operates
in, which in turn should be represented by the shape of the residual demand
curve, the generator is expected to randomly select the price of the price-
quantity pair from the uniform price distribution defined between the previously-
calculated lower and upper price limits.
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4.3.1.2 Pricing the quantities of the remaining residual demand curve
scenarios
Applying the UC and ED model to the residual demand curve forecast scenario
n results in a target dispatch schedule which proposes the generator to supply
the market up to Q∗n(t). In case the proposed supply deviates from the already
submitted supply Q∗n−1(t), the generator has the incentive to further supply the
market. The resulting maximum anticipated market clearing price λ∗n(t) then
poses an upper bound on the price of the price-quantity pairs to be submitted
to supply the incremental quantity Q∗n(t) −Q∗n−1(t).
The generator must submit this additional quantity at a price strictly higher
than λ∗n−1(t) in order to (1) ensure the acceptance of all previously submitted
price-quantity pairs prior to the acceptance of the price-quantity pair to increase
the generator’s supply to Q∗n(t), and (2) not to violate the optimality of the
target dispatch schedule by supplying Q∗n(t) at equal or lower anticipated
market clearing prices.
All incurred variable and fixed costs are recovered in a similar manner as the
”cost recovery” pricing scheme described in formulas (4.3)-(4.4). Analogously,
the final ”cost recovery” price CR,n(q, t) of price-quantity pair q at market
round t is limited to λ∗n(t) to keep the likelihood of being accepted consistent
with that of emerging prices to exceed the values denoted by residual demand
curve forecast scenario n.
The formal representation of the price-quantity pair is given by
{Q
O,n
(q), QO,n(q), λO,n(q), tStart, tEnd} (4.7)
Q
O,n
(q) =

Q∗n(q, t) −Q
∗
n−1(q, t) (1); q ./ (kt, i)
γ ∗ P(kt, i) −Q∗n−1(q, t) (2); q ./ (kt, i)
Q∗n(q, t) −Q
∗
n−1(q, t) (3); q ./ (kh, ·)
∆Q∗n(q, t) (4); q ./ (kh, ·)
0 otherwise
with
QO,n(q) = Q
∗
n(q, t) −Q
∗
n−1(q, t)
λO,n(q) ∈ [max
(
λ∗n−1(t) + P ;CR,n(q, t)
)
. . . λ∗n(t)]
tStart = tEnd = t
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Q∗n(q, t) < γ ∗ P(kt, i) (1)and
Q∗n(q, t) ≥ γ ∗ P(kt, i); Q∗n−1(q, t) < γ ∗ P(kt, i) (2)
∆Q∗n(q, t) ≥ Q∗n(q, t) (3)
∆Q∗n(q, t) < Q
∗
n(q, t); ∆Q∗n(q, t) > 0 (4)
∆Q∗n(q, t) = γ ∗ PD(kh) −
q−1∑
q ′=1
[Q∗n(q
′, t)]|q ′./(kh,·)
The minimum quantity to be supplied depends on whether the minimum
technical limits to supply energy during market round t have already been taken
into account by previously created price-quantity pairs. Price-quantity pairs
are created according to this representation for all remaining residual demand
curve forecast scenarios and each market round in the market session. This step
of the offering strategy is hence iterated T ∗ (N− 1) times. Price-quantity pairs
are only created in case QO,n(q) > 0.
4.3.1.3 Pricing remaining portfolio capacity
Generators are obliged to submit the complete available generation capacity of
thermal plants to the MO to ensure sufficient market liquidity, guaranteeing
an efficient operation of the electricity market. In case a thermal unit has not
been dispatched at full capacity according to target dispatch schedule Q∗N(t),
the remaining capacity γ ∗ P −Q∗N(t) thus still needs to be submitted. This
requirement is obviously not applicable to hydropower and RES plants because
of reservoir energy level limitations respectively controllability issues.
The price at which to submit the remaining capacity is bounded downward
by λ∗N(t) since the excess capacity is not supposed to actually be dispatched
according to target dispatch schedule N. Since no more residual demand forecast
scenarios are available to determine the upper bound of the price at which the
price-quantity pair can be submitted, only the practical price limit equal to the
market ceiling price is binding. As previously noted, technical limits have to be
taken into account when creating the price-quantity pair.
The formal representation is given by
{Q
O,N+1
(q), QO,N+1(q), λO,N+1(q), tStart, tEnd} (4.8)
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in which
Q
O,N+1
(t) =
{
γ ∗ P(kt, i) −Q∗N(q, t) (1); q ./ (kt, i)
0 otherwise; q ./ (kt, i)
QO,n(t) = P(kt, i) −Q
∗
N(q, t)
λO,n(t) ∈ [max (λN(t) + P ;CR,N(q, t)) . . . λ(t)]
tStart,n = tEnd,n = t
Q∗N(q, t) ≤ γ ∗ P(kt, i) (1)with
4.3.2 Determining complex price-quantity pairs
Price-quantity pairs per market round reflect the generator’s anticipation to
price deviations within the residual demand curve forecast confidence interval
marked by λ∗1(t) and λ∗N(t). On the other hand, in case emerging residual
demand curves in individual market rounds are significantly perturbed due
to e.g. an unanticipated deviation from renewable energy injection levels or
the inadequacy of the residual demand curve forecast distribution to grasp the
underlying uncertainties in competitors’ behaviour, price-quantity pairs might
be rejected even though the plants in the portfolio do not have the technical
capabilities to resolve the resulting infeasible dispatch schedule. The generator
subsequently faces expensive balancing requirements.
In order to address the lack of intertemporal technical flexibility, complex
price-quantity pairs spanning multiple subsequent market rounds are created.
Since thermal units are least flexible and therefore more prone to an infeasible
dispatch schedule caused by a rejection of associated price-quantity pairs, their
operational risk is hedged by creating complex price-quantity pairs. This
assumption is consistent with the modelling assumptions in chapter 3, since
only thermal units have modelled intertemporal constraints.
The downward price risk faced by an operational thermal unit is mitigated
by calculating the opportunity cost for shutting down operational units when
anticipated market clearing prices are lower than λ∗1(t). Upward price risks are
mitigated by starting up an idle thermal unit in order to increase profit in case
market clearing prices are higher than λ∗N(t). Hedging against both risks is
elaborated in section 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 respectively. No exogenous constraints
on the size, type or amount of price-quantity pairs are imposed.
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4.3.2.1 Hedging against Downward Price Risk
Downward price risks are hedged by defining a complex price-quantity pair to
keep the unit operational during multiple subsequent market rounds, even at
unprofitable anticipated prices, in order to avoid more expensive start-up costs.
However, in case the complex price-quantity pair is rejected, the unit has to
be able to ramp down to zero to shut down and to ramp up again during all
market rounds for which the complex price-quantity pair is defined, in order to
avoid being systematically positively imbalanced.
A price-quantity pair is created in case it covers an operational duration from
market round tStart to tEnd included, as long as this duration satisfies the
thermal unit’s technical ramping flexibility during each operational phase, its
minimum stable power level duration and minimum inactive duration. The
time it takes the thermal unit to ramp down from and up to its target dispatch
schedule is denoted by
tEnd − tStart + 1 =τPD(kt, i) + τPU(kt, i) + τD(kt, i)
+ τU(kt, i) + τOFF(kt, i) + τ
′
U(kt, i) + τ
′
D(kt, i)
(4.9)
τPD(kt, i) =
Q∗n(q, tStart − 1) − P(kt, i)
κPD(kt, i)
with
τPU(kt, i) =
Q∗n(q, tEnd + 1) − P(kt, i)
κPU
τD(kt, i) =
P(kt, i)
κD(kt, i)
τU(kt, i) =
P(kt, i)
κU(kt, i)
The first and second term denote the time it takes the unit to ramp down
to and ramp up from the minimum stable power level without violating the
plant’s commitment to supply the market according to its optimal dispatch
schedule before tStart and after tEnd as calculated by the UC and ED model.
The third and fourth term denote the duration of the shut-down and start-up
power trajectory. Thirdly, τ ′U(kt, i) and τ ′D(kt, i) denote the time needed to
maintain a stable power level duration after tStart and before tEnd respectively.
Finally, the minimum time needed to start up after the shut-down moment is
τOFF(kt, i).
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Any complex price-quantity pair spanning a lower number of market rounds
prevents the unit to fully ramp down in case the complex pair is rejected due
to its limited technical flexibility. Although supplementary gradient costs can
be incurred in order to reduce the market round span over which the complex
price-quantity pair is defined, this possibility is no longer relevant during this
step of the offering strategy. Indeed, the creation of complex price-quantity pairs
is aimed at reducing the likelihood of a rejection of individual price-quantity
pairs per market round rather than to provide dispatch flexibility to obtain a
larger profit. Results obtained in chapter 3 support this reasoning.
Since a downward price risk is envisaged, the complex price-quantity pair is
defined to cover all subsequent market rounds in which the average anticipated
emerging clearing prices are lowest. Hence, the residual demand curve forecast
scenario for which complex price-quantity pairs are created, corresponds to the
one with the lowest average anticipated emerging clearing prices which trigger
the dispatch of the unit over market rounds tStart to tEnd included. During
the remainder of this section, this residual demand curve forecast scenario is
referred to as scenario n. In case no such forecast scenario exists, no complex
price-quantity pairs are created.
To determine the price and quantity of the complex price-quantity pair, the
opportunity cost related to an acceptation and a rejection of the thermal unit
to supply the market are compared. In case of a rejection, an expected cost
Crej(q) is faced by the generator in order to ramp down from its power level at
tStart and ramp up to its power level at tEnd:
Crej(q) =
tS,2∑
t ′=tS,1
CP(kt, i, t) +
tE,1∑
t ′=tS,2
CS(kt, i, t)
+
tE,2∑
t ′=tE,1
CP(kt, i, t)
(4.10)
tS,1 = tStart + τ
′
D(kt, i)in which
tS,2 = tStart + τ
′
D(kt, i) + τPD(kt, i)
tE,1 = tEnd − τ
′
U(kt, i) − τPD(kt, i)
tE,2 = tEnd − τ
′
D(kt, i)
74 OFFERING STRATEGY
In case the complex price-quantity pair is accepted, the incurred cost Cacc(q)
equals the total incurred generation cost minus the revenue obtained for
supplying the market with QO,n(q) at a minimum averaged renumeration
λO,n(q). The incurred cost when accepted is given by
Cacc(q) = QO,n(q) ∗
tEnd∑
t ′=tStart
(CP(kt, i, t) − λO,n(q)) (4.11)
The complex price-quantity pair has to be accepted when Cacc(q) < Crej(q).
The resulting relationship between λO,n(q) and QO,n(q) allows the generator to
submit increasing quantities at increasing price-quantity prices. The generator
can thus theoretically create complex price-quantity pairs covering downward
price risk for the individual power tranches of which the full power level per
unit is composed. Practically however, exogenous constraints on the size, type
or amount of price-quantity pairs limit the number of complex pairs in order to
still be able to solve the market clearing problem.
The minimum quantity of each created complex price-quantity pair has to be at
least equal to the minimum stable power level P(kt, i) in order to avoid being
accepted to operate in the unstable start-up or shut-down phase. The maximum
quantity is limited by the minimum power level obtained from the scheduling
solution associated to residual demand curve forecast scenario n, from tStart
to tEnd included. Any larger quantity would indeed violate the optimal target
dispatch schedule, thereby reducing the exercised market power potential.
Finally, the complex price-quantity pair is priced higher than the averaged
anticipated prices according to residual demand curve forecast scenario n− 1,
or the market floor price in case n = 1. Similarly, the upper bound is set by
the average of anticipated prices according to residual demand curve forecast
scenario n. The complex price-quantity pairs are
{Q
O,n
(q), QO,n(q), λO,n(q), tStart, tEnd} (4.12)
QO,n(q) ∈ [P(kt, i),
tEnd
min
t=tStart
Q∗n(kt, i, t)]in which
Q
O,n
(q) = QO,n(q)
λO,n(q) = max (λopp(q), λ^n−1(t) + P)
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λ^n(t) =
{
λ(t) n = 1∑tEnd
t ′=tStart λn(t
′) otherwiseand
λopp(q) = ηt(kt, i, r)|
(
Q∗n(kt,i,t)
γ
∈r) −
Crej(q) − (QO,n(q) ∗
∑
CP(kt, i, t))
(tEnd − tStart + 1) ∗QO,n(q)
4.3.2.2 Upward Price Risk Opportunity
Upward price risk is taken advantage of by defining complex price-quantity
pairs to initiate the operation of an idle thermal unit at profitable prices. An
acceptation of such complex price-quantity pair should not provide a contractual
obligation to produce according to an infeasible accepted dispatch schedule.
The duration for which a unit’s price-quantity pair is defined is therefore equal
to τON(kt, i). Because upward price risk is envisaged, tStart and tEnd are
chosen so that all market rounds with the highest average anticipated prices
λ∗N(t) are covered.
The price and quantity of the complex price-quantity pair are determined to
increase the generator’s profit Xacc compared to not dispatching the unit:
Xacc(q) =
tEnd∑
t=tStart
(λO,n(q) ∗QO,n(q)) − CP(kt, i, t) − CS(kt, i, t) > 0
λO,n(q) ∗QO,n(q) >
CS(kt, i, tStart)
τON(kt, i)
+ CP(kt, i, tStart) (4.13)
A further deduction of this equation describes an inverse relationship between
the quantity and price of the complex price-quantity pair. Hence, only a single
complex price-quantity pair per thermal unit can be defined. The minimum
stable power level P(kt, i) is selected as the reference point for the quantity of
the complex price-quantity pair in order to minimally generate at the minimum
stable power level.
The price at which to submit the complex price-quantity pair is established by
(4.13). In order to be consistent with the target dispatch schedule according to
residual demand curve forecast scenario N, the price is nevertheless bounded
downward by the average of the anticipated market clearing prices according to
residual demand curve forecast scenario N, from market round tStart to tEnd.
The final price-quantity pair is formally represented by
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{Q
O,n
(q), QO,n(q), λO,n(q), tStart, tEnd} (4.14)
QO,n(q) = P(kt, i)with
Q
O,n
(q) = QO,n(q)
λO,n(q) = max (λopp(q), λ^N(t) + P)
λ^n(t) =
{
λ(t) n = 1∑tEnd
t ′=tStart (λn(t
′)) otherwisein which
λopp(q) =
CS(kt, i, tStart)
QO,n(q) ∗ τON(kt, i)
+
CP(kt, i, tStart)
QO,n(q)
Note that the complex price-quantity pairs partially replace the price-quantity
pairs defined to comply with the obligation to submit the complete thermal
capacity to the MO.
4.4 Impact of the offering strategy
The performance of the offering strategy is assessed in both a competitive and
oligopolistic environment. The presented strategies are compared with ones
commonly applied in literature in order to deduct objective conclusions. The
simulation setup of each of the two seperate case studies retrieved assesses
the impact of the presented strategy in isolation from the others in order to
facilitate the interpretation of results.
Since the presented offering strategy explicitly incorporates portfolio flexibility,
it is expected to attain a significantly larger profit and smaller imbalance after
day-ahead market clearing. The degree in which profit increases and imbalances
decrease is expected to be larger in the competitive environment as, in contrast
to the oligopolistic one, quantity is not considered a stochastic variable.
The use of realistic residual demand curves and a portfolio covering the full
relevant range of technical flexibility and plant economics justifies the deduction
of general conclusions rather than case-specific ones.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of the emerging market clearing prices in the Iberian
electricity market as calculated from January, 1, to March, 11, 2008
4.4.1 Perfectly competitive market
4.4.1.1 Simulation setup and data generation
The simulation setup is based on realistic data corresponding to the time
horizon retrieved from reference (Lagarto et al., 2012). Market clearing prices
are obtained from the website of the MO Operador del Mercado Ibérico de
Energía (OMIE) in the Iberian electricity market or the electricity market from
mainland Spain if market splitting occurred (OMIE, 2013). Since this case
study aims at assessing the performance of the presented offering strategy in
a competitive market environment, the residual demand curves are modelled
as a single price-quantity pair of which the price equals the emerging market
clearing price and the maximum quantity can be assumed infinite.
The case mimics the offering problem faced by a fictitious generator entering
the electricity market. The generator has to submit price-quantity pairs to
the MO in order to be able to supply the market during the market session
organised on the 12th of March 2008 (Lagarto et al., 2012). The actual price
uncertainty faced by the generator is illustrated in figure 4.5 and is calculated
based on historical market clearing prices from January, 1, 2008 to March, 11,
2008. The full black line denotes the actual market clearing price on the 12th of
March and is fully described by the created price distribution.
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Base Base Mid Mid Peak Peak
# 6 6 18 12 7 5
P [MW] 100 100 75 75 5 5
P [MW] 400 300 250 250 30 30
κPU/κDU [MW/h] 100 100 75 75 30 30
η [e/MWh] 35 40 50 60 70 80
τU/τD [hour] 8 5 2 2 1 1
CS [e] 1000 800 500 500 80 80
Table 4.1: Thermal Generation Portfolio Parameters
This actual price distribution per market round is however unknown to the
generator. It therefore predicts the market clearing price for each market round
of the market session by means of Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
(ARIMA) forecasting technique (Nogales et al., 2002). The price distributions
per market round, obtained by the forecast tool, are illustrated in figure 4.1.
Comparison of the actual and forecast price distributions reveals the existence
of distribution discrepancies during individual market rounds, most notably
those from hours 8 to 16, although the forecast tool grasps the actual market
clearing price distribution trend during the market session. Emerging market
clearing prices therefore potentially significantly differ from predicted ones.
The generator owns a fictitious portfolio of which the technical and economic
characteristics are presented in table 4.1. Plants are assumed not to violate their
minimum stable power level durations. The 12 GW portfolio consists of 54 plants
categorised as 3 load-serving and 6 technical plant type variations. Each plant
consists of a single unit. Although the offering strategy also applies to portfolios
consisting of hydropower and RES plants, assessing its performance to represent
portfolio flexibility justifies the choice of a intertemporally-constrained, thermal-
only portfolio. The variable cost values of each plant variation fully cover the
price uncertainty range faced by the generator. The profit risk management
method is therefore fully assessed with respect to the claimed contributions.
Five offering strategies can be pursued by the generator. The ”expected
literature benchmark” strategy submits the plant’s expected target dispatch
schedule at its variable cost, while the ”full literature benchmark” strategy
submits the full capacity of each plant in the portfolio at its variable cost.
Both strategies are assumed in literature as a generator’s best response offering
strategy in a perfectly competitive market. The ”robust optimisation” strategy
is an offering strategy retrieved from reference (Baringo & Conejo, 2011). It
constructs simple price-quantity pairs by submitting an increase in power level
during market round t at the anticipated market clearing price triggering the
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additional quantity to be supplied. The approach corresponds to a recent
development in offering strategy formulation and is considered optimal in an
oligopolistic market environment. Finally, the ”presented simple” and ”presented
complex” offering strategy respectively correspond to the presented offering
strategy with and without the creation of complex price-quantity pairs.
Two key performance indicators are identified to objectively assess the
performance of all offering strategies given the envisaged market environment:
the relative profit gap and the strategy’s future balancing cost.
Firstly, the obtained profit when pursuing an offering strategy is benchmarked
against the maximum attainable profit during each market session. It is
calculated by subtracting the cost for generating the actual dispatch schedule
from the revenue. The actual dispatch schedule PP(t) is obtained by performing
a cost-based UC given the accepted portfolio dispatch schedule PA(t). Revenue
is calculated by multiplying the emerging market clearing price λ∗(t) with the
minimum of the accepted and the actual power level since the generator is
only rewarded for the contracted levels. The maximum profit is obtained by
calculating the optimal dispatch schedule PI(t) under perfect knowledge of the
market clearing prices. This formally corresponds to
∑T
t=t0
((λ∗(t) ∗min (PA(t), PP(t))) − C(PP(t)))∑T
t=t0
((λ∗(t) ∗ PI(t)) − CI(t))
(4.1)
Secondly, the change in obtained profit between two offering strategies is
compared to the change in total daily imbalance between accepted and actual
dispatch schedules. This indicator allows the deduction of relevant conclusions
on the future balancing requirements caused by pursuing each offering strategy.
Four possible outcomes are observed. In case the profit increases while the daily
imbalances increase, the cost related to the increase in imbalance should be offset
by the increase in profit. As such, the metric serves as an upper bound for future
balancing costs to justify the use of the offering strategy. Similarly, a lower bound
of balancing costs is obtained when profit and imbalances both decrease. In the
electricity market of mainland Spain2 upward imbalance prices are typically
situated between e35/MWh and e55/MWh. Downward imbalance prices are
typically found in the range between e15/MWh and e30/MWh (REE, 2013).
An increase in profit and a decrease in imbalance illustrates the superiority of
the applied offering strategy and vice versa. The imbalance is calculated as
2The Iberian electricity market is split in case of congested transmission lines. When
market results deviate between Portugal and mainland Spain, results of the latter are used in
this case study.
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T∑
t=t0
|PA(t) − PP(t)| (4.2)
The performance and robustness of each strategy are assessed for 100 different
emerging market clearing price outcomes. These outcomes have been calculated
from the covariance matrix between the price distributions of each market round
(figure 4.5). Since each offering strategy creates price-quantity pairs based on
the price forecast distribution, 100 market sessions are simulated in which an
identical set of price-quantity pairs is matched to different emerging market
clearing price outcomes. The performance and robustness of the offering strategy
is as such statistically assessed given an imperfectly known price distribution
and a variety of plant types.
The problem formulation per market session consists of 36 variable groups and 72
constraint groups. For the envisaged portfolio, this leads to a model containing
44034 discrete and 52129 continuous variables, and 451723 constraints. The
offering problem is solved in 4.7 minutes for each price forecast scenario, using
the GNU Linear Programming Kit (GLPK) solver in C++ (Makhorin, 2012),
on a machine with a 2.83GHz processor and 3.84GB RAM memory.
4.4.1.2 Results
Figure 4.6 illustrates the distribution of the obtained profit relative to the
maximum attainable profit per market session over all 100 market outcomes.
The data is plotted in boxplot format in order to visualise the median profit
value and the associated uncertainty. The ”full literature benchmark” (LF)
and ”expected literature benchmark” strategy (LE) only offer according to the
price scenario of the price forecast distribution at the 50% percentile, while
the remaining strategies use more than one price scenario. The amount of
used price scenarios is denoted by the number in brackets. All price scenarios
are determined by dividing the 90% confidence interval of the price forecast
distribution uniformly in smaller confidence intervals for each offering strategy.
The presented strategy, both with and without complex price-quantity pairs,
provide a higher median and mean profit than any of the alternative literature
benchmark strategies. While the mean profit equals e484.36k and e466.07k
for both benchmark strategies, mean profit equals e491.77k to e495.14k when
pursuing the ”presented simple” (PS), and e504.34k to e505.79k when applying
the ”presented complex” (PC) strategy. The mean performance of the ”full
literature benchmark” strategy (89.4%) outperforms the one of the ”expected
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Figure 4.6: Comparative assessment of the performance of each offering strategy
to obtain maximum profit after the market clearing mechanism, assuming a
competitive market environment
LF LE PS PC RO
77.7% 68.4% 80.0%-80.4% 86.4%-89.4% 44.4%
Table 4.2: Downward profit risk, measured in terms of the percentage of
maximum profit obtained in 90% of all cases
literature benchmark” strategy (86.2%), but is lower than the performance
of the ”presented simple” strategy (91.2%-91.9%) and the performance of the
”presented complex” strategy (94.4%-95.0%). The ”robust optimisation” (RO)
offering strategy only attains 79.6% to 81.2% of the maximum profit. Only the
”expected literature benchmark” offering strategy does not succeed to attain
the maximum profit once throughout all simulation runs.
The presented strategies additionally significantly reduce the downward profit
risk (table 4.2). In 90% of all cases, the ”full literature benchmark” strategy
attains more than 77.7% of the maximum profit, compared to 68.4% of the
”expected literature benchmark” strategy, 80.0% to 80.4% when using the
”presented simple” strategy and 86.4% to 89.4% when pursuing the ”presented
complex” strategy. The ”robust optimisation” offering strategy fares worst by
attaining at least 44.4% of the maximum profit in 90% of the cases.
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Finally, from all offering strategies using multiple target dispatch schedules,
the presented offering strategy is most robust. Although the performance of
each strategy increases with the number of target dispatch schedules, sensitivity
of input parameters is less distinct compared to the ”robust optimisation”
strategy. Although not represented on the figure, the expected performance of
the ”presented simple” strategy converges to the one of the ”robust optimisation”
strategy in terms of increasing target dispatch schedules while profit risk stays
significantly larger when pursuing the latter. The main reason is found in the
pricing mechanism of all price-quantity pairs: while the ”presented” offering
strategies represent technical unit constraints and unit economics, the ”robust
optimisation” offering strategy represents the maximum anticipating price,
leading to a higher risk of the price-quantity pair being rejected.
Offering full capacity at variable cost yields a larger profit than offering the
expected capacity since more quantity is accepted. The resulting change in
imbalance by offering a smaller quantity is presented in figure 4.7. The ”expected
literature benchmark” offering strategy is observed to result in a larger profit
and reduced imbalance in 34% of the cases. The opposite is true 31% of the
cases. No scenarios have emerged where the profit increases at the expense
of larger imbalances. The reduction of imbalances at the expense of profit is
however less profitable in 71.4% to 80.0% of the remaining cases when pursuing
the ”expected literature benchmark”. The ”full literature benchmark” strategy
thus only outperforms the ”expected literature benchmark” strategy in 56% to
59% of the cases given the considered imbalance price levels.
The increase in profit when pursuing the ”full literature benchmark” strategy
is not heavily correlated with the resulting change in remaining imbalances,
indicating the profit increase is rather explained by the supplementary revenues
incurred because of submitting the full capacity of the portfolio. The change in
profit when the ”expected literature benchmark” strategy is more successful
shows a clearer correlation with changes in remaining imbalances, indicating
this strategy needs to be pursued in case being balanced outweighs maximising
profit as objective of the generator. The same conclusion can be drawn by
increasing the imbalance prices: the higher the imbalance price, the more
successful the ”expected literature benchmark” strategy becomes compared to
the ”full literature benchmark” strategy.
Figure 4.8 similarly illustrates the difference in performance when comparing
the ”presented complex” strategy using 7 price scenarios to the ”full literature
benchmark” strategy. In 86% of the cases, a higher profit is achieved at a
lower imbalance, illustrating the capability of the presented strategy to increase
profits while decreasing imbalances. In contrast, the best performing alternative
offering strategy performs better in only 2% of the cases. The remaining cases
either obtain a higher profit and a larger imbalance, or a lower profit and
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Figure 4.7: Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from being
accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by the MO when pursuing
the ”expected literature benchmark” benchmarked against the ”full literature
benchmark” strategy, in a competitive market environment.
smaller imbalances. The change in profit outweighs the change in cost for future
balancing purposes in 75.0% to 91.7% of the remaining cases, when pursuing
the ”presented complex” offering strategy.
The presented strategy in total outperforms the literature benchmark strategy
in 95% to 97% of all cases. Profit increase is firmly correlated with reductions
in remaining imbalances, indicating the strategy’s capability to obtain a
feasible, profitable accepted dispatch schedule subject to price uncertainty. The
performance of the presented strategy is consequently insensitive to increasing
imbalance prices as it is able to fullfil both objectives of profit maximisation
and imbalance minimisation. As a result, it can be considered the dominant
strategy among all applied strategies.
As illustration, figures 4.9 and 4.10 respectively present the accepted, actual and
optimal dispatch schedule of the ”full literature benchmark” and the ”presented
complex” offering strategy during the market session in which the latter strategy
performs best. In market rounds 15 to 18, the ”presented complex” is accepted
for 6 GW, allowing the actual dispatch schedule to closely follow the accepted
and optimal dispatch schedule. The benchmark strategy is only accepted for
4.2 GW resulting in a large imbalance due to the technical inability of the
portfolio to be redispatched to attain the accepted power level. Both submitted
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Figure 4.8: Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from being
accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by the MO when pursuing
the ”presented complex” benchmarked against the ”full literature benchmark”
strategy, in a competitive market environment.
price-quantity curves in hour 16 are presented in figure 4.11, illustrating the
base power plants’ complex price-quantity pair creation below variable cost to
mitigate deviations from the optimal dispatch schedule.
Finally, figure 4.12 compares the performance of the ”presented simple” with
”presented complex” offering strategy. The beneficial impact of creating complex
price-quantity pairs is clearly observed in 68% of all cases. Both offering
strategies show the same performance in all other cases.
4.4.2 Oligopolistic market
4.4.2.1 Simulation setup and data generation
Data of the first 84 market sessions in 2012 (from January, 1 to March, 24,
2012) organised by the Iberian electricity market operator have been gathered
to obtain a similar time horizon as retrieved from the competitive case (OMIE,
2013). In case market splitting occurs between mainland Spain and Portugal
because of congested transmission lines, market results from mainland Spain are
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Figure 4.9: Accepted, actual and optimal dispatch schedule when pursuing
the benchmark offering strategy, during the worst performing market session
compared to the ”presented complex” strategy
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Figure 4.10: Accepted, actual and optimal dispatch schedule when pursuing the
”presented complex” offering strategy using 7 price scenarios, during the best
performing market session compared to the benchmark strategy
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Figure 4.11: Offer curves for each strategy, as submitted for hour 16, during the
presented strategy’s best performing market session compared to the benchmark
strategy
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Figure 4.12: Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from being
accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by the MO when pursuing
the ”presented simple” benchmarked against the ”presented complex” strategy,
in a competitive market environment.
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Figure 4.13: 90% confidence interval of the residual demand curve forecast
distribution for market round 5, in the electricity market of mainland Spain as
calculated from January, 1 to March, 24, 2012
used. Crossborder exchanges are implicitly represented by the residual demand
curve.
The residual demand curve forecast distribution is calculated from the first 24
market sessions, of which the 90% residual demand curve confidence interval is
illustrated for market round 5, 20 and 22 in figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.4 respectively.
The residual demand curves for each market round in the remaining 60 market
sessions are unknown to the generator and used to assess each offering strategy
in terms of the indicators introduced in section 4.4.1. The portfolio owned by
the generator is considered equivalent to the one presented in table 4.1.
The problem formulation is equivalent to the one described in 4.4.1, consisting
of 36 variable and 72 constraint groups per market session. The exact number
of variables and equations depends on the number of price-quantity pairs out of
which each residual demand curve is composed. Generally, the offering problem
is more complex so that the GLPK solver takes 27 minutes to solve the offering
problem on a machine with a 2.83GHz processor and 3.84GB RAM memory.
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Figure 4.14: 90% confidence interval of the residual demand curve forecast
distribution for market round 20, in the electricity market of mainland Spain as
calculated from January, 1 to the March, 24, 2012
4.4.2.2 Results
Figure 4.15 ilustrates the distribution of the obtained profit relative to the
maximum attainable profit per market round over all 60 market outcomes.
Comparison with figure 4.6 reveals all strategies to underperform due to
the additional uncertainty in terms of supply quantity. The ”full literature
benchmark” strategy (41.1%) performs worse compared to ”expected literature
benchmark” strategy (47.9%). The ”presented simple” offering strategy performs
around 58.3%-59.7% while the ”presented complex” strategy performs best
by attaining 65.6%-73.2% of the maximum obtainable profit. The ”robust
optimisation” strategy performs worst with a ratio of only 8.9%-17.0%.
Only the strategies presented in section 4.3 never lead to a loss. The capability
of these strategies to reduce downward profit risk is confirmed when looking at
the minimum profit obtained in 90% of all cases (table 4.3). The ”presented
complex” strategy obtains at least 41.3%-46.8% of the maximum attainable
profit, while this performance declines when looking at the ”presented simple”
(37.6%-39.0%), the ”expected literature benchmark” (19.9%), the ”full literature
benchmark” (16.9%) and the ”robust optimisation” strategy (-50.0%-36.8%).
Although the performance increases with a larger number of residual demand
curve forecast scenarios, the results of each offering strategy can be considered
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Figure 4.15: Comparative assessment of the performance of each offering strategy
to obtain maximum profit after the market clearing mechanism, assuming an
oligopolistic market environment
LF LE PS PC RO
16.9% 19.9% 37.6%-39.0% 41.3%-46.8% -50.0%-39.8%
Table 4.3: Downward profit risk, measured in terms of the percentage of
maximum profit obtained in 90% of all cases
robust in terms of the user-defined parameters.
Submitting expected power levels at variable cost obtains a larger profit than
submitting the full capacity because the MO only partially rejects a price-
quantity pair thanks to the price-elastic residual demand curve, thereby reducing
downward imbalance risks due to the rejection. Figure 4.16 illustrates the change
in profit and imbalance by offering according to the former strategy compared to
the latter. In 55.0% of all cases, a larger profit is obtained while also obtaining
a more balanced position when offering according to the ”expected literature
benchmark” strategy. In 11.7% the ”expected literature benchmark” strategy
obtains a lower profit while obtaining a less balanced position.
Assuming the same imbalance prices as in section 4.4.1.2, the ”expected literature
benchmark” strategy outperforms the ”full literature benchmark” strategy in
76.7% of all cases. Although the ”expected literature benchmark” strategy
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Figure 4.16: Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from being
accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by the MO when pursuing
the ”expected literature benchmark” benchmarked against the ”full literature
benchmark” strategy, in a oligopolistic market environment.
results in lower remaining imbalances in 83.3% of all cases, no clear correlation is
observed with changes in profit. Both strategies thus focus on different objectives:
the ”expected literature benchmark” strategy reduces remaining imbalances
while the ”full literature benchmark” strategy aims at increasing revenues.
The residual demand curve’s inverse relationship between supplied quantity
and emerging market clearing prices mitigates the success rate of the latter
strategy, giving more incentives to generators to pursue the ”expected literature
benchmark” strategy. This incentive increases with increasing imbalance prices.
Figure 4.17 compares the ”presented complex” strategy using 3 price scenarios
and the ”full literature benchmark” strategy. In 86.7% of the cases, a larger
profit is achieved at a lower remaining imbalance while only 5% of all cases
exhibits a smaller profit at a higher remaining imbalance. The increase in profit
outweighs the cost for balancing in 91.7% of all cases. Profit increase is largely
correlated with reductions in remaining imbalances, indicating the presented
offering strategy is also capable of obtaining a feasible, accepted dispatch
schedule under residual demand curve uncertainty. The effect is nevertheless
less outspoken compared to the results under a competitive market setup.
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Figure 4.17: Change in profit against change in imbalances resulting from being
accepted according to an infeasible dispatch schedule by the MO when pursuing
the ”presented complex” benchmarked against the ”full literature benchmark”
strategy, in a oligopolistic market environment
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter describes a novel profit risk hedging offering strategy the generator
could pursue when participating in the day-ahead spot market as organised
under the European PX model. Simple price-quantity pairs defined per market
round, and complex price-quantity pairs spanning multiple market rounds are
created with the objective to mitigate the emergence of an infeasible accepted
dispatch schedule. The performance of the offering strategy is benchmarked
against alternative offering strategies in a realistic market environment.
The presented offering strategy succeeds in increasing profits obtained during
the market session while mitigating up- and downward profit risks. Compared to
strategies applied in literature, in a perfectly competitive market environment,
the presented strategy outperforms in 95% to 97% of all scenarios. Since all
scenarios have been generated based on data obtained from the Iberian MO,
the performance rate is representative for a system with moderate to high price
volatility, as characterised by medium to large RES integration.
This performance rate is largely insensitive to the cost associated to future
balancing requirements as profit is increased while imbalances are reduced in
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more than 80% of all cases. Creating complex price-quantity pairs results in an
increase in performance in 68% of all scenarios. As such, even though perfectly
competitive market conditions are assumed, deviating the price of price-quantity
pairs away from the variable generation costs is a rational offering strategy.
The presented strategy moreover attains higher profits in an oligopolistic
environment as the presented strategy outperforms the second best performing
alternative strategy in 91.7% of all cases. Again, scenarios are representative for
a system characterised by medium to large RES integration. The correlation
between increasing profit and decreasing remaining imbalances indicates the
capability of the presented offering strategy to obtain a profitable and feasible
accepted dispatch schedule after market clearing. Moreover, the offering strategy
successfully hedges against profit risk since it is the only strategy which avoids
supplying the market at a loss during simulations.
This case study therefore shows profit is increased, and profit risk reduced, by
representing the flexibility of the portfolio through the price-quantity pairs.
The offering strategy attains more than 90% of the maximum profit using the
lowest number of price scenarios. The performance only increases 0.7% in case
the number of price scenarios is doubled, illustrating the method’s robustness
and computational efficiency, even in case the actual price distribution is not
perfectly represented by the forecast price distribution. Since the number of
price scenarios is the method’s sole user-defined input parameter, the method
is argued to illustrate a lower sensitivity to input parameters compared to
alternative methods. Consequently, even though a price taker power producer
does not have market power potential to alter the market clearing price to
its own advantage, deviating the offer price away from the variable cost is a
rational strategy to hedge against profit risks.
Part II
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Chapter 5
Electricity market models
Regulatory intervention is currently based on ex-post indicators which measure
the exercise of market power. Whether market power potential is exercised
is deducted by comparing market prices or companies’ market share obtained
by market simulations with actually observed ones (Joskow & Kahn, 2001), or
by calculating key indices such as the Lerner index, pivotal supplier analysis,
price discovery, concentration ratio or the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (de la
Fuente & Junco, 2011; Porter et al., 2008). These indices are however not 100%
conclusive on whether market power potential is exercised as their value is
heavily dependent on the definition of the market they investigate.
The reactive nature of corrective regulatory action results in increased
uncertainty for market participants in terms of market design evolution. The
action’s effect is moreover unproven as it might simply conceal the cause
of suboptimal market performance in the short term rather than effectively
eliminating it in the long term. Regulators therefore seek ways to establish
effective and transparent market rules consistent with short and long term
competitive market results, while minimising further interventions. More reliable
tools to monitor market power are thus necessary (Helman & Hobbs, 2010).
Ex-ante market simulation techniques on the other hand require assumptions
on actions of generators, the transmission network properties and demand
characteristics, among others. The sensitivity of simulation results to the selected
assumptions and the lack of a common framework to address them are important
factors why regulatory authorities are sceptical towards the application of ex-
ante simulation techniques to specific regulatory purposes (Neuhoff et al., 2005).
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Nevertheless, ex-ante simulation tools are able to give information on the
dynamics of price convergence while ex-post measurements only assess a static
situation. Representing the dynamics of generators to flexibly adapt their energy
supply to changing market and regulatory conditions is critical when evaluating
electricity markets, especially since electricity is not storable, demand is rather
inelastic and transport requires a physical link (Borenstein, 2000).
This chapter provides the motivation to create a novel agent-based electricity
market model. Besides providing an introductory overview and comparison of
recent electricity market modelling trends, three recently developed agent-based
electricity market models are discussed. Their strengths and limitations are
compared and the impact of the assumptions on the results are highlighted.
The content of this chapter is based on references (Maenhoudt & Deconinck,
2010a; Maenhoudt & Deconinck, 2010b).
5.1 Introduction
Three categories of electricity market models are identified in recent literature:
game theory-based optimisation, supply function equilibrium and evolutionary
models (Ventosa et al., 2005; Zhang, 2010). Each type is briefly discussed below.
5.1.1 Game theory-based optimisation models
Game theory-based optimisation models focus on the difficult and detailed profit-
maximisation problem for a single firm competing in the electricity market. They
maximise the profit of a generator facing an exogenous price or an exogenous
residual demand curve in order to explore relevant aspects of the market design
and regulations. They have been widely applied because of their numerical
tractability (Hobbs, 2001; Wietze et al., 2006; Pritchard, 2002). They are
therefore well documented in literature and can easily be solved by powerful
and well-known optimisation algorithms, such as for example the Mixed-Integer
Linear Problem (MILP) framework.
Unfortunately, the simple algebraic mathematical framework is not capable of
modelling the level of complexity required when handling the complete electricity
system, thereby limiting its scalability, scope and applicability as decision
support tool for designing market rules and protocols. As such, perfect and
complete information on competitors’ cost functions and strategies, unlimited
network capacity and a perfectly known utility function are typical assumptions.
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Additionally, the demand function faced by all generators should be continuously
differentiable (Orbay, 2009). Besides heavily reducing the number of market
design features that can be evaluated, such models also quickly lead to non-
convex feasible regions. Non-existent or non-unique equilibrium solutions exist
as a result, which leads to significant differences in results under slightly different
assumptions (Neuhoff et al., 2005; Hobbs & Pang, 2007).
Another drawback is the ability of a generator to only offer one single
price-quantity pair. Depending on the choice of the strategic variable,
two important subcategories of game theory-based optimisation models are
distinguished. The Cournot model applies to tight market conditions as
generators strategically optimize the quota, while the Bertrand submodel applies
to intensely competitive market conditions as generators optimise in terms
of price. The Cournot competition model has been widely applied to better
understand the influence of individual market design options on the performance
of electricity markets (Bushnell et al., 2004; Yao et al., 2007). Although the
Bertrand and Cournot models have recently been integrated to form a more
realistic hybrid model, the above-mentioned disadvantages of game theory-based
optimisation models remain valid (Edenhofer et al., 2010).
Alternative subcategories do exist. The Stackelberg leadership model for example
models sequential competition in terms of quota between generators. The
application of this model is justified if one generator has a major advantage
over its competitors. This is especially true in recently deregulated electricity
markets when labelling the incumbent as Stackelberg leader and new entrants
as followers (Harris, 2006b).
5.1.2 Supply function equilibrium models
Equilibrium models perceive the electricity market as a static, non-cooperative
game in which two or more market participants have the objective to maximise
their individual profit subject to quasi-perfect knowledge of the equilibrium
strategy or best-response functions of all other competitors (Forshner & Shy,
2009). The assumption that each participant has complete information or a
reasonable estimate of competitors’ costs, strategies and pay-off functions, may
be valid in small systems with a small number of competitors, but cannot
hold when considering a large amount of participants. Equilibrium models also
assume the existence of a market equilibrium at which no market participant
can profitably affect the market clearing price by changing its own strategy given
the strategies employed by its rivals. Both oligopolistic and competitive markets
can be modelled. The equilibrium state of the former is called Cournot-Nash,
the latter Walras-Nash equilibrium.
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Equilibrium models using both price and quota as strategic variables are
categorised as supply function equilibrium models (Klemperer & Meyer, 1989).
They basically extend traditional game-theoretic optimisation models with the
conjectural variations approach (Vives, 2001). Representing the beliefs of a
generator concerning how the total energy supply from its rivals changes in
terms of market clearing prices, allows generators to behave strategically on
both price and quota, in contrast to the one-dimensional strategic actions when
applying game theory-based optimisation models (Day et al., 2002). Different
degrees of competitive intensity can be modelled by defining different assumed
supply responses. Actual responses are not necessary equal to the assumed
responses by other generators.
The mathematical theory of bargaining for market power has been extensively
used thanks to its mathematical tractability (Shahidehpour et al., 2002b).
Extending the model to include continuous linear supply and demand functions
however transforms the simple mathematical framework into a set of differential
equations, thereby rendering the model numerically intractable (García et al.,
2002). The assumption of continuous demand and supply functions itself does
not fully match with reality as Power Exchanges (PXs) only accept step-wise
functions from both suppliers and consumers. Moreover, since the results of
equilibrium models are highly sensitive to the representation of the demand
and supply functions, the outcome of these models can radically differ from
reality (Fabra et al., 2006). For instance, studies applying the supply function
equilibrium model to analyse the effect of divestiture in the England and Wales
spot market have repeatedly and consistently underestimated the subsequent
remaining potential of market power (Green & Newbery, 1992; Green, 1996).
Matching supply function equilibrium models to the practical requirements of
PXs produced inconclusive results (Hortacsu & Puller, 2004). Nevertheless,
the approach is capable of representing how the transmission network perturbs
the efficient operation of the electricity market by allowing market participants
to anticipate the effect of the dispatch schedule of one of the plants in their
portfolio on the whole network (Barquin & Vazquez, 2008). Consequently,
supply function equilibrium models can be considered more appropriate than
game theory-based optimisation models to be applied to realistic cases.
5.1.3 Evolutionary models
Evolutionary models allow market participants to independently formulate best-
response actions based on observed historic information and their current
perception of the environment. Historic information contains the market
participant’s observations on how its former actions affect the environment
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it operates in, and therefore also its objective function. The goal of applying an
evolutionary model is to gradually adjust behavioural parameters in order to
determine which actions are most probably the best response in which situations.
The model hence allows for a better understanding of the underlying market
dynamics from the point of view of a market participant.
The absence of equilibrium constraints might prevent evolutionary models
to reach an optimal solution. The choice of individual market participants’
learning capabilities, among other assumptions, plays a significant role in this
drawback. For instance, an individual memory of historic performances rather
leads towards a Nash-Cournot equilibrium (Bergin & Bernhardt, 2004), while
instating a collective memory under the same setup tends to converge to a
Nash-Walras equilibrium (Alós-Ferrer, 2004). Another example: applying the
Q-learning mechanism results in more collective solutions in contrast to a trial-
and-error or imitation learning method (Waltman & Kaymak, 2008). As such,
even though an evolutionary model has the flexibility, scalability and capability
to adequately represent the complexities of an electricity system, its results are
subject to scepticism if embedded assumptions are not clearly communicated.
Despite this drawback, supply function equilibrium models have been shown to
significantly underestimate the effect of market power potential while the results
obtained from evolutionary models have been shown to be more in line with
what has been observed in reality (Day & Bunn, 2001). Consequently, before
practically applying dynamic electricity market models, extensive validation
studies to assess the impact of assumptions on the results should be undertaken
before relevant conclusions can be drawn.
5.1.4 Conclusive discussion
The complex and detailed offering problem the generator faces to create
price-quantity pairs can be perceived as a static game. Hence, it has to be
complemented with an evolutionary model in order for the generator to update
its perception of the environment and to decide which actions are most likely
to successfully maximise its profit. The resulting hybrid model thus benefits
from properties such as flexibility, scalability, capability of representing the
complexities of the electricity system and moderate numerical tractability.
The hybrid model can be applied to evaluate the operation of the electricity
market and to understand the underlying market dynamics. The choice on
how to represent market participants’ interactions is crucial since scepticism
towards modelling assumptions are the most significant drawback of evolutionary
models. Multi-agent systems and genetic algorithms are evolutionary models
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with the most academic support1. Since genetic algorithms are search heuristics,
combining the natural mechanisms of inheritance, crossover, mutation and
selection, multi-agent systems are argued to be more transparent in terms of
assumption scrutiny. Genetic algorithms are moreover better suited to model
the evolution of a population rather than the evolution of the individuals
themselves (Safarzyńska & Bergh, 2010; Zhang et al., 2009).
5.2 Multi-agent systems
5.2.1 Methodology description
A multi-agent system is a bottom-up modelling approach to represent a system
in which a global system property is determined by the complex and repeated
interactions of numerous computing elements, denoted as agents (Wooldridge,
2009). Situated in a dynamic environment, agents are capable of deciding
autonomously, during simulation run-time, which actions need to be undertaken
in order to meet its design objectives. For this purpose, agents learn from historic
experiences as each action differently affects the environment. Since the agent’s
action does not have a deterministic outcome, perceiving what effect its actions
had on the environment rather allows it to assess the likelihood of achieving
its objectives if the action is pursued under similar conditions (Uhrmacher
& Weyns, 2009). System convergence is expected during simulation runtime,
although the agents’ decisions and interactions can differ between simulation
runs, leading to different system equilibrium states.
The effect on the system resulting from the collective actions of all agents is
argued to grasp the dynamic state of real world systems without explicitly
constricting it to predefined system equilibrium states. Multi-agent systems
have therefore steadily gained popularity as an approach to model strategic
gaming behaviour in the electricity market (Ventosa et al., 2005; Sueyoshi &
Tadiparthi, 2008; Veit et al., 2009). Each individual generator is modelled
as an agent with the objective to compete for generation services at a price
determined by decisions of competing generators, consumers and market rules.
Despite increasing contributions, no common protocol for the design and
validation of multi-agent models has been developed. Four key concepts have
been identified (Michel et al., 2009). Firstly, an agent is autonomous as it acts
on its own initiative; these actions are shaped by the agent’s local knowledge
about its competences and resources. Secondly, the agent acts with other agents
1Simulation based on human behaviour and interactions is omitted as these studies are
more situated in the broader concept of experimental economics
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located in the environment: only when the agent is an element of a society,
a complex system behaviour can emerge; the role the agent plays within this
society determines the actions it can perform to achieve its goal. Thirdly,
the emergent behaviour cannot manifest itself without agent interaction: local
interactions produce organised patterns of activities such as cooperation, conflict
or competition. Lastly, the agent is situated within an environment, defining
the conditions the agent finds itself in.
5.2.2 Agent-based electricity market models
Economies are a suitable application for multi-agent systems as they are complex
and dynamic systems characterised by the presence of a large number of
participants that engage repeatedly in local interactions which result in a
system-wide emergent behaviour. These emergent effects are perceived by
all market participants, subsequently adjusting their behaviour accordingly.
The application of multi-agent systems to simulate economies is labelled as
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) (Tesfatsion, 2006).
Generators, Transmission System Operators (TSOs), Market Operators (MOs),
consumers and regulators are agents within the liberalised electricity market.
Considering the generator, it is subject to transmission constraints and local
demand response. Agents have extensive databases of historical performances
to anticipate future market conditions.
Three ACE agent-based models are discussed: the Electricity Market Complex
Adaptive System (EMCAS), the Agent-based Modelling of Electricity Systems
wholesale power market test bed (AMES) and the PowerACE model. These
models are considered to be more comprehensive compared to alternative
ones (Praca et al., 2003; Weidlich & Veit, 2008).
5.2.3 Electricity market complex adaptive system
The commercially available EMCAS model is developed by Argonne National
Laboratory (Conzelmann, 2008). This model includes generators as strategic
reasoning agents and models all other market participants as agents without
reasoning capabilities or with static behaviour. The time span of the model
stretches from year-ahead until real-time decision making.
The generator has the possibility to follow three offering strategies: a generation
cost, a physical withholding and an economic withholding strategy. The
generator acts competitively — only submitting one price-quantity pair per
market round to supply its full generation capacity at variable costs — when
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pursuing the generation cost strategy. When pursuing the physical withholding
strategy, the generator tries to predict the expected system reserve. When
this reserve falls below a user-defined threshold value, the generator reduces
its supply in an attempt to increase the market clearing price. The economic
withholding strategy finally lets the generator increase (decrease) the price of its
price-quantity pair proportionally to the price of that submitted on the previous
day in case it was accepted (rejected) (Androcec et al., 2010).
Two types of learning techniques are implemented when using the physical
withholding or economic withholding approach. Using the observation learning
technique, the agent proportionally changes the quota or price of its price-
quantity pair in line with the previously observed effects on the market clearing
price and its own profit. Periodically, the agent switches to the exploration-based
learning technique in which it changes the price or quota pseudo-randomly in
order to obtain more information from the environment than it would receive
when only using the observation learning technique. The actual decisions are
made by taking into account a user-defined risk tolerance parameter.
The EMCAS model has been applied to power markets situated in the Iberian
Peninsula, Western and Eastern Europe (Fekete et al., 2009) and the Midwestern
United States (Conzelmann et al., 2005).
5.2.4 Agent-based modelling of electricity systems wholesale
power market test bed
The AMES model is a non-commercial, open-source tool developed to increase
insights in the complex dynamics of electricity markets, developed by the
Economics Department of the Iowa State University (Tesfatsion, 2013). The
model includes generators as strategic reasoning agents and treats other market
participants as passive. The time span of the model is short-term.
The generator chooses a linear supply price-quantity curve for each hour of
the day at the beginning of the daily simulation. The strategic action of the
agent consists in deciding the optimal slope and ordinate of the supply curve.
The submitted curve must have higher or equal reported costs than its own
variable fuel cost. By increasing or decreasing the slope or ordinate, the agent
strategically seeks to increase its daily net earnings.
At the end of each day, stochastic reinforcement learning is used to update the
probability of success assigned to each supply price-quantity curve in its action
domain. Stochastic reinforcement learning increases or decreases the likelihood
of success of each action corresponding to the expected reward.
MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 103
The AMES simulator has been applied to a nodal representation of Central West-
ern Europe (Zhu et al., 2011) and interesting academic case studies (Hongyan
& Tesfatsion, 2009a; Hongyan & Tesfatsion, 2009b).
5.2.5 PowerACE
PowerACE is a software tool to model the electricity market and emission
markets in Germany. It incorporates generators, load serving entities, electricity
traders, MOs, certificate traders and consumer agents.
The generators behave strategically by optimising price-quantity pairs on the
day-ahead and balancing market. To determine the price-quantity pair on the
day-ahead market, a user-defined range of both prices and quota is determined.
This continuous range is discretised in a number of values specified by the user.
Each price-quantity pair is then created by combining the discrete price and
quota values. Only one price-quantity pair is created per unit and hour.
Using modified Erev-Roth reinforcement learning, the agent updates the success
probabilities of each pre-defined price-quantity pair. A user-defined parameter
ensures the gradual convergence towards a dominant action but is however
shown to significantly affect final simulation results if somewhat altered. The
same approach and learning method is used for creating the price-quantity pairs
on the balancing power market (Weidlich, 2007).
PowerACE has been applied to investigate the interplay between electricity
and emission markets. Recently, demand response from plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles has been integrated in the model (Dallinger & Wietschel, 2012).
5.2.6 Comparison of electricity market modelling tools
Although not all models are accurately described in literature, each model’s
embedded assumptions can be identified. An overview of the three discussed
models and their assumptions are listed in table 5.1. Four categories of limiting
assumptions are identified which can be improved in order to mitigate criticism
and scepticism towards an ACE model.
Firstly, underlying technical characteristics and plant economics are not
accurately represented through the action domain of the active generator.
Each generator randomly chooses the price and quota of the price-quantity pair
rather than creating them based on the capability and flexibility of the plants
of its portfolio. Consequently, the generator is subject to significant profit risks
when pursuing its actions, which is unrealistic.
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Secondly, each model can only be applied to a static environment in which
the generators face exactly the same demand profile each day. Applying each
model to dynamic games is not straightforward since the duration for reaching
convergence during such a static game is not negligible. As illustration, on the
simple 5-bus system, AMES needs more than 50 iterations before converging.
In order for the model to be applied to a dynamic environment, convergence
must be reached after only a few iterations.
Thirdly, only one-dimensional or discrete strategies can be pursued by the
generator. The pursued strategy is moreover selected by the user before the
actual simulation run. A more realistic strategy allows the generator to choose
its pursued strategy from a continuous action domain.
Lastly, none of the models is suited to assess the impact of market design
parameters on the behaviour of the market participants. The many studies
conducted with each of the described models implicitly assume an approximation
of the current day-ahead market design. Consequently, only the effect of a
pay-as-bid pricing compared to a uniform pricing scheme can be investigated.
The models are therefore not suited to aid the discussion towards a future target
electricity market design.
5.3 Conclusion
This chapter presents the motivation for the design, implementation and
validation of a novel tool to dynamically simulate the European electricity
market. Modelling the electricity market ex-ante indeed reveals the impact the
market participants’ actions, transmission network properties and demand
elasticity has on the market dynamics leading to market clearing price
convergence. Consequently, it is argued to lead to more effective and transparent
market rules compared to static ex-post measurement techniques.
A review of the existing modelling frameworks indicates that a hybrid model,
consisting of an evolutionary model complemented by a detailed supply function
equilibrium model produces results close to what has been observed in reality.
Moreover, a hybrid model is flexible, scalable, numerically tractable and capable
to represent the complexities of the electricity system. Although a wide
diversity of evolutionary models are available in literature, the multi-agent
system methodology seems to be better suited to model individual behaviour.
Three recently developed large-scale ACE models are discussed. The discussion
clarifies why regulatory authorities are sceptical of using ex-ante simulation
models to support long-term policy decisions. Firstly, assumptions on the
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generators’ strategies, action domain and underlying technical constraints and
portfolio economics are required. Secondly, no theoretical framework exists to
determine the optimal strategy to pursue during future market sessions. Thirdly,
the speed at which the action domain is adapted towards the best-response
strategies limits the applicability of each model to dynamic market environments.
Fourthly, existing simulators are only capable of modelling the impact of the
pricing scheme on the pursued actions of market participants and are therefore
inadequate to support the decision making towards the creation of the European
electricity market’s target design.
Considering the limitations in existing models, chapter 6 proposes a novel
design of an ACE model. The supply function equilibrium model has already
been introduced in part I. The design of the agent-based model complementing
the supply function equilibrium model is presented in chapter 6. Embedded
assumptions are made transparent and their potential impact on final results is
made clear. Case studies are presented to illustrate the validity of the model.
Chapter 6
Agent-based electricity
market model
Without an adequate framework of rules and protocols to manage the operation
of a liberalised electricity market, dramatically different results than the expected
ones emerge. Simulation tools mimicking the behaviour of generators have been
proven to realistically reproduce observed strategic gaming behaviour. Given
the discussion of relevant and recently developed electricity market simulators
in chapter 5 however, there is a need for a dynamic electricity market model
simulating strategic gaming behaviour exercised by a generator while taking
into account specific market design parameters.
This chapter presents a newly developed numerical agent-based simulation
platform. It models the operation of the short-term day-ahead electricity
market. Generators are modelled as hybrid agents while Transmission System
Operators (TSOs) and Market Operators (MOs) are modelled more as centralised
planners without learning capabilities. Retailers or large industrial consumers
are modelled as agents with pre-defined actions, without learning capabilities.
Generators are capable of creating price-quantity pairs to maximise their profit
under uncertainty. The simple and complex price-quantity pairs are submitted
to the MO before gate closure time. The frequent organisation of the market
allows each agent to gradually explore its action domain thanks to its ability to
dynamically learn from the feedback received from the MO.
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Besides the contribution of designing, implementing and validating the agent-
based simulation platform, as discussed in section 6.2, the performance of
the model is benchmarked against the open-source Agent-based Modelling of
Electricity Systems wholesale power market test bed (AMES) in section 6.3.
Benchmarking is carried out by applying the presented agent-based simulation
platform to a dynamic 5-bus test case scenario, in both a competitive and
strategic setup. The impact of altering market design parameters on the
behaviour of generators — and subsequently the state of the power system —
is assessed to illustrate the applicability of the simulator as a decision support
tool to investigate the robustness of future target market designs.
This chapter reflects the content of references (Maenhoudt et al., 2011;
Maenhoudt, 2012b; Maenhoudt, 2012a; Maenhoudt et al., 2012), created during
the OPTIMATE project. Also reference (Maenhoudt, 2013), written after the
official end of the project, is integrated. .
6.1 Introduction
The presented agent-based simulator has been developed by the KU Leuven
following its research work as work package leader during the OPTIMATE
project1. The collaborative research and demonstration project was co-funded by
the European Community’s 7th Framework Programme under grant agreement
FP7-239456-optimate over the period October 2009 to December 2012. The
consortium combined the practical experience of five TSOs2 with the theoretical
knowledge of six academic institutions3.
The project aimed at developing a numerical test platform to analyse and
to validate new market designs which facilitate the integration of Renewable
Energy Sources (RES) dispersed in multiple bidding areas. For this purpose a
simulation platform was developed to support the simulation of interconnected
power systems, interacting with electricity markets. The final objective was
to support the assessment of new electricity market design parameters to help
reaching the 2020 EU27 targets and to recommend promising technical and
regulatory solutions moving towards a ”virtual single European transmission
grid” as well as regional balancing processes, considering the zonal diversity of
market features and of generation mixes (OPTIMATE, 2009).
1Open Platform to Test Integration in new MArkeT designs of massive intermittent Energy
sources dispersed in several regional power markets (OPTIMATE)
2Elia, TransnetBW, REE, RTE and 50Hz
3KU Leuven, ARMINES, DTU, University of Madrid-Comillas, University of Manchester
and EUI
INTRODUCTION 109
The project resulted, in 2013, in the commercial exploitation of the OPTIMATE
prototype simulation tool subject to competitive behaviour of generators
(appendix B). Within the project, the author was responsible for designing,
implementing, testing and validating the competitive behaviour of generators as
indicated by the yellow modules in the schematic representation of the sequential
platform architecture on the third page of the appendix. Hence, the author was
also heavily involved in the general design of the whole day-ahead process.
Although the competitive simulator already contributes to the state-of-the-art
in dynamic electricity market simulation tools, two major shortcomings can
be identified when considering the ’Bids & Offers to Market’ and the ’Final
Program’ modules4. Firstly, each generator creates price-quantity pairs by
means of price forecast distributions. As indicated in part I, not forecasting
the residual demand curve distribution significantly increases profit risk and
reduces profits. Especially from the perspective of the project’s objectives, this
shortcoming can be considered a major drawback since history has shown that
the assumption of suboptimal behaviour leads to the creation of a market design
which itself might induce undesired strategic gaming behaviour.
Secondly, and closely related to the first drawback, generators do not dynamically
learn from their experiences. Instead, ex-post learning adapts the user-defined
reference input parameters5 to the actually emerging market outcomes. These
adjustments ensure consistency between the actions the TSO takes related to
required reserves and available transmission capacity, and those by generators
related to the creation of price-quantity pairs. Learning is thus primarily used
to ensure convergence in behaviour rather than to encourage diversity when
applying the competitive simulator.
Lastly, the simulator assumes all individual European exchanges to be perfectly
coordinated in terms of market round granularity, market session granularity
and gate closure time. This assumption is not only an approximation of reality
as can be deducted from chapter 2, it also represents a modelling limitation to
simulate promising future target market designs which propose an alteration
from current market designs in terms of market round granularity, market
session granularity and gate closure time.
The agent-based simulator presented in this chapter enhances the competitive
simulator with a multi-agent system in order to introduce strategic gaming
behaviour and in order to eliminate granularity and timing limitations.
4The ”Bids & Offers to Market” module determines the price-quantity pairs to submit to
the MO. The ”Final Program” module determines the least-cost dispatch schedule subject to
the accepted dispatch schedule, as received from the MO. See part I for details.
5Reference input parameters cover forecasts and reference dispatch schedules among others
and are calculated by running the ANTARES tool which has been developed by RTE (Doquet,
2007; Doquet et al., 2008).
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6.2 Agent-based simulator
6.2.1 Agent definitions
The diverse participants in the electricity market are represented as agents. Each
agent has its own set of objectives, decision-making rules, action domain and
behavioural pattern. Further, agents draw on an array of historical information
and projected data. Figure 6.1 schematically illustrates all agents in an electricity
market in terms of a simplified class diagram.
A cluster corresponds to a physical region in which the transmission network
can be considered a copper plate during a user-defined percentage of the year.
Clusters are interconnected by a transmission network consisting of individual
branches. In each cluster, generation assets or loads, further referred to as
equipment, are located. The generation assets are subdivided in the five power
plant types introduced in chapter 3.
Areas are a combination of clusters. The set of clusters in which equipment
compete to be accepted by the MO to supply the day-ahead or intra-day market
is denoted as bidding area (BA). The set of clusters in which the imbalance
settlement is decided, is called a control area (CA). Figure 6.2 illustrates how
European bidding and control areas are mapped to the cluster definition. The
transmission lines are considered to be congested for at least 5% of the year.
The holding agent is a parent company controlling the management and
operations of corporations owning generation assets or loads. These corporations
are defined along the two introduced areas. The bidding area agent (BAA) is
responsible for managing all equipment within a single bidding area. It is in
charge of creating price-quantity pairs to supply the day-ahead and intra-day
market. The control area agent (CAA) on the other hand is responsible for
all equipment within a single control area. Its objective is hence to minimise
imbalance costs, given the former actions of the bidding area agent and the
actual real-time situation. Because the scope while designing and implementing
the agent-based simulator is limited to the day-ahead market, the design and
implementation of cognitive agents is limited to the bidding area agent.
Large industrial consumers and retail companies only own electricity consuming
equipment or loads. They are modelled as bidding area agents without learning
capabilities and pre-defined default actions: they do not adapt their price-
quantity demand curve based on perceptions of the actions of generators. The
demand profile and dispatch schedule of load equipment are given as user input
before clearing the market session. The design allows the definition of hybrid
agents owning both generation as well as consumption equipment.
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Figure 6.1: Simplified class diagram of the agent-based simulator with the
Thermal power plant (Th), Run-of-River power plant (RoR), Pumped-Hydro
Storage plant (PHS), Load (L), Photo-Voltaic power plant (PV), Wind power
plant (W) class types
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Figure 6.2: Example of mapping the European geographical environment to the
definition of clusters
The TSO is responsible for monitoring the security and reliability of the network
within a control area. Its main actions comprise reserving generation capacity
to fulfil reserve requirements, accounting for potential violations of the thermal
limits of crossborder branches and of organising the imbalance settlement. The
simulator models both secondary and tertiary control according to the guidelines
as retrieved from the European Network of Transmission System Operators
for Electricity (ENTSO-E)’s operation handbook, but omits primary control
from its scope. The TSO is modelled as a centralised planner without learning
capabilities: it balances its interconnected control area at least cost, in perfect
cooperation with neighbouring TSOs.
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In reality, perfect cooperation might not always be a valid assumption, either
from the investment planning perspective (Buijs, 2011) or from the perspective
of its role as market facilitator (Van Hertem, 2009). Since the TSO has
been designed and implemented by external parties, the calculations are not
detailed here, although the interested reader can find them in the appropriate
OPTIMATE deliverable (Bordier et al., 2010).
The MO sets the market rules in a single bidding area. Since a European scope
is envisaged, the MO is operating according to the Power Exchange (PX) model.
The MO is modelled as a centralised planner without learning capabilities: its
main objective is to optimise trading between bidding areas and to calculate
the optimal day-ahead and intra-day market clearing quantities and prices. The
day-ahead market clearing mechanism is implemented by an external partner
and mimics the mechanism as currently implemented in the Central Western
European (CWE) region. Detailed equations are found in the appropriate
OPTIMATE deliverable (Bordier et al., 2010).
The MO is responsible for collecting and matching supply and demand price-
quantity pairs from bidding area agents located in its bidding area. The MO
also feeds back the anonymous aggregated supply and demand curves, as well
as the final emerging market clearing price and crossborder trade.
Active intervention from regulatory agents is not modelled. This assumption
allows generators to fully exercise their market power potential so that
the effect of market design parameters on their behaviour can be fully
assessed (Conzelmann, 2008; Tesfatsion, 2013).
6.2.2 Bidding area agent
6.2.2.1 Action domain
The creation of strategic price-quantity pairs is carried out by a two-stage
decision process: a scheduling problem followed by an offering strategy (part I).
The process aims at recovering all costs while minimising profit risks due to
the rejection of price-quantity pairs. An additional objective, in the presence of
market power potential, is to strategically increase the emerging market clearing
price in order to further increase profits (chapter 3 and 4).
Consequently, the action domain of the agent is continuous within the price-
quantity dimensions. This approach contrasts with the user-defined, discrete
action domains deployed by alternative agent-based simulators. The bidding
area agent is moreover able to determine its strategy during simulation runtime
in absence of any external user influence.
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Figure 6.3 illustrates the decision process from the perspective of the bidding
area agent. Four types of input data need to be available to the bidding area
agent: the plants in its portfolio, the strategy for submitting the renewable
energy supply, whether behaving strategically is more favourable compared to
behaving competitively and the degree to which it can increase its profit by
submitting price-quantity pairs strategically. The latter three decisions are
made for each individual market round in the market session.
Firstly, the technical characteristics and plant economics of all equipment owned
by the bidding area agent are known at the beginning of each simulation. The
characteristics of the portfolio owned by its competitors is not known. The
simulator allows for dynamically defining the equipment owned per bidding area
agent to simulate investments or divestments made during simulation runtime.
Deciding whether it is appropriate to invest or divest in a specific plant is
however not part of the scope of the simulator.
Secondly, the initial limits between which the RES energy supply per market
round should be submitted is user-defined at the beginning of the simulation.
The user then opts for either fixing these limits during simulation runtime, or
to allow individual bidding area agents to gradually adapt them over time to
maximise their total profit. In case the bidding area agent additionally owns
hydropower plants, this decision also incorporates how much hydropower to
reserve in order to minimise future self-balancing requirements (section 6.2.2.2).
Thirdly, the decision on whether to approach a future market round
competitively or strategically is determined during simulation runtime except
when the user specifically enables the option to simulate a competitive-only
environment. All bidding area agents in the geographical scope then solely
adjust the price of all price-quantity pairs to account for profit risk. Although
not equal to the definition of behaving competitively, as found in many existing
models, the results found in section 4.4.1 illustrate the proposed competitive
behaviour to outperform alternative competitive offering strategies.
When competition is not enforced by the user, the bidding area agent learns its
status during simulation runtime based on past experiences (section 6.2.2.3).
Approaching a future market round strategically, the agent maximises its profit,
while reducing profit risk, by complementing the physical withholding and
economic withholding strategy in order to deviate the emerging market clearing
price away from competitive levels. This behaviour is consistent with the results
found in section 4.4.2 and actually observed behaviour in chapter 2.
Lastly, the degree to which the bidding area agent can increase its profit
by strategically submitting price-quantity pairs, is learned during simulation
runtime. By interpreting the impact of its offering strategy on the decisions of
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competitors during historic market sessions, the bidding area agent composes a
residual demand curve forecast distribution from which it draws a user-specified
amount of step-wise residual demand curve forecast scenarios. The degree to
which the agent can behave strategically is determined by the elasticity of the
residual demand curve forecast scenarios. The amount of residual demand curve
forecast scenarios N remains static during simulation runtime, since results
presented in section 4.4 are largely insensitive to the number of residual demand
curve forecast scenarios, under both a competitive and oligopolistic market
environment (section 6.2.2.4).
Since only the residual demand curve distribution emerging in the bidding
area agent’s own bidding area is learned, the bidding area agent still needs to
account for crossborder trade. This effect is learned over time (section 6.2.2.5).
Consequently, the N residual demand curve forecast scenarios are obtained
by merging N1 residual demand curve forecast scenarios from the distribution
observed in the agent’s own bidding area with F crossborder trade scenarios as
observed between the agent’s own bidding area and interconnected ones. The
process is depicted in figure 6.4.
6.2.2.2 Learning the strategy for submitting the renewable energy supply
The proposed method to decide the supply of each renewable energy source
to the day-ahead market depends on the ability of the bidding area agent to
forecast intra-day and real-time market clearing prices, to forecast intra-day and
real-time market liquidity and to forecast imbalance settlement prices. Given
these values, the bidding area agent stochastically calculates the expected cost
associated to submitting a renewable quantity to the MO. These costs are
subsequently fed to the Unit Commitment (UC) and Economic Dispatch (ED)
problem to determine which renewable quantity should be submitted in order
to maximise total profit. The more accurate the estimation of these parameters,
the better-performing the stochastic optimisation becomes.
Due to the numerical instability and lack of validation of intra-day, real-
time and imbalance settlement parameters as received from the externally
developed OPTIMATE modules, the stochastic optimisation is not activated
during simulation. Additionally, the dynamic learning of parameters R(kr, t),
R(kr, t), H(kr, t) and H(kr, t) used in equations (3.61)-(3.64) is not activated
although it has been designed and implemented.
Consequently, parameters R(kr, t), R(kr, t), H(kr, t) and H(kr, t) are user-
defined in the current version of the agent-based simulator. Their values
remain static during simulation runtime.
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6.2.2.3 Learning whether to behave strategically
Figure 6.5 illustrates the process carried out by the bidding area agent to
evaluate whether the status decision was justified. After receiving feedback from
the MO, the bidding area agent performs a ”what-if” analysis to find out what
the market clearing price would have been if it would have submitted price-
quantity pairs under the assumption of behaving competitively or strategically
during all market rounds. The ”what-if” analysis is carried out by matching
the hypothetically submitted price-quantity pairs with the actually emerged
residual demand curve. Although this matching process might not resemble the
matching algorithm used by the MO, relevant conclusions are drawn.
The matching results in three comparable profit values: actually emerging profit
obtained by the pursued offering strategy, hypothetically emerging profit if the
bidding area agent would have acted strategically during all market rounds, and
hypothetically emerging profit the bidding area agent would have received if it
acted competitively during all market rounds.
In case the profit that would have been obtained if the competitive set of
price-quantity pairs were submitted, is larger than the actually obtained profit,
competitive behaviour is reinforced for all market rounds in which the bidding
area agent behaved strategically. Indeed, the evaluation suggests the bidding
area agent has incurred higher losses by behaving strategically during these
market rounds. Analogously, in case the profit resulting from submitting the
strategic set of price-quantity pairs is higher than actually obtained, strategic
gaming behaviour is reinforced for all market rounds in which the bidding area
agent behaved competitively. Lastly, in case the obtained profit is maximum,
no status is reinforced. In case the obtained profit is minimum, both the
competitive and strategic gaming behaviour are equally reinforced to prevent
premature convergence.
Each status reinforcement is stored in a database along with the value of the
emerging market clearing price, the injected renewable energy and the market
round type. The emerging market clearing price determines which plants are
eligible for dispatch, the market round type indicates the effect of intertemporal
constraints on the dispatch schedule as submitted by competitors and the
injected renewable energy influences both competition and prices by reducing
the participation per segment of conventional generation plant (Sensfuß et al.,
2008). All three interdependent values affect the status behaviour to pursue.
Historic status reinforcements are considered to give insights in which behaviour
to pursue during future market rounds. Figure 6.6 illustrates the status decision
process for future market rounds. Firstly, the database with historic status
reinforcements is processed to retrieve all relevant historic reinforcements. The
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Figure 6.6: Decision process for selecting the status to pursue
bidding area agent is assumed to use a standard statistical hypothesis testing
technique to determine whether historic information is relevant: if the historic
market clearing price is not rejected by the future market round’s price forecast
distribution at a 100α% significance level, if the historic renewable energy
injection level is not rejected by the future market round’s renewable injection
forecast distribution at a 100β% significance level, and if the historic market
round type equals the market round type of the future market round, the
historic status reinforcement is considered relevant. The values of α and β are
user-defined per bidding area agent.
Once all relevant historic status reinforcements have been retrieved, the binomial
status forecast distribution is built by the bidding area agent. According to the
properties of this distribution, the decision on which status to pursue during
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the future market round is randomly drawn. In order for the distribution to be
sufficiently accurate before guiding the decisions of the bidding area agent, it
must be minimally composed of a user-defined number of instances. In order
for the bidding area agent to flexibly adapt its behaviour, older instances are
omitted. All parameters are user-defined per bidding area agent.
6.2.2.4 Learning the residual demand curve scenarios
The bidding area agent receives information from the MO on its accepted
dispatch schedule and the emerged market clearing price per market round.
This information is stored in a database from which the bidding area agent
retrieves relevant historically observed residual demand curves when facing the
problem of creating a residual demand curve forecast distribution for a future
market round (figure 6.7).
Although many MOs already anonymously feedback the aggregated supply and
demand curves, even without feedback, the assumption is still justified. The
portfolio dispatch level and emerging market clearing price reveal a single point
of the residual demand forecast distribution. More than two decades of market
experience justify the assumption that generators have sufficient data available
to create such residual demand forecast distribution (Baker & Bresnahan, 1988).
To save computation time while running each simulation and because it is more
and more common in reality, the supply and demand curves are considered
published by the MO to all bidding area agents active in the area.
Each stored residual demand curve is accompanied by the value of the emerging
market clearing price, the renewable energy supply and the market round type.
Similar to the approach used in 6.2.2.3, the emerging market clearing price
determines which competing plants are eligible for dispatch, the market round
type indicates the effect of intertemporal constraints on the dispatch schedule
as submitted by competitors and the injected renewable energy influences both
competition and prices by reducing the participation per segment of conventional
generation plant (Sensfuß et al., 2008).
Historic residual demand curves are considered similar to the future anticipated
residual demand curve in case (1) the historic market clearing price is not
rejected by the price forecast distribution at a 100α% significance level, (2)
the historic renewable energy injection level is not rejected by the renewable
injection forecast distribution at a 100β% significance level and (3) the historic
market round type equals the market round type of the future market round.
The values of α and β are user-defined. Although more complex classification
techniques could be implemented to more accurately determine similar residual
demand curves, this would come at a higher computation cost.
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Figure 6.7: Decision process for selecting residual demand curve forecast
scenarios
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The residual demand forecast distribution consequently consists of all relevant
residual demand curves. In order to be sufficiently accurate before guiding the
decisions of the agent, the distribution has to be composed of a user-defined
minimum number of residual demand curve instances. Similarly, in order for
the agent to have a recent distribution available, more historic instances are
removed from the residual demand curve forecast distribution in favour of recent
ones. This minimum threshold parameter is user-defined.
Once all similar residual demand curves have been selected, the residual demand
curve forecast distribution is determined. The N1 residual demand curve
forecast scenarios are drawn from a 100δ% confidence interval of this distribution
according to selected percentile values, as denoted by
p%(n1) =
1− δ
2
+ (n1 ∗ δ
N1 − 1
) (6.1)
All mentioned parameters are user-defined. Since each residual demand forecast
scenario represents an opportunity for gaining revenue, the relevant historic
residual demand curves are sorted according to their integral value. The integral
of the curve is taken up to the maximum available capacity of all equipment
in the portfolio of the bidding area agent since the remainder of the residual
demand curve is irrelevant in terms of revenue.
6.2.2.5 Accounting for crossborder trade
The bidding area agent receives, from the MO, information on the emerged
market clearing price in its own bidding area per market round. Market clearing
prices from other bidding areas in the geographical scope of the simulator
are also publicly available. Based on this information, it is able to assess the
crossborder trade from its own perspective. The goal when accounting for
crossborder trade is therefore not to estimate how much power is exchanged
between bidding areas, but rather to estimate how much potential the bidding
area agent itself has to export or how much import threat it is subject to, as
only these parameters affect its action domain.
Considering one branch connecting two neighbouring bidding areas, the export
opportunity or import threat is revealed by assessing the difference in quantity
between the hypothetical isolated bidding area and the actually emerging
interconnected case. Data on the emerging case is obtained from the feedback
on emerging market clearing prices, the hypothetical one from feedback of the
supply and demand curves published by the MO.
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Figure 6.8: Example of reinforcing crossborder trade
For instance, consider the residual demand curves in figure 6.8. The residual
demand curve on the left belongs to the bidding area further denoted as first
bidding area; the one on the right belongs to the second bidding area. Two
competing bidding area agents are active, one in each bidding area. Both
bidding areas are assumed to be coupled by a transmission line with unlimited
capacity and the portfolio is assumed to have no dispatching costs. These
assumptions are only meant for simplification without loss of generality. The
shaded regions indicate the anticipated revenue by each bidding area agent.
The difference in emerging market clearing price between the hypothetical case
(λ ′(·)) and the actually emerging one (λ(·)) reveals whether there is a potential
export opportunity or import threat. In case the price in the hypothetical case
is lower than or equal to the actually emerging one, it is in the best interest of
the bidding area agent to continue its participation in exporting. By increasing
its supply, it could attain a larger volume of sold energy, while the emerging
market clearing price in its own bidding area increases up to the market clearing
price as emerged in the neighbouring bidding area. Exporting therefore has a
beneficial impact on its profit.
The full export opportunity of the bidding area agent is deducted from the
observed residual demand curves. The bidding area agent in the second bidding
area perceives it has a potentially unexplored export opportunity since the
actually emerging price equals the hypothetical one. By assessing at which
hypothetical exports the hypothetical price λ ′(·) emerges, the bidding area agent
determines the possible range of export opportunities (figure 6.9). This range
corresponds to any possible export. The reinforced export value is uniformly
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Figure 6.9: Evaluating export opportunities and import threats
drawn from this range as the export opportunity the bidding area agent can
expect. The price associated to the export opportunity is set at the market
clearing price of the neighbouring bidding area.
In case the price in the hypothetical case is higher than the actually emerging
one, it is in the best interest of the bidding area agent to avoid engaging into
competition with bidding area agents located in neighbouring bidding areas.
Although this action results in less volume of energy sold, the resulting congestion
of transmission lines connecting its own bidding area with the exporting ones
would maintain a higher-than-competitive market clearing price. Congestion
leads to a dominant local market position which in turn increases market power
potential, offsetting the loss from reducing its supply. In case this response fails
to offset the loss, the bidding area agent reconsiders whether strategic gaming
behaviour leads to higher profits (section 6.2.2.3).
By assessing at which hypothetical imports the actual price λ(·) emerges, the
bidding area agent determines the possible range of import threats. The import
threat reinforcement is randomly drawn from this range. The price associated
to the import threat is set at the market clearing price of the own bidding area.
This process (figure 6.10) is carried out for each branch connecting the agent’s
bidding area. All reinforcements are aggregated to obtain a crossborder import
or export price-quantity curve which is stored in a database together with the
emerging market clearing price in the agent’s own bidding area, the injected
renewable energy and the market round type.
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Figure 6.10: Calculating the import threat and export opportunity price-
quantity pair
Historic crossborder trade assessments are considered to shed light on future
crossborder trade if the historic market clearing price is not rejected by the price
forecast distribution at a 100α% significance level, the historic renewable energy
injection level is not rejected by the renewable injection forecast distribution
at a 100β% significance level and the historic market round type equals the
market round type of the future market round. In order for the distribution
to be sufficiently accurate when guiding the decisions of the agent, it must be
composed of a minimum threshold of reinforcements. In order for the bidding
area agent to flexibly adapt its behaviour, more historic instances are omitted
when creating the distribution.
Once all relevant crossborder import or export assessments have been selected,
the crossborder trade forecast distribution is built by the bidding area agent
(figure 6.11). The F crossborder trade scenarios are drawn from a 100δ%
confidence interval of this distribution according to selected percentile values
denoted by
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Figure 6.11: Decision process for selecting the best-response crossborder trade
scenarios
p%(f) = 1− δ
2
+ (f ∗ δ
F− 1
) (6.2)
6.2.3 Holding company
The holding coordinates the actions of its bidding area agents and control area
agents in order to maximise the total profit on the holding level. Since the
scope of strategic gaming behaviour is limited to the day-ahead market, only
the discussion of the coordination between bidding area agents is relevant.
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Figure 6.12: Coordinating export opportunities and import threats
Crossborder cooperation between bidding area agents belonging to the same
holding is achieved by sharing perceptions on competitors’ behaviour. The
agents’ perception of crossborder trade located in interconnected bidding areas
is in this respect reported to the holding. The holding is then able to interpret
misalignments in individual bidding area agents’ perceptions on crossborder
trade and is able to correct them before a decision has been made. Consequently,
instead of integrating a single crossborder price-quantity pair reinforcement per
bidding area (section 6.2.2.5), each bidding area agent integrates the actually
exchanged price-quantity curves.
Figure 6.12 illustrates the coordinated approach. The dashed residual demand
curve in the importing bidding area illustrates the corrective action in case both
bidding area agents belong to the same holding. The corrective action consists
of inserting the potentially imported price-quantity pairs up to the point where
both hypothetical prices λ ′(·), as anticipated by each bidding area agent, are
equal. Comparing with the initial setup (figure 6.8), the coordination primarily
facilitates convergence towards an equilibrium, if one exists.
Competing holdings are assumed not to share information, thereby eliminating
collusion from the modelling scope. This nevertheless does not necessarily
means that collusive solutions never emerge since learning, even by means of
solely an individual memory, could lead to more collusive solutions given that
the memory is updated with most recent observations (Vallée & Yildizoglu,
2009; Vallée & Yildizoglu, 2013).
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6.2.4 Agents’ interactions
Before the start of each simulation, a timeline consisting of a sequence of market
rounds is created for each bidding area. Market rounds are aggregated in market
sessions with gate closure times denoted in number of market rounds before
the starting time of the first market round belonging to the market session.
Although the implementation allows each market session to be different from
others within the timeline, the current timeline creation assumes all sessions to
be identical in terms of gate closure times and in terms of number of market
rounds, is in line with common practice. Since each bidding area has its own
timeline, market sessions between areas can still differ in properties.
The timeline is the driver of market events and agents’ actions. Instead of
implementing a central sequencing algorithm as in the modularly developed
competitive OPTIMATE simulator, processes can be carried out in parallel
with each other in the agent-based simulator. Such a design has the advantage
of reducing the gap between modelling assumptions and reality. For example,
the latter design allows forecasts to be gradually updated during simulation
runtime, while the former assumes the most recent forecast to be available
before initiating subsequent modules. Depending on the time it takes for future
decision and calculation processes to be finished, the gate closure time might
be reached before the updated price-quantity pairs could be calculated. The
resulting heterogeneous beliefs could lead to an inefficient creation of price-
quantity pairs, which might lead to a suboptimal market coupling solution
which does not accurately reflect underlying market forces (Qiu, 2013).
Figure 6.13 illustrates which actions and decisions the bidding area agent should
undertake during simulation runtime. From a day-ahead perspective, only one
hard deadline has to be complied with by the bidding area agent: the gate
closure time of the day-ahead market session (B). Feedback is received from
the MO after the day-ahead (C) and intra-day (D) market clearing. After the
actual time of delivery (E), information on the imbalance settlement is obtained
from the TSO. This design facilitates scalability and maintenance.
Each of the events trigger the actions of the bidding area agent (figure 6.14).
Once an event triggers the action, the bidding area agent creates one of the
specialised subagents (table 6.1). Consequently, the bidding area agent is
exempted from performing computationally intensive tasks. All subagents
are created per market round in the market session except for the subagents
responsible for creating the price-quantity pairs the bidding area agent has to
submit to the MO.
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Figure 6.13: Decisions and actions the bidding area agent must undertake, in
terms of the agent-based timeline
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Figure 6.14: Actions from the bidding area agent’s perspective
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Name Description
RdcCalculator Calculates the actual residual demand curve
XbExchangeDecider Decides F crossborder trade price-quantity pair
PriceDecider Decides the pairs’ price to submit
RdcScenarioDecider Decides N1 residual demand curve forecast scenarios
QuantityDecider Decides the pairs’ quantity to submit
StatusDecider Decides whether to behave strategically
XbExchangeEvaluator Reinforces crossborder trade assessments
StatusEvaluator Reinforces the status decisions
Table 6.1: Specialised subagents
6.3 Case study
6.3.1 Simulation setup
The case study is retrieved from the published tests carried out to validate the
AMES simulator (Hongyan & Tesfatsion, 2009a; Li et al., 2009). Although the
case study originates from studying the impact of financial transmission rights,
the existence of network constraints and a load pocket renders the case also
useful to study the effects of strategic gaming behaviour (ISO New England,
2002). Study cases applied to alternative dynamic electricity market simulation
tools — such as e.g. Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System (EMCAS)
or PowerACE — did not contain sufficient data to be accurately reproduced
and have therefore not been applied to the presented simulation tool. These
practical limitations have been raised in literature (Weidlich & Veit, 2008).
The case study depicts a dynamic 5-bus system in which five generators and
three utilities operate (figure 6.16). The reactances of the transmission lines
and portfolio characteristics are illustrated in tables 6.2 and 6.3 respectively.
Although thermal plant types were envisaged in AMES, the presented agent-
based simulator models them as hydropower plants with infinite reservoir levels
because of the lack of intertemporal constraints and start-up costs. Demand is
taken from (Shahidehpour et al., 2002c) and represented in figure 6.15.
Three case studies are conducted. The first studies the competitive outcome
and compares the results with these from the AMES simulator. The second
investigates strategic gaming behaviour. The third illustrates how changes
in market design affect the behaviour of generators. Although not a realistic
representation of a real power system, all case studies provide insights on the
validity and applicability of the agent-based model as a policy support tool.
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Figure 6.15: Demand per market round, per bus
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Figure 6.16: Dynamic five-bus test system used to validate the AMES simulator
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Area 1 Area 2 Capacity [MW] Reactance [Ohm]
A B 250 0.0281
A D 150 0.0304
A E 400 0.0064
B C 350 0.0108
C D 240 0.0297
D E 240 0.0297
Table 6.2: Branch characteristics
Agent Bidding area Capacity [MW] Water value [e/MWh]
Alta A 110 14.55
Park City A 100 15.60
LSE1 B 400 NA
Solitude C 520 30.20
LSE2 C 350 NA
Sundance D 200 32.40
LSE3 D 350 NA
Brighton E 600 14.20
Table 6.3: Agents’ characteristics
6.3.2 Results
6.3.2.1 Competitive behaviour
Assuming all bidding area agents behave competitively, the market clearing
prices per market round converge to the values in table 6.4 for each market
round during the market session. Figures 6.17 and 6.18 illustrate the state of
the power system during low and high demand respectively. In both situations,
the transmission lines E-D, A-D and A-B are congested.
During all market rounds, independent on whether demand is low or high, the
congestion of transmission lines A-D and A-B prevent bidding area agents Alta
and Park City from dispatching their more efficient plants at full capacity. As
a result, bidding area agent Solitude is the price-setting generator in areas B, C
and D, as can be seen from the emerging market clearing prices. These results
are in line with the results obtained by the AMES simulator.
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Figure 6.17: State of the system in market round 5 when all bidding area agents
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Figure 6.18: State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding area
agents behave competitively
A B C D E
14.55 30.20 30.20 30.20 14.55
Table 6.4: Market clearing prices in case all agents behave competitively
[e/MWh]
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6.3.2.2 Strategic behaviour
When allowing strategic gaming behaviour using the AMES simulator, the
resulting market clearing prices in areas B, C, D and E are slightly higher than
the ones obtained in the competitive setup in each market round. However,
market power is only exercised significantly in market round 18, with a tenfold
price increase in areas B and C, and a threefold in area D. The AMES simulator
also indicates a decrease in market clearing price in area A down to negative
levels (Hongyan & Tesfatsion, 2009a; Li et al., 2009).
When applying the presented agent-based simulator, strategic gaming behaviour
leads to a convergence in the system state. Explorative behaviour of all
agents however deviates emerging prices away from their equilibrium which
in turn might trigger a temporary price battle. The study’s limited demand
elasticity moreover exacerbates these price variations originating from the
random economic withholding behaviour (section 4.3).
Since the case study investigates the effect of strategic gaming behaviour
on the state of the system, an in-depth discussion on the evolution of the
market clearing prices is omitted. Figures representing the price evolution
when behaving strategically are included in appendix C. Considering the above
properties of the simulator, bidding areas in which large price variations are
consistent over time, are undergoing the exercise of market power.
The identified equilibrium system state during the market round with highest
demand is given in figure 6.19, while table 6.5 illustrates the emerging market
clearing prices. Since the absolute price values themselves only provide a
snapshot of the whole simulation run, the range of emerging values is denoted
instead, in order to deduct relevant conclusions.
When behaving competitively, agent Solitude has a dominant position thanks
to a constrained transmission grid. It is expected to exert its market power
when behaving strategically. This behaviour is indeed observed when comparing
figures 6.19 and 6.18: agent Solitude reduces its supply by 170.44 MW. Only
agent Sundance is capable of filling the resulting supply gap, since more efficient
competitors are restricted in terms of supply by transmission constraints. Market
clearing prices in areas B, C and D are thus determined by a leader-follower
relationship between Solitude and Sundance, in which Solitude sets the price.
The physical withholding strategy is explained by the imposed market ceiling
price, equalling e3000/MWh, and the demand in area C, which is larger than
the capacity of transmission line D-C. During simulation, agent Solitude prefers
to congest transmission line D-C in order to prevent Sundance to impose an
implicit price barrier. Indeed, if Solitude prices its price-quantity pairs higher
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Figure 6.19: State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding area
agents behave strategically
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15.60 ≥30.40 ≥30.40 32.40 15.60
Table 6.5: Market clearing prices in market round 18 in case all agents behave
strategically
than the variable cost of Sundance without pursuing the physical withholding
strategy, the MO would reject the price-quantity pairs at the expense of granting
Sundance dispatch. By pursuing the physical withholding strategy, Solitude
can price its price-quantity pairs at any price.
Agent Sundance cannot exercise a similar strategy to increase the market
clearing price in its own bidding area. Since area D only serves as a transit zone
to supply B and C, it faces competition from Alta, Park City and Brighton. Due
to its variable cost, it is the least efficient market participant. Consequently,
agent Sundance has no choice but to behave competitively.
Agent Brighton’s full capacity is always accepted as it is the most efficient market
player. Alta is the second most efficient supplier but nevertheless exercises
physical withholding due to a transmission capacity bottleneck between areas A
and B. Both players try to explore their strategic opportunities independently.
Agent Brighton observes no benefit from pursuing physical withholding while
agent Alta observes that it does not benefit from pursuing physical withholding
as well as from trying to export to more profitable bidding areas.
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A C
B
240MW
360MW
150MW
250MW
37.16MW
240MW
600MW
55.11MW
205.11MW
40MW
0MW
287.16MW
43.29MW
246.13MW
Figure 6.20: State of the system in market round 5 when all bidding area agents
behave strategically
A B C D E
15.60 ≥32.40 ≥32.40 ≥32.40 15.60
Table 6.6: Market clearing prices in market round 5 in case all agents behave
strategically
Accidentally, synchronised exploration from agents Brighton and Alta triggers
the acceptation of Park City to supply the market. Consequently, market
clearing prices in areas A and E are set by the expensive plant owned by Park
City, allowing Brighton and Alta to benefit from higher prices. The simulator
does not explicitly model collusion, however, the leader-follower relationship in
which the follower sets the price, clearly signals collusion opportunities between
Brighton, Alta and Park City.
As conclusion for market round 18, the market participants setting the price
are the two identified leaders: Solitude and Brighton-Alta. The former obtains
its market power thanks to its unique position in the electricity grid, while the
latter only obtains market power when colluding with Park City.
The identified equilibrium system state during the market round with lowest
demand is shown in figure 6.20, while table 6.6 illustrates the emerging market
clearing prices. Compared with the system state when behaving competitively
(figure 6.17), signals Solitude applying the same offering strategy as during
market rounds with higher demand.
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E
D
A C
B
212.12MW
313.15MW
0MW
313.15MW
135.47MW
0MW
525.27MW
108.32MW
320.44MW
0MW
0MW
448.62MW
520MW
384.53MW
Figure 6.21: State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding area
agents behave competitively in a Flow-Based (FB) market coupling environment
A B C D E
14.55 14.55 30.20 32.40 14.20
Table 6.7: Market clearing prices in case all agents behave competitvely under
FB market coupling
In contrast to the results obtained by applying the AMES simulator, significant
market power is not only limited to market round 18 but actually occurs in
all market rounds. This result is confirmed by interpreting any steady-state
solution of the system and assessing the resulting profit increase compared to
an alternative offering strategy. Additionally, no negative market clearing prices
occur in bidding area E, in line with expectations. The agent-based simulator
hence successfully converges to the optimal offering strategy.
6.3.3 Altering market design parameters
6.3.3.1 Towards flow-based market coupling
Figure 6.21 illustrates the equilibrium system state subject to competitive
behaviour when imposing FB market coupling. Since the highest benefit in
terms of social welfare is achieved by supplying bidding area B with power
supplied by the most efficient supplier Brighton, FB market coupling aims at
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E
D
A C
B
120.44MW
363.21MW
0MW
363.21MW
0MW
0MW
483.65MW
200MW
320.44MW
0MW
0MW
363.21MW
384.53MW
384.53MW
Figure 6.22: State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding area
agents behave strategically in a FB market coupling environment
A B C D E
14.55 3000.00 ≥32.40 32.40 ≤14.55
Table 6.8: Market clearing prices in case all agents behave strategically under
FB market coupling
exploiting the full capacity of lines E-A and A-B. The capacity of line A-B is
increased to 313.15 MW, from 250 MW when imposing Net Transfer Capacity
(NTC) market coupling. As side effect however, no power is transported on line
A-D. The resulting market clearing prices are shown in table 6.7.
Competitive behaviour is not the dominant strategy for agent Solitude to pursue.
The market clearing price in bidding area B is indeed lower than the variable
cost of agent Solitude, which supplies bidding area B by 135.47 MW. Running
the agent-based simulator with strategic gaming behaviour hence results in
agent Solitude to restrict its supply. Physical withholding from bidding area
agent Solitude forces the FB market coupling mechanism to partially shed
demand from Load Serving Entity (LSE) B in order to optimise the social
welfare of the whole geographical scope (figure 6.22). The FB market coupling
mechanism on the other hand increases the supply from bidding area E to B
via transmission lines E-A and A-D even further, compared to the competitive
case, by increasing the capacity from transmission line E-A to 363.21 MW at
the cost of reducing the capacity of transmission line E-D to 120.44 MW.
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This reduction benefits agent Sundance as it is rewarded the dispatch of its full
capacity in order to satisfy residual demand in bidding area D. Consequently,
no generation capacity is available to compete with agent Solitude, granting
the latter the opportunity to become a monopolist in bidding area C.
This test case hence illustrates that the implementation of a measure to increase
overall social welfare could lead to unintended results in case no ex-ante
assessment of its effects in a non-competitive environment has been carried out.
The resulting market clearing prices are given in table 6.8, their evolution in
appendix C. Comparison with the evolution of the prices under NTC market
coupling reveals that the envisaged geographical scope does not clearly benefit
from implementing a different market coupling mechanism. In contrast, the
inability of the whole system to supply total demand, even though sufficient
generation capacity is installed and the unfulfilled demand is priced at the
market ceiling price, rather suggests damaging effects.
6.3.3.2 Imposing market ceiling prices
Another regulatory corrective action consists of reducing the market ceiling
price to more competitive levels. Prices in neighbouring bidding areas indicate
the market ceiling price could be reduced to e32.40/MWh, still higher than any
emerging market clearing price observed when competitive behaviour is assumed
and equal to the variable cost of the most inefficient plant in the system. All
other bidding areas maintain the original market ceiling price.
Applying strategic gaming behaviour, the equilibrium system state presented in
figure 6.23 and the market clearing prices presented in table 6.9 are reached.
The difference in market ceiling price between areas B and C significantly
reduces the incentive for agent Solitude to strategically supply area B. Instead,
agent Solitude’s profit is only increased by behaving almost fully competitively.
Indeed, since transmission lines C-B and D-C are not congested — as Sundance
is never profitably dispatched — creating a local monopoly in bidding area C
is not a viable strategy for agent Solitude to pursue. Indeed, in case Solitude
would reduce its supply, the market clearing mechanism is obliged to shed load
in bidding area B at, from Solitude’s perspective, profitable prices.
Hence, this case study illustrates that lowering the market ceiling price might
be a good regulatory intervention to enforce competitive market clearing prices
in the envisaged environment. The agent-based simulator does however not
take into account any long term inefficiencies caused by artificially removing
the symptom of market power instead of providing a structural solution.
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A C
B
240MW
360MW
150MW
250MW
198.62MW
69.56MW
600MW
0MW
320.44MW
40MW
0MW
448.62MW
513.59MW
384.53MW
Figure 6.23: State of the system in market round 18 when all bidding area agents
behave strategically with a market ceiling price of e32.40/MWh in bidding area
B
A B C D E
15.60 32.40 32.40 32.40 15.60
Table 6.9: Market clearing prices in case all agents behave strategically with a
market ceiling price of e32.40/MWh in bidding area B
6.4 Conclusions
The design of an agent-based simulation platform modelling the operation of the
short-term day-ahead electricity market is presented. Generators are capable of
creating price-quantity pairs to maximise their profits subject to uncertainty.
Each generator submits its step-wise supply curve before gate closure and
dynamically learns from the feedback of the MO. The frequent organisation of
the market allows each agent to gradually explore its action domain to formulate
an optimal offering strategy. The TSO and MO are modelled as centralised
planners, and retailers or large industrial consumers as agents without learning
capabilities and pre-defined actions.
The performance of the model has been validated by applying it to a dynamic
5-bus test system. Comparing the results when assuming either competitive
or strategic gaming behaviour illustrates the validity of implementing such
an agent-based simulator as a decision support tool. Indeed, assuming only
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competitive behaviour results in a system state equilibrium which significantly
deviates from the system state when assuming strategic gaming behaviour. Case
studies illustrating how the state of an interconnected electrical system changes
as a result of an alteration in day-ahead market design, show the capability of
the agent-based simulator to be used as a common framework to facilitate the
convergence towards an efficient European target market design.
Part III
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and
recommendations
A dynamic electricity market model capable of assessing the robustness of market
designs subject to strategic gaming behaviour, has been designed, implemented
and validated. It can be applied to support policy desicion making processes
aiming at facilitating day-ahead cross-border trade between European countries,
ensuring an efficient use of the limited network capacity and massively integrating
Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in the grid. Such common platform facilitates
the convergence towards an efficient European market, currently difficult due
to the involvement of many stakeholders with conflicting interests and the long
term uncertain consequences in case a design decision is taken.
This chapter provides a synthesis of the presented work and addresses its central
research question. Section 7.1 summarises the added value of each chapter in
addressing the research questions and lists their contributions. The importance
of each contribution from the perspective of the central research question is
clarified. Section 7.2 presents the practical impact of the research, both in terms
of the short-term future of the competitive simulator developed during the
OPTIMATE1 project and in terms of how the presented agent-based simulator
affects the commercialisation of the OPTIMATE simulator. Limitations are
discussed in section 7.3 and recommended future work in section 7.4.
1Open Platform to Test Integration in new MArkeT designs of massive intermittent Energy
sources dispersed in several regional power markets (OPTIMATE)
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7.1 Summary, contributions and conclusions
7.1.1 Summary per chapter
Chapter 1 introduces the motivation for researching how the market design
affects the state of an interconnected electrical system after clearing the day-
ahead market, as organised under the European Power Exchange (PX) model,
given that generators do not necessarily behave competitively. The unanticipated
results encountered after the liberalisation of the electricity market at the end of
the 20th century indeed debunk the assumption that electricity markets naturally
produce competitive results. The failure to create competitive electricity markets
has been attributed to network constraints, few dominant sellers in a relatively
small market, market designs that encourage strategic gaming behaviour, price-
inelastic consumers, reductions in generation capacity, unavailability of perfect
information provided in real-time, and a lack of transparent market instruments
to express technical constraints and portfolio economics.
All causes mentioned of inefficient use of available resources are an input to
the decision making process of market participants. Since a liberalised market
changes the objective of generators from an obligation to supply demand at
least cost to a choice to supply demand profitably, chapter 2 presents important
current and target market design parameters influencing the profit-maximising
behaviour of a generator. Market design parameters impact the generator’s
behaviour on three domains: its domestic market environment, influences by
cross-border exchanges and RES supply uncertainty. Integrating the identified
market design parameters when designing the profit-maximising behaviour of a
generator ensures the practical applicability of the offering strategy.
The strategic gaming behaviour of a generator is formally described as a two-
step process. The generator first calculates the portfolio’s scheduling solution
by means of a price-based Unit Commitment (UC) and Economic Dispatch
(ED) problem formulation (chapter 3). In the second step, the scheduling
solution is translated to a set of price-quantity pairs (chapter 4). The offering
strategy is approached from the perspective of strategic and flexible dispatch,
as required from a generator in an electricity system characterised by massive
RES integration. Modelling the flexible dispatch is shown to augment the
profit of a generator in electricity systems with medium to high price volatility.
The offering strategy presented outperforms alternative strategies in both a
competitive and an oligopolistic environment by successfully hedging profit risks.
Since massive RES integration is expected to increase price volatility, modelling
the flexible dispatch further gains importance, rendering the presented strategy
more dominant to pursue compared to the introduced alternative ones.
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The offering strategy itself is categorised as a supply function equilibrium model.
In order to dynamically simulate the operation of an electricity market, it must
be complemented by an evolutionary model. Chapter 5 presents the motivation
for selecting multi-agent systems to model the evolution of the behaviour of
individuals within a population. It also indicates the criticism such models are
prone to. Although the assumption on the generator’s strategy, action domain
and underlying technical constraints and portfolio economics has been addressed
in chapters 2, 3 and 4, the learning and decision process of exogenous influences
on profit needs to be addressed (chapter 6).
As a result, the presented agent-based simulation platform models the operation
of the short-term day-ahead electricity market in which each generator gradually
explores its best-response actions thanks to the repetitive organisation of the
market. The platform’s performance in terms of final result and convergence
speed has been validated by applying it to a dynamic five bus system in order
to test how the market design affects the state of an interconnected electrical
system after clearing the day-ahead market, as organised under the European
PX model, given that generators do not necessarily behave competitively.
7.1.2 Conclusions and contributions
Two decades of deregulation, gaining experience, and reforms were needed
to gradually adapt the initially instated market designs — introduced after
the transformation of the electricity system from a monopolistic environment
to a liberalised one — in order to mitigate unanticipated emergent strategic
gaming behaviour. In the European context, this resulted in a variety of co-
existing, complex market designs. Currently, a new transformation around three
policy pillars is in progress: integrating RES, maintaining system reliability
and security, and creating a pan-European market to guarantee affordable
electricity prices. Keeping the early experiences after liberalisation in mind,
how generators could behave strategically in such future electricity system needs
to be studied. This research question is addressed in part I.
In order to detect potential unanticipated emergent strategic gaming behaviour
ex-ante, a hybrid model consisting of an evolutionary model complemented
by a detailed supply function equilibrium model is designed, implemented
and validated. Such hybrid model is argued to produce results close to
the observations in reality. How the market design affects the state of an
interconnected electrical system after clearing the day-ahead market, given that
generators do not necessarily behave competitively, cannot be investigated with
existing tools. Part II addresses the lack of such dynamic simulation tool.
The state-of-the-art is advanced in five domains:
148 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Generators own a portfolio consisting of thermal, hydropower and RES
plants. In comparison, existing models threat either only thermal plants
or a combination of RES and hydropower plants. This contribution is
presented in chapter 3 presenting a novel coordinated UC and ED Mixed-
Integer Linear Problem (MILP) model of a global, modern portfolio.
2. Both a transmission grid with limited capacity as well as price-responsive
demand is modelled. As shown in chapter 3, the price-responsive demand
is realistically modelled as step-wise decreasing curves. The influence of
the limited transmission grid has been validated in chapter 6.
3. Generators pursue a total profit-maximisation objective by simultaneously
exercising the physical and economic withholding strategy while explicitly
taking into account underlying technical constraints and plant economics.
The scheduling problem has been validated in chapter 3, while the novel
profit risk hedging offering strategy is validated in chapter 4. The
consideration of portfolio flexibility to mitigate profit risks is proven to
yield a higher total profit when benchmarked against alternative strategies.
4. Each generator updates its perception on which it supports its strategic
decisions by evaluating the performance of historic decisions on its profit.
Four learning and decision processes have been designed along the three
dimensions identified in chapter 2: domestic market environment, influence
of crossborder exchanges on profit and RES supply uncertainty. The design
of each learning and decision process is presented in chapter 6.
5. By explicitly taking into account relvant market design parameters, the
agent-based simulation platform is capable of anwering research questions
existing electricity market simulation tools cannot address. Important
market design parameters have been identified in chapter 2, while chapter
5 illustrates the limitation of alternative dynamic electricity market
simulators to only simulate how the pricing scheme affects the state
of an interconnected electrical system after clearing the day-ahead market.
The above-mentioned contributions result in the development of a new dynamic
agent-based electricity market model. Although the model does not address the
question which market design is optimal, it does address how robust a specific
market design is subject to strategic gaming behaviour.
Considering the coming transformation of the electricity system, all stakeholders
are in need of such common simulation platform in order to facilitate the
convergence in terms of policy decisions aiming at (1) facilitating cross-border
exchanges between European countries in the day-ahead, intra-day and balancing
markets, (2) ensuring an efficient use of the limited network capacity and (3)
massively integrating RES.
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7.2 Practical impact
7.2.1 Future of the competitive OPTIMATE tool
Since its release in spring 2013, the competitive simulator developed during
the OPTIMATE project is being made commercially available in its prototype
form for European Transmission System Operators (TSOs), regulators, public
entities, and research units. Although Réseau de Transport d’Électricité (RTE)
is conducting the exploitation, the developed modules ’Bids & Offers to Market’
and ’Final Program’ are still owned by KU Leuven.
Access to the simulation platform can be purchased on an annual basis. A
license to access the web platform costs e1.7k per year and includes technical
user support and access to relevant documentation. Once a license is obtained,
the user is granted access to the online simulation platform where it can define
custom scenarios and visually interpret the final results.
In order to enable both experienced users and beginners to start using the
simulation platform, training sessions are regulary scheduled. Their goal is to
get acquainted with the functional aspects of the tool as well as to understand
the platform’s results. Group studies are also conducted on topics selected by
the participants in order to facilitate user discussions on market design. The
commercialisation of the tool is still ongoing and is likely to lead to a faster,
more modular version of the platform by mid 2015.
The simulation platform has already received widespread interest from the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-
E), individual TSOs and national administrations of Energy. The simulator is
also deployed within the EU-FP7 project GARPUR, whose objective is to design,
develop, and assess new system reliability criteria and management processes
while maximising social welfare, with the aim to progressive implementation
over the coming decades at a pan-European level.
7.2.2 Impact of the agent-based simulator
Although the competitive OPTIMATE simulator already represented a
breakthrough in terms of electricity market modelling, the results obtained by
the presented agent-based dynamic electricity market model show significant
differences. These differences in results originate not only from the implemented
strategic gaming behaviour, but also from the differently implemented
competitive behaviour (chapter 4).
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OPTIMATE aimed at developing a simulation tool to provide a commonly
agreed upon modelling framework in order to facilitate the collaboration and
discussion between policy makers and other stakeholders. Since the agent-based
simulation platform reveals more information on the robustness of market
designs than simply assuming competitive behaviour, discussions are ongoing
between KU Leuven and RTE to transfer the exploitation rights of the presented
agent-based simulation platform. The agent-based simulation platform will then
be available to users of the OPTIMATE tool.
7.3 Model limitations
Although the model is able to grasp aspects of the complexity of the electricity
market, assumptions are made which impact the model’s results and the
conclusions that can be drawn. The limitations mentioned should be taken into
account when interpreting the outcome of the model.
7.3.1 Behaviour of TSOs
The TSO carries out three main tasks: short run management of network
externalities2, coordination of neighbouring TSOs for cross-border trade, and
long term management of network investments (Rious et al., 2008). The first
two tasks are most important within the scope of the energy market.
Network externalities are handled by reserving generation capacity for redispatch
purposes or by counter trading3, coordination of cross-border trade by imposing
limits which are considered constraints during market coupling. These security
norms are however not stable due to the nature of power flows and variable line
capacity limits. The congestion signal is a variable, complex and non-transparent
constraint and may be easily manipulated for monetary purposes. The TSO may
e.g. favour a simple market splitting or reduce cross-border trade over costly
counter-trading to solve an internal congestion (Glachant & Pignon, 2005), or
over-estimate the amount of reserve requirements it needs. This behaviour in
turn creates incentive misalignment and affects the coordination between TSOs,
who already rely on incomplete and asymmetric information.
2Network externalities mainly consist of congestion and losses, but can e.g. also include
voltage constraints.
3Counter-trading refers to the voluntary adjustment market, in which generators submit
price-quantity pairs to the TSO in order to deviate from their dispatch schedules resulting
from the day-ahead market.
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Although no evidence of such behaviour has been observed in practice, the
current modelling assumption of perfectly coordinated TSOs, who base their
decisions on complete and symmetric data as if they do not have a financial
stake, is an ideal behaviour (Vandezande et al., 2008). Although such behaviour
might be expected in practise because TSOs are strictly regulated, lack of
transparency and confidentiality of information render accurate monitoring
difficult. Consequently, although the behaviour of TSOs generally tends towards
the ideal, strategic gaming behaviour cannot be ruled out in complex cases
where such behaviour leads to significantly lower costs. Such cases are more
likely to occur in an environment characterised by massive RES integration
so that the results of the model will over-estimate the efficient utilisation of
resources and the degree of price convergence, and under-estimate the level of
strategic gaming behaviour of market participants.
7.3.2 Intra-day and balancing markets
The scope of strategic gaming behaviour of market participants is limited
to the operation of the day-ahead spot market, given they are considered
as a reference for all other transactions. No strategic gaming behaviour is
modelled in simulataneously organised automatic generation control, reserve or
capacity markets, nor are intra-day and balancing markets modelled. Instead,
intertemporal arbitrage is assumed to already have been carried out.
This arbitrage can however increase strategic gaming behaviour. From this
respect, the arbitrage between the day-ahead and balancing market can be highly
profitable. Enron’s4 ”Richochet” strategy for example consisted of scheduling an
export in day-ahead and then re-importing the power in real time to arbitrage
between the day-ahead and real-time markets (California ISO, 2002).
Other strategies include the ”Fat Boy” strategy, designed to sell power in the
real-time market at the imbalance price by submitting a balanced schedule
to the day-ahead market, consisting of the intended supply and a fictional
demand. When this demand does not occur in real time, the supply is sold as
an imbalance. The imbalance price was guaranteed not to be zero since other
TSOs rarely needed to decrement resources due to chronic underscheduling
by other market participants. The ”Get Shorty” strategy consists of selling
ancillary services in the day-ahead market to buy them in the real-time market.
The incentive to pursue these strategies is greatly reduced by instating forward
load scheduling, 10-minutes settlement periods, and the establishment of capacity
4Enron Corporation was an energy, commodities, and services company based in Houston,
Texas and is a well-known example of willful corporate fraud. Their trading strategies have
played a major role in creating the California electricity crisis.
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obligations on load and generation, among others. Although increased regulatory
intervention also limit such strategic gaming behaviour, one must bear in mind
that intertemporal arbitrage strategies are not explicitly reflected by the model’s
results. This limitation gains in importance in case prices for balancing and
spot prices are largely disconnected. As generators are observed to undersupply
the higher the day-ahead price when exercising strategic gaming behaviour,
structurally biased imbalances will occur, reinforcing the importance of this
limitation (Möller et al., 2011; Vandezande et al., 2010).
7.3.3 Regulatory intervention
Regulatory intervention is currently only taken into account in the form of a
specific market design topology at the beginning of each simulation run. During
simulation, no regulatory influence is assumed, allowing generators to fully
exploit their strategic gaming behaviour. The model can therefore be applied to
investigate how an electricity market could operate and evolve in the short-term,
but not to determine how the electricity market will operate and evolve. The
model is a dynamic simulation tool, not a prediction tool. Observations in
reality will generally show a significantly lower exercise of market power thanks
to the threat of regulatory intervention counteracting the profit-maximising
interests of generators if it exploits its full market power potential.
7.4 Recommended future work
7.4.1 Behaviour of bidding area agents
The presented agent-based simulator models strategic gaming behaviour
of generators. Besides their actions, decisions made by market operators,
transmission system operators, regulators, financial institutions and retail
companies or large consumers affect the outcome of the market. Modelling the
strategic actions of retail companies or large consumers is most relevant as it
enables the simulator to assess unintended consequences of increased consumer
empowerment. Representing behaviour of the Market Operator (MO) and TSO
is however also interesting as the simulator is capable of testing different market
clearing mechanisms or new system reliability criteria respectively.
Secondly, the decisions of the generator — and therefore the convergence rate
to an equilibrium state — are influenced by the implemented learning and
decision process. Although the currently implemented learning and decision
process rapidly and correctly identifies equilibrium system states, more realistic
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evolutions in market clearing prices could be obtained by adding additional
learning loops, e.g. to estimate the probability density function of all historically
accepted price-quantity pair prices, or by adding more advanced learning and
decision processes, such as neural networks or fuzzy logic.
7.4.2 Perimeter definition of the simulator
The scope of the current simulator can firstly be broadened along the dimension
of the market term. Altough strategic gaming behaviour in more short term
markets such as the intra-day and real-time markets are derived from the
decisions made in the day-ahead market, it could also drive the decisions made
during the day-ahead market. Examples of such strategies are the infamous
”inc/dec” and ”Death Star” games in which a generator artificially congests
the transmission grid and is subsequently remunerated for removing the false
congestion during real-time markets (Navarro & Shames, 2003).
Similarly, long term contracts are suspected to increase short-term market
power by limiting opportunities for market entry. On the other hand, long-term
contracts can provide efficient solutions to support investments in different
generation technologies with high capital intensity (Glachant et al., 2011).
Modelling potential strategic gaming behaviour on the long-term market could
therefore provide the simulation tool the ability to assess the trade-off between
long- and short-term market efficiency.
The scope can also be broadened along the market type dimension. Besides
energy markets, a mature wholesale market additionally consists of capacity
markets, infrastructure capacity markets and emission markets .
7.4.3 Scenario generation
The agent-based simulator has been applied to academically interesting
validation cases. Within the OPTIMATE project, access-restricted data on
the European power system has been gathered. The competitive OPTIMATE
simulator has therefore already been applied to a realistic representation of the
Central Western European (CWE) region. Consequently, once the agent-based
simulator has been integrated on OPTIMATE’s servers, these realistic scenarios
can be assessed by the agent-based simulator.
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Belgium France The Netherlands
power exchange Belpex EPEX SPOT Power NL
market operator APX EPEX SPOT SE APX
bidding type portfolio portfolio portfolio
time granularity hourly hourly hourly
floor price e−3000/MWh e−3000/MWh e−3000/MWh
ceiling price e3000/MWh e3000/MWh e3000/MWh
coupling method ATC ATC ATC
coupling type price price price
instruments
limit limit limit
block block block
market market
max # pairs – 256 –
min # pairs – – –
max # complex 2500MW/hour 40 –
quantity granularity 0.1MWh 0.1MWh 0.1MWh
price granularity e0.01/MWh e0.1/MWh e0.01/MWh
curves published? yes yes yes
gate closure time 11h00 12h00 12h00
Table A.1: Summary of market design parameters for selected West-European
bidding areas
Germany/Austria Switzerland Poland
power exchange EPEX SPOT EPEX SPOT POLPX
market operator EPEX SPOT SE EPEX SPOT SE PGE
bidding type portfolio portfolio portfolio
time granularity hourly hourly hourly
floor price e−3000/MWh e0/MWh –
ceiling price e3000/MWh e3000/MWh –
coupling method ATC ATC ATC
coupling type price price price
instruments
limit limit limit
block block block
market
max # pairs 256 256 –
min # pairs – – 5
max # complex 100 30 –
quantity granularity 0.1MWh 0.1MWh 0.1MWh
price granularity e0.1/MWh e0.1/MWh 0.01zl/MWh
curves published? yes yes no
gate closure time 12h00 11h00 14h20
Table A.2: Summary of market design parameters for selected Central-European
bidding areas
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Denmark/Nordic Iberian Peninsula Italy
power exchange Elspot MIBEL MGP
market operator Nord Pool Spot AS OMI GME
bidding type portfolio unit unit
time granularity hourly hourly hourly
floor price e−200/MWh e0/MWh e0/MWh
ceiling price e2000/MWh e180.3/MWh 3000
coupling method ATC ATC ATC
coupling type price / volume price price
instruments
limit limit limit
block block block
flexible
max # pairs 64 25/unit –
min # pairs – – –
max # complex 50 – –
quantity granularity 0.1MWh 1MWh 0.001MWh
price granularity e0.1/MWh (1kr/MWh)) e0.01/MWh e0.01/MWh
curves published? yes yes
gate closure time 10h00 11h00 9h15
Table A.3: Summary of market design parameters for selected North- and
South-European bidding areas
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Figure C.1: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area A
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market coupling
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Figure C.2: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area A
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling
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Figure C.3: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area B
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market coupling
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Figure C.4: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area B
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling
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Figure C.5: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area C
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market coupling
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Figure C.6: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area C
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling
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Figure C.7: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area D
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market coupling
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Figure C.8: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area D
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling
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Figure C.9: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area E
when behaving strategically under net transfer capacity market coupling
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Figure C.10: Evolution of emerging market clearing prices in bidding area E
when behaving strategically under flow-based market coupling
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